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Why states want nuclear
weapons
By Erich Marquardt
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, one
of the leading foreign-policy interests of powerful
states has been to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
Leading powers that have nuclear capability - or that
are allied with nuclear-armed states - have put pressure
on non-nuclear states to prevent them from developing
and acquiring nuclear weapons. While no one state has a
global nuclear monopoly, nuclear-armed states want to
preserve their power over non-nuclear states. The reason
that nuclear-armed countries have power over non-nuclear
countries is that there are fewer risks involved in
attacking non-nuclear states versus attacking
nuclear-armed states.
When a state acquires
nuclear weapons, the cost of invading that state
increases, making it more difficult and expensive for
the invader to gain a military edge. For example, in the
early 1980s Iraq was developing a nuclear reactor for,
at least in part, energy purposes; however, the only
nuclear-armed state in the region, Israel, feared that
Iraq's reactor would be used to develop nuclear weapons.
Israel correctly assumed that if Iraq were to acquire
nuclear weapons, Israel would lose its nuclear monopoly
in the Middle East and thus likely lose foreign-policy
leverage with other countries in the region. Therefore,
since Iraq did not yet have nuclear weapons, in 1981
Israel was able to launch a successful military strike
on the Iraqi nuclear reactor without the fear of a
powerful retaliation.
After that strike,
according to Iraqi nuclear scientists, Iraq hastened its
mission to develop nuclear weapons. The Iraqis realized
that the only way to increase their leverage with their
rivals - such as Iran and Israel - was to acquire such
weapons, knowing full well that this would make it much
more difficult for rival states to threaten or attack
Iraq. This same reason may be why the Ba'ath Party
leadership was unwilling to allow United Nations weapons
inspectors complete access to every part of Iraq: the
ambiguity surrounding its weapons program could have
theoretically increased Baghdad's foreign-policy
negotiating power.
This ambiguity can also be
seen in current North Korean foreign policy. Ever since
the election of US President George W Bush, whose
administration publicly considers North Korea a threat
that may require "regime change", Pyongyang has sent out
a dizzying amount of confusing signals regarding its
nuclear program. The purpose of such dubious statements
is likely to create the perception that North Korea is
possibly a nuclear-armed state. As long as powerful
rival states, such as the United States and Japan, are
unclear about North Korea's nuclear program, they will
have to be careful before deciding to take military
action against the country.
As these two
examples illustrate, nuclear-armed states work to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in order to
preserve their power and increase their foreign-policy
leverage. States without nuclear weapons, on the other
hand, may strive to acquire nuclear weapons in order to
increase their power and foreign-policy leverage, while
also protecting their own country from military attacks
by outside major and minor powers.
There are
diverging opinions over which state of affairs is better
for world order: more nuclear-armed states, or fewer
nuclear-armed states. In theory, if every state had
nuclear capability, countries would be unwilling to
attack one another out of fear of "mutual assured
destruction" (MAD). It is unlikely that states would be
willing to use their nuclear weapons if they knew they
would be a victim of a retaliatory nuclear attack. This
reality caused former US defense secretary Robert
McNamara to say that nuclear weapons "are totally
useless - except to deter one's opponent from using
them". In addition to preventing nuclear attacks, if all
states were nuclear-armed it could theoretically limit
the amount of conventional conflict, as there would be
much more risk to take into account before deciding to
attack a rival nuclear-armed state.
For others,
the ideal situation would be to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons until they could finally be phased out
altogether. However, this goal is unrealistic, as states
without nuclear weapons will continue to try to acquire
them in order to increase their foreign-policy leverage.
Furthermore, if nearly all nuclear weapons were
eliminated, one state could possibly develop a global
nuclear monopoly and thus become extremely powerful on
the world stage. Since the development of nuclear
weapons in 1945, the only country that has had such a
monopoly was the United States during the brief period
of 1945-49. However, by no means did the United States
have nuclear superiority during this time, as it lacked
adequate delivery capabilities in addition to having an
extremely limited quantity of nuclear weapons.
Current US foreign policy basically follows the
latter approach. The United States, along with its
allies and other powerful nuclear-armed states, has
worked to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, while also
attempting to coax rival nuclear-armed states into
relinquishing their nuclear weapons. Despite its
attempts, Washington has been careful to leave some of
its important allies with nuclear weapons in order to
preserve the balance of power in certain regions.
Israel, for example, is a state that has nuclear weapons
with the sanction of the United States. Since Israel is
the only nuclear-armed country in the Middle East, it is
able to keep the current balance of power in the region
tilted toward Israel and its ally, the United States.
The fear of losing control of the Middle East
explains why both the United States and Israel have been
carefully monitoring Iran's nuclear program. Both the US
and Israel fear that if Iran were to acquire nuclear
weapons, the United States and Israel would lose much of
their power and foreign-policy leverage in the oil-rich
region. It also explains why Washington has warned
Pyongyang against developing nuclear weapons, albeit
with weaker rhetoric because East Asia is currently not
as high a priority as the Middle East.
In
conclusion, in the current conditions of world order it
is highly unlikely that a nuclear-armed state would use
nuclear weapons against its rivals. In fact, the only
time that nuclear weapons have been used in combat were
the initial attacks launched by the United States on the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of
World War II. Since then, nuclear weapons have merely
acted as balancing devices used to deter aggression from
rivals, and not as actual weapons. It is for this
purpose that non-nuclear states seek to acquire nuclear
arsenals.
There are signs, however, that this
state of affairs may change. The Bush administration has
been flirting with the idea of developing a new
generation of "tactical" nuclear weapons, often referred
to as "mini-nukes". Officials in the Pentagon and the US
Energy Department have argued that "mini-nukes" could be
effective in destroying hardened bunkers or other
underground targets. If the Bush administration were to
approve the use of "tactical" nuclear weapons, it would
be an attempt to erase much of the stigma associated
with the use of nuclear weapons. If such a policy were
pursued, the distinction between "mini-nukes" and other
nuclear weapons could quickly dissolve.
Furthermore, if the foreign policies of
countries such as the United States continue to become
more aggressive, the rush by non-nuclear states to
acquire nuclear weapons for protective purposes will
increase. Even more daunting, if Washington opens the
door to nuclear-weapon use for offensive purposes,
non-nuclear states will also seek nuclear weapons for
offensive purposes in addition to protective purposes,
possibly igniting a new arms race.
Published
with permission of the Power and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed to content@pinr.com
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