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Money politics alive and well in
Japan
By Jamie Miyazaki
According to a recent survey by Transparency
International, 52 percent of Japanese identified
political parties as the primary source of corruption in
Japan. Surprisingly, or perhaps worrying, this figure
was second only to Argentina (at 58 percent) and far
ahead of both Colombia and India - both usually
perceived as more politically corrupt.
Unfortunately for speeding motorists, corruption
in Japan is not quite as apparent as the "$20 kickback
to the cops" variant that can be freely experienced on
the streets of Lagos. Instead, the iron triangle among
politicians, big business and bureaucracy that has
dominated postwar Japan's landscape has proved to be an
excellent breeding ground for high-level corruption with
its increasingly visible corrosive effects on society
and the national economy.
Like most problems
bedeviling Japan, which tend to blend together
seamlessly, identifying where corruption begins and ends
is not easy. A cultural emphasis on the giving of gifts,
a high level of interaction among big business,
bureaucracy and politics that has blurred lines of
accountability, and a top-down social structure that
morphed into a curious centralized capitalist command
economy have lent themselves easily to high-level
corruption.
In the past the triangle was a
valuable source of synergy and strength for "Japan Inc".
The symbiotic relationship between the government and
bureaucracy handing out contracts to favored companies,
and these companies in turn throwing their weight behind
government policies, was central to Japan's postwar
economic rebirth. It is now, however, the old guard's
primary mechanism for frustrating reform and their
efforts to stem the fallout of a system in terminal
decline. It is no accident that the sectors that have
received heaviest government and bureaucratic patronage
are Japan's most troubled. Construction, retail,
consulting, insurance and financial-services industries
all stand out as hotbeds of inefficiency and
influence-peddling in the Japanese political landscape.
Japan's latest attempts, passed in 2001, at
drafting tough new anti-corruption laws were as
lackluster as other recent reform-agenda legislation.
The legislation bans holders of public office from
receiving money and gifts in return for favors. The law
applies to members of the Diet, local assemblies,
governors and mayors, as well as their state-paid
secretaries, but crucially does not extend to their
private secretaries. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
also backed down from a proposal to ban political
donations to legislators just two weeks after its first
being touted back in 2001. Misuse of government funds by
Diet members funneling cash to relatives masquerading as
personal assistants - charmingly dubbed "name lending" -
is still considered near-standard practice, as the
recent arrest of opposition politician Kiyomi Tsujimoto
has shown.
Lack of legislation protecting
whistleblowers also makes it hard for corporate
shenanigans to be effectively exposed. Just this month
revelations by a former managing director of TSK, the
country's seventh-largest private health insurer, of
influence-peddling over Social Insurance Agency (SIA)
officers came to light. Yet it took more than seven
months and two "mislaid" letters (later discovered) sent
to the SIA before a letter sent directly by the
whistleblower to the minister of health detailing his
accusations was finally acted upon. Even then the
individual's actions cost him his job; one senior civil
servant at the SIA tellingly revealed to the
whistleblower: "You certainly did a brave thing,
considering you will probably lose your job because of
it."
Senior bureaucrats regularly retire from
their ministries to take up positions at quangos
(quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations) or
major companies from the sectors they were charged with
overseeing - a phenomenon called amakudari,
literally "descending from heaven". "Moral hazard" and
"conflict of interest" don't yet appear to be buzzwords
for most Japanese regulators.
The current fiasco
at the Japan Highway Public Corp, which is slated for
privatization, clearly illustrates the scope for which
malpractice can flourish. Its current head, Haruho Fuji,
was formerly a director general of the Road Bureau at
the Construction Ministry - a strong proponent of
continued roadwork projects despite Japan being covered
with a multitude of superfluous highways, bridges and
hideously loss-making toll roads. Fuji has sidelined
officials in favor of privatizing the body and is
suspected of cooking its accounts to give the impression
of financial well-being, while many independent
observers suspect the body of being mired in debt.
Corruption in the awarding of contracts for
public-works projects is a particular problem for Japan,
where construction firms represent such a
disproportionate share of the economy that Japan has
been nicknamed the kensetsu kokka (the
construction state). Yutaka Inoue, president of the
Upper House, resigned in April 2002 after allegations
that a policy aide received a 64 million yen kickback
from a construction company on a public works project.
(To Inoue's credit, the bribe-receiving aide actually
existed and was not a fabricated individual used to
funnel money to relatives.) Tales of consultancy firms
funneling hundreds of thousands of dollars to
legislators to secure public-works contracts for clients
are widespread.
Legislators themselves often
treat their constituencies as private mini-fiefdoms.
Senior Liberal Democratic Party politician Takami Eto, a
noted ally of Haruho Fuji, announced his decision to
retire from the Diet this October and promptly appointed
his eldest son as the constituency's next LDP candidate.
Suggestions of primaries and open application systems to
make the selection process more transparent were quickly
dismissed by Eto as "completely outrageous". But in
terms of no-holds-barred malpractice, few figures though
can compete with former LDP politician Suzuki Muneo.
After he was arrested last year on charges of accepting
bribes from logging companies in his constituency, it
was revealed that Muneo had also tried to influence
Japan's foreign and development aid policy to Russia
over a number of disputed islands for the benefit of a
construction firm.
The media are unfortunately
not particularly effective in stirring things up either:
informal alliances between exclusive press clubs and key
government ministries also hamper accountability, with
journalist clubs often holding press conferences for
their affiliated ministries. This has upset the European
Union, which has been pressing for the 800 or so press
clubs to be scrapped, calling them "restraints on the
free trade in information".
While giri
(obligation) is a virtue that is heavily stressed in
Japanese society, accountability appears not to be one
registering on too many politicians or bureaucrats'
radars. This lack of accountability and transparency is
a key factor in the constant stream of scandals that
Japan churns out. Interestingly, this week saw the
merging of two main opposition parties. Naoto Kan, the
party's new leader, no doubt hopes to emulate the
electoral success of Italy's Olive Tree coalition that
was meant to mark a watershed in the nation's corrupt
political history. Japan's newest and largest opposition
party aims to provide a unified alternative to the
incumbent LDP, which is seen as the champion of money
politics.
In the unlikely event the LDP is voted
out of office, politicians such as Muneo can at least
take comfort from developments in Italy. Silvio
Berlusconi, defeated by the Olive Tree coalition back in
1996, went on to survive a slew of major corruption
scandals, only to bounce back into the presidency once
more and successfully pass a bill preventing prosecution
for corruption of the president when still in office.
Disappointed Colombian and Indian politicians should
take note: money politics, it seems, is still alive and
well in Japan at least.
(Copyright 2003 Asia
Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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