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COMMENTARY
Japan's
ill-advised backtracking on
Iraq
By Yuki Tatsumi
(Used by
permission of Pacific Forum
CSIS)
Last month, Japan passed legislation
that opened the door to sending the Self-Defense Forces
(SDF) for missions in Iraq. In principle, this was a
very positive step forward for those who had hoped to
see Japan play a greater role in international security
affairs.
Since the passage of the legislation,
however, the cabinet of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
seems to be backtracking. It had been suggesting that
Japan's specific contributions to operations in Iraq
might not be determined until November. Now, with the
recent terrorist attack against the United Nations'
headquarters in Baghdad, the decision may come even
later. If Japan remains indecisive in its contribution
in Iraq, despite the now-established legal framework, it
will not only hurt Japan's national interest, but also
could damage its foreign credibility.
There are
several possible reasons why Japan has not yet
determined where and when it will dispatch SDF personnel
in Iraq. Some argue that the security situation in Iraq
is not stable enough for Japan to send SDF in a clearly
defined "non-combatant area". These critics argue that
if the SDF suffers casualties, public opinion in Japan,
which has been growing more supportive of the SDF's
participation in UN peacekeeping operations and
humanitarian disaster relief, could turn against such
missions.
Others argue that Japan's domestic
political schedule - the Liberal Democratic Party's
presidential election in September, followed by the
House of Representatives' election later in the fall -
has made Koizumi politically risk-averse. Koizumi, they
argue, needs to save his political capital for upcoming
domestic political battles, and he cannot afford to make
any decision that could jeopardize his position.
Although somewhat convincing, these views do not
adequately consider Japan's national interest.
Burden-sharing as a US ally is only part of the
rationale. In fact, sending SDF troops to support the
missions in Iraq is not only in Japan's political
interests but also its economic interests.
Japan's heavy dependence on the Middle East for
its energy resources (currently about 88 percent) is a
well-established fact. It is therefore in Japan's
interest to contribute to stability in the Middle East.
How Japan develops its relations with a post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq, a country with largely uncultivated oil
reserves, is critical in its continuous efforts to
diversify energy sources. It is in Japan's interest
therefore to participate in shaping the future of Iraq,
so that Japan will be able to build its own relationship
with a new government in Iraq.
Further,
participation in the reconstruction of Iraq is in
Japan's political interest. While often criticized as
blindly following US policy, Japan in fact has a history
of exercising an independent approach in its policy
toward the Middle East. Disagreement between the two
allies over policy toward Iran is one such example.
Having "boots on the ground" (that is, SDF forces in
Iraq) helps Japan to make an independent assessment of
the Iraqi situation and thus enables Tokyo to formulate
Iraq policy without solely relying on information from
other countries.
Last, it is simply
irresponsible of Japan to continue to rely on other
countries to protect its national interests abroad. The
"war against terrorism" and the war against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global
efforts, and thus every nation in the world has to share
some responsibility in countering these threats. Japan
cannot continue to escape from sharing its due
responsibility by hiding behind an argument that is
understood solely in the context of the Japanese polity.
Some may argue that dispatch of the SDF is not
the only contribution Japan can make in Iraq. This is a
legitimate argument. In fact, it is important for the
Japanese government to come up with a comprehensive
policy toward Iraq. However, it is also a fact that
Koizumi made the dispatch of SDF into a centerpiece of
Japan's contribution to Iraq by publicly stating his
will to pave the way for their dispatch. Now, he has to
follow up on his words.
Of course, the decision
Koizumi and his government make on Japan's contribution
to Iraqi reconstruction will come with a certain degree
of political risk. But Koizumi should not be afraid of
that risk. Instead, he needs to base his decision on his
views on Japan's national interest (not on a domestic
political calendar), and present his case to his fellow
politicians as well as the Japanese public.
The
1991 Gulf War was a traumatic experience for Japan.
Despite its generous financial contribution to the
coalition military operation, Japan was criticized for
its checkbook diplomacy, and the international community
considered its postwar dispatch of minesweepers to be
"too little, too late". More than a decade later,
despite its significant contribution in Operation
Enduring Freedom and the ongoing Afghan reconstruction
efforts, Japan faces the prospect of similar criticism
if it fails to make a robust contribution to the
reconstruction of Iraq. The onus is now on the Koizumi
government whether it can make a difficult decision of
sending SDF troops and thereby sharing risks with other
nations.
Yuki Tatsumi is a research
associate at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, DC. She can be reached at ytatsumi@csis.org.
This article is used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS (e-mail pacforum@hawaii.rr.com).
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