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Japan makes
hesitant move toward Iraq
By Yoichiro
Sato
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
Japan's
parliament has passed the Iraq Humanitarian
Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law (Iraq
Reconstruction Law). The law enables the prime minister
to dispatch Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) to Iraq to
assist the US-led coalition forces there.
Japan
has already sent three of its C-130 transport planes to
Jordan to fly humanitarian aid from Italy under its
peacekeeping operations (PKO) law. GSDF deployment under
the new law will likely start in November. Together with
Japan's naval and air logistical support for the
anti-terror coalition against Taliban/al-Qaeda forces,
the GSDF dispatch to Iraq will mark a new era of
Japanese military activism outside the United Nations
PKO framework.
Between the UN and
US
The bitter lesson from Japan's much-criticized
response to the 1991 Gulf War set the bottom line for
Japanese action, but Tokyo's reliance on US diplomatic
and military support in dealing with the threat of
nuclear weapons by North Korea is pushing Japan toward
further cooperation with the United States. Japan's
interests in the Middle East differ from those of
Washington. Japan's dependence on oil from the region,
its large creditor status vis-a-vis Iraq, the lack of
any role in arms transfers to regional antagonists, its
marginal role in the Israel-Palestinian issue, and
considerable doubt among the Japanese public about the
justification for war against Iraq all provide potential
constraints on Japanese actions. However, alliance
maintenance prevailed above all these concerns.
While the US administration initially refrained
from officially making requests to Japan, informal
communication between the Liberal Democratic Party's
former Policy Affairs Research Council chairman, Kamei
Shizuka, and US Department of Defense officials
highlighted three areas of possible Japanese
contributions: diplomatic support for the military
action, rear support for the military operation, and
postwar reconstruction of Iraq. The dispatch of an Aegis
destroyer to the Indian Ocean under the anti-terror
special measures law (passed in November 2001) was
tacitly understood as an indirect contribution to
relieve a US Aegis destroyer from Afghanistan
operations.
While the United States and the
United Kingdom sought support for their draft UN
resolution to authorize explicitly the use of force
against Iraq, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi offered
only vague support for the UN process without referring
to military actions. This cautious approach robbed Japan
of time to pass new legislation to dispatch SDF in the
war against Iraq. Other dispatch options were
considered, but dropped: normal patrol activities in
international waters under the Self Defense Forces Law
were not needed, and maritime logistical support under
the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law was ruled out, as
alleged links between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda could
not be substantiated. Instead, Japan promised to aid
postwar reconstruction of Iraq. Only after the March 17
ultimatum by US President George W Bush did Koizumi
explicitly support a military attack against Iraq. Then
he cited the need to maintain a credible alliance with
the United States in the face of the immediate North
Korean threat.
The Japanese public has remained
skeptical of the war's legitimacy. Nearly half of the
public opposed the war without a new UN resolution.
However, polls also indicated that a majority perceived
the United States as Japan's most important ally and
threats from North Korea as a justification for
maintaining a strong alliance. Public opposition to the
Iraq war therefore lacked intensity. However, the recent
allegations of intelligence failures are giving strength
to those opposed to GSDF involvement in Iraq's postwar
reconstruction.
Postwar
reconstruction
Japan hoped that the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) would
overcome their differences and agree to a UN-mandated
postwar PKO. That did not happen, as divisions among the
P-5 remain deep. The Japanese government could not
dispatch GSDF to Iraq under the existing PKO law.
Therefore, new legislation became necessary.
The
Japanese government also plans to fold the ongoing
airlift operations by C-130 transport planes into the
new Iraq Reconstruction Law and fly the planes directly
into Baghdad. The firing of a surface-to-air missile at
a US transport plane at Baghdad International Airport
(presumably by Iraqi guerrilla fighters) is likely to
call for a review of this plan.
During the
Bush-Koizumi summit in May, the US side officially
requested 1,000 Japanese ground troops to provide rear
support for the effort to restore domestic order in
Iraq. While Koizumi worked on the enabling legislation,
he emphasized water supply as the main mission of the
GSDF, carefully avoiding details of the deployment plan.
The task was left to the Basic Plan to be approved later
by the cabinet. The reported plan of deploying GSDF near
Baghdad Airport is a Catch-22, as the United States
wants the GSDF to be deployed in the less secure
northern region, while the Japanese public now sees even
the airport as too dangerous. Delaying the deployment
plan to November is based on the anticipated Lower House
election early that month.
The lack of details
worries some legislators. The law left the definition of
"non-combat areas" - to which the GSDF can be deployed -
to the government. Most Japanese see all of Iraq as a
combat area as guerrilla activities against coalition
forces are reported every day. Even some Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) parliamentarians reminded Koizumi
of the need to consult the party before sending the
GSDF, watering down the law that only requires a Diet
(parliament) approval within 20 days of SDF dispatch.
Unlike the Anti-Terror Law, which explicitly barred
transporting weapons and ammunition, the Iraq
Reconstruction Law left such details to the Basic Plan.
The government has been testing and preparing public
opinion by arguing that checking every cargo for weapons
and ammunition (if banned) would be impractical.
Concentrating decision-making power in the prime
minister's office and the Japan Defense Agency through
vaguely written legislation, however, did not give them
unlimited power to expand SDF activities. The limited
Japanese offer indicates that opposition inside and
outside the ruling coalition does check moves that are
too fast or drastic.
Japanese political leaders
have gone the extra distance to cooperate with the
United States despite the perceived lack of
justification for the Iraq war. Koizumi's skills in
bypassing the opposition and persuading the public
greatly contributed to the passage of the Iraq
Reconstruction Law. However, inflated expectations based
on Koizumi's accomplishments will not likely be
fulfilled under a different leadership. US
dissatisfaction with Japan's proposed contributions has
already surfaced in the media. But overt pressure on
Japan at a time of increasing international suspicion
about the legitimacy of the war is counterproductive and
likely to throw Koizumi's baby out with the bath water.
Koizumi's declared effort toward a permanent law, which
would enable overseas SDF dispatch in a coalition of the
willing, with or without UN mandate, will require
careful nurturing.
Dr Yoichiro Sato is
an associate professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii. The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not
reflect the official policy or position of the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Department of
Defense, or the US government. This article is used by
permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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