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US-Japan: A question of
perspective
By Brad Glosserman
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
TOKYO
- The conventional wisdom on the other side of the
Pacific is that US-Japan relations are the best they've
ever been. The view is very different in Japan. Here, an
increasing number of voices argue that the benefits of
the relationship only flow one way. On a recent visit, I
was continually challenged to explain just what Japan
was getting out of these "historically good relations".
The questions underlined the unease that influences and
threatens to dominate Japanese security thinking.
In Washington's eyes, the US-Japan relationship
just keeps improving. Some credit the "George-Jun"
friendship shared by the US president and the Japanese
prime minister; longtime alliance watchers say it has
eclipsed the "Ron-Yasu" era of the 1980s, the previous
high-water mark. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
deserves credit for seizing the opportunities that
followed the September 11, 2001, terror attacks and
taking the initiative in ways that no other Japanese
prime minister had. Others note the groundwork laid by
alliance supporters on both sides of the Pacific who
vowed ties would never again be as strained as they were
in the early 1990s. No matter what the cause, the result
is the best relations ever and, according to one US
administration official, Tokyo's "unprecedented
influence" in Washington.
Yet for all the
applause and optimism in the US, there is considerable
unease in Japan. This nervousness takes several forms.
First, there is the feeling that Japan has no
foreign policy of its own and only parrots US positions
on issues. While the US views Koizumi as a loyal ally,
at home he is seen as a lap dog, blindly following US
President George W Bush down whatever path he takes. At
one conference, a Japanese speaker said that Japanese
admire South Koreans for being able to stand up to
Americans. She concluded that the Japanese were
"intimidated" and noted a rising frustration in Japan
arising from the government's lack of a foreign-policy
strategy.
An offshoot of this thinking condemns
the US for pushing Japan continually to do more on
security issues - deploying Maritime Self Defense Forces
(SDF) to the Indian Ocean during the Afghan war
("showing the flag") and sending ground self defense
forces to Iraq (putting "boots on the ground"). These
critics complain that Washington is using the "war
against terrorism", and a pliant prime minister, to
recalibrate the security equilibrium in Japan. Bush
administration hawks are realizing their goal of
creating "a UK in Asia" and pushing Japan to become a
more "normal" nation. The critics believe that Japan
can't say "no" to the US and that Washington sets the
security agenda in Tokyo.
A second concern
focused on US statements about Japan developing a
nuclear arsenal. At just about every stop on my tour,
someone wanted to know what the US really meant when its
politicians said Tokyo should contemplate arming itself
with nuclear weapons. The Japanese see dark forces at
work. In the short term, they believe Washington is
playing that card to force Beijing to take action
against North Korea; in the long term, they see
themselves as pawns in an eventual confrontation with
China.
A third strand involves fear of
abandonment. Several Japanese confessed that Tokyo's
support for the US in Iraq was intended to ensure that
the US heeded Japanese concerns when Washington turned
its attention to North Korea. Japan worries that the US
1) Would not fight to get Japan a seat at the
multilateral negotiations; 2) Might not support Japanese
attempts to get its concerns (especially abductees) on
the agenda; and 3) Might cut a deal that didn't address
Japanese security concerns and left Tokyo with the bill,
as in the Agreed Framework talks.
On one level,
those fears are easy to address. The US is pushing Japan
to contribute to the "war against terror", but US
officials have stressed at every opportunity that only
Tokyo can decide what it will do and that Washington
will respect those decisions. No responsible US
politician with any authority or influence has ever
advocated Japan going nuclear; few developments are
potentially more destabilizing and more counter to US
interests in the region. The US has supported and will
support Japan in the North Korean negotiations because a
failure to do so could rupture the alliance. US
credibility in Asia and elsewhere depends on it being
seen as a responsible ally; a failure to address
Japanese security concerns would undermine the alliance
and Washington's image worldwide. And indeed the US has
staunchly supported Japanese demands throughout the
difficult negotiations with Pyongyang.
It is
encouraging that this insecurity hasn't taken its usual
form. In the past, any signs of Sino-US collaboration
would have prompted considerable nervousness in Japan.
On this trip, however, no one asked whether Washington's
readiness to work with Beijing to solve the North Korean
nuclear problem heralded another era of Japan-passing or
whether closer relations with China would come at
Japan's expense.
There are still reasons to be
worried, however. Tokyo's belief that it has to back the
US in Iraq to make sure it gets a hearing when it comes
to North Korea reveals a disturbing lack of confidence
in the alliance. That insecurity may be unfounded, but
the problem is the perception, not the reality, and it
is unclear what will ease the fear of abandonment.
A solution will be especially hard to find if,
as I suspect, the fear is rooted in the notion that
Japan is not a truly independent actor when it comes to
foreign policy. If Japan is not making its own choices
in such matters, then it has to be obsessed with what
the US thinks and does - especially at a time of rising
tension in Northeast Asia. At a recent meeting, one
Japanese speaker after another - all intelligent and
thoughtful people, but not security specialists -
declared that the US made all important security
decisions for Japan and Tokyo was incapable of asserting
its own will in such matters.
This sense of
helplessness is generating a backlash. Masatoshi Honda,
an associate professor at Musashino Women's University,
argues that the lack of a sense of identity is fostering
"political nationalism". More and more Japanese, such as
the one who admired the South Koreans, feel that they
need to be more assertive, especially when it comes to
dealing with the US.
The result is the
politicization of the security alliance with the US.
Even though Japan needs a debate on national security,
the focus of that debate should be the external security
environment and the best way to protect the country in
those circumstances. Discussion of the security alliance
should follow a broader assessment of national security
needs.
But the insecurity and helplessness that
bubble up threaten to reverse that process and put the
alliance with the US at center stage. This has already
happened during the debate over the proposed SDF
deployment to Iraq.
It's too early to be worried
about an overly emotional response in Japan. But US
policymakers need to be alert to how one-sided the
bilateral relationship looks from a Japanese
perspective. Washington has to be especially sensitive
to appearing to be heavy-handed.
But much of the
blame belongs on the shoulders of Japanese who have
avoided taking responsibility for their decisions and
instead passed the buck to Washington. They do
themselves, their country, and the alliance a
disservice.
Brad Glosserman, a contributing editor to the Japan
Times, is director of research at Pacific Forum CSIS, a
Honolulu-based think-tank. He can be reached at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com
.
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
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