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Japan postures to play catch-up with
China
By Brad Glosserman
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
It's
hard to get excited about last week's Japan-ASEAN
summit. The decision to foster a new "special
relationship" between the two could be historic, but the
economic free-trade areas that will provide its
foundation look like long shots. Japanese efforts are
likely to be frustrated by the same political forces
that have blocked previous initiatives. That is a pity,
not only for Japan, but for the Southeast Asian
governments that seek a rejuvenated relationship with
Tokyo.
Initially, hopes were high for the summit.
The meeting marked the 30th anniversary of Japan's
relations with the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and, in reflection of that long-standing
relationship, was the first ASEAN Commemorative summit
with a dialogue partner as well as the first summit to
be held outside the region. Japanese officials had
promised a "historic" meeting, implying at least that
there would be something more to the gathering than news
of the summit itself.
Now it seems "The Tokyo
Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN
Partnership in the New Millennium" and its action plan
might measure up to those ambitions. The declaration
calls for deepening ties and enhancing cooperation in
the fields of political and security affairs, monetary
and financial policies, as well as information
technology. Concretely, Japan will provide US$1.5
billion over the next three years to promote human
resources development and another $1.5 billion over
three years for subregional development projects such as
the Mekong River Basin and the Brunei
Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN
Growth Area. Japan and ASEAN will cooperate to fight the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, piracy
and trans-national crimes; and they will undertake joint
research to tackle emerging infectious diseases, such as
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
Much
of the language - and even some of the aid - resembles
the usual boilerplate. In places, the declaration
promises much more, however. The biggest developments
are Tokyo's decision to join ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) and the commitment to create a
"comprehensive economic partnership" between Japan and
ASEAN, which will include elements of a free-trade area
by 2012. Although the region-wide talks aren't scheduled
until 2005, the effort will begin in earnest next year
when Tokyo commences bilateral trade talks on free-trade
agreements with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.
But it's hard to be optimistic about their
prospects. Japan's ability to negotiate free-trade
agreements has been severely restrained by the power of
the country's agricultural lobby, which has in effect
blocked any deal that would liberalize farm imports. As
a result, Tokyo has, thus far, concluded just one
free-trade agreement - with Singapore, which has no
agricultural exports. Just two months ago, the farmers'
lobby stymied an agreement with Mexico, even though
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had appeared to endorse
the deal.
The same obstacles have prevented Japan
from playing a more influential role in global trade
negotiations - and it is hard to imagine a higher
priority for Tokyo, given the country's dependence on
international trade and the crying need for
rationalization of its agricultural sector.
The
real tragedy, however, is the wasted opportunity. ASEAN
has warm feelings for Japan and looks for Tokyo to play
a greater role in the region. Southeast Asia has a deep
and abiding respect for Japan's accomplishments in the
post-war era and greatly appreciates the assistance that
Tokyo has provided in the past. The "Fukuda Doctrine" is
credited with helping ASEAN through difficult times in
the 1970s and 1980s amid fears of "falling dominoes" and
"red scares". Japan provided markets for Asian exports,
along with the technology and management know-how that
facilitated the region's development. Japanese
businesses and their networks played a critical role in
that process as well. Along the way, ASEAN became
Japan's second-biggest trading partner; the region's
trade with Japan reached $124.4 billion in 2002.
ASEAN knows it has reason to be grateful to
Tokyo. The region has received the largest share of
Japan's official development assistance - some $23
billion over the past three decades. Tokyo's efforts to
help solve the Cambodia problem - in which Tokyo helped
broker a political deal that ended the political crisis
following the 1997 coup in Phnom Penh - were highly
regarded, as was the Miyazawa plan, devised in the
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis to ease the
region's capital shortage. Tokyo also played a
high-profile role in recent efforts to bring peace to
the troubled Indonesian province of Aceh.
The
problem for Japan is that its profile is shrinking. It
is perceived as lacking confidence and unable to take
the initiative in dealing with the region. Tokyo is seen
as invariably lagging behind China, responding -
unevenly - to Beijing's initiatives. Indeed, the
Japan-ASEAN summit is seen largely as a response to
China's offer last year to conclude an ASEAN-China
"strategic partnership", which would include a
free-trade agreement. The decision to join the TAC
follows a similar decision by China and India at the
ASEAN summit held in Bali in October as well as Japan's
contribution to the Mekong River initiative, which was
anticipated by a Chinese proposal last year as deepening
Chinese integration with the Mekong region.
As
the Pacific Forum conducts meetings throughout the
region in an attempt to help stimulate cooperative
policies in the areas surrounding the Asia-Pacific,
China is invariably on the agenda - typically in the
context of "the meaning and impact of China's rise".
Japan, however, rarely makes the program, and is
infrequently mentioned in discussions. The fact is,
ordinary Southeast Asians don't think that much about
Japan. That isn't all bad because it also means that the
traditional obstacles to Japanese participation in
regional affairs have diminished - a good thing as
strategists and policymakers now look for Japan to get
more involved.
Ratification of the TAC is
thought to signal deeper Japanese involvement in
Southeast Asian security management. That is a powerful
vote of confidence in Japan, particularly in the wake of
the Koizumi government's steady attempts to increase
Japan's military profile, attempts it has been making
since September 11, 2001. It would seem to signal the
end of worries about Japan's "remilitarization" - a
pointed contrast with the comment by Singapore's former
prime minister Lee Kwan Yew several years back about
Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations being
akin to giving liqueur-flavored chocolates to a
recovering alcoholic.
While China's rise is now
being seen as "an opportunity rather than a threat",
there is still some discomfort, and much uncertainty,
about the implications of China's growing strength.
Regional leaders meanwhile see Tokyo as providing some
balance - at a minimum, it offers them increased
opportunities for bargaining with the two Asian powers.
Southeast Asians know that for all of China's
prospects, Japan will continue to be critical to the
region's economic growth and development for some time
to come. Just as importantly, Southeast Asians also know
that the values that undergird their East Asian
community are more deeply rooted in Japan than in China.
That is a critical consideration as the ASEAN+3 process
matures and "East Asia" becomes better defined. It is
also an invaluable and incalculable asset - but it will
count for little if Japan cannot meet Southeast Asian
expectations by providing "concrete results" from last
week's summit. And at this point, the past offers little
grounds for optimism.
Brad Glosserman
is director of research at the Pacific Forum CSIS. He can be
reached at bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.
Used by permission.
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