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Japanese
right manipulates abduction issue
By Victor Fic
SEOUL - If every political controversy has a pulse, then commentator Eric
Johnston's finger is most firmly on the wrist of one: the Japanese right wing's
strategy of seizing on North Korea's kidnapping of Japanese citizens to pursue
a nationalistic agenda.
A journalist at the Japan Times' Osaka bureau, Johnston's analysis
comprehensively covers a subject that will be long-lived, divisive - and a
challenge for most to fathom. Johnston's political acumen, his in-country
location and his determination to keep engaging the issue's visible and hidden
aspects earmark him as a leading commentator on the topic.
Johnston came to Japan in 1988 from the United States and started writing on
economics three years later before joining the Osaka bureau in 1994. Reports of
the abductions first appeared in the mainstream Japanese media in 1997 and
became increasingly frequent thereafter; before then, articles on the
kidnappings were scattered, with the Foreign Ministry and leftist circles
dismissing them as propaganda or rumors and the public only marginally
interested. Johnston began to report the story.
His foresight paid off in September 2002, when Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi met North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang. The
latter confessed that his special agents had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens
over some 25 years. After North Korea allowed five victims to return to Japan
in October 2002, Johnston noticed that the Japanese right wing, quick to
capitalize on the public furor, was determined to commandeer the issue out of
real yet selective outrage, and as a stratagem. They have succeeded.
Many agree with Johnston that the most visible arch-conservative involved is
Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara, who has called for "revenge" against North
Korea. While many politicians worldwide are outspoken, a powerful figure within
Japan such as Ishihara is likely to have greater impact than commentators in a
more open society. This is so because Japanese culture exalts social consensus,
which is attained through a process called nemawashi.
The term means "root binding", and refers to how a gardener binds a plant's
roots together, creating unity. When facing a decision or issue, Japanese
elites play the gardener, pushing and prodding subalterns and juniors with
comments, threats of punishment and promises of reward - and by setting a
public example. Japanese conservatives who utter revisionist comments, visit
Yasukuni Shrine and do related acts are trying to bind the social roots. Given
his respected academic credentials, reputation as a novelist and unflinching
candor, Ishihara's political thumb is among the greenest.
Below Ishihara, Johnston sees "quasi-right-wing, revisionist politicians,
media, academics, and others". Johnston deems them dangerous in a different way
because they agitate in the shadows. Most simply lack a high-profile pulpit.
However, they may also essay to avoid the close scrutiny that can invite
rebuttal. Finally, Johnston notes that in an ironic twist, Japanese political
culture also esteems "the shadow shogun or kuromaku" whose influence is
felt, but his face not seen. Certain reactionaries may actually shun center
stage for the mystique of subtle power.
Johnston has long argued that it is hard to quantify the Japanese right, and
they also defy exact labels. What links them is their commitment to nativist
values such as racial purity and cultural uniqueness; their insistence that the
Japanese people are victims, even as they minimize the suffering their state
has caused; their endorsement of whitewashed history textbooks and official
visits to Yasukuni Shrine; and their vision of a Japan as a revived great power
- likely one armed with nuclear weapons - free of the United States and
unafraid of China. Though it is unlikely that a mastermind or cabal is
orchestrating their efforts, their root-binding is loosely coordinated.
Regarding North Korea, the conservatives' specific objectives include imposing
sanctions on Pyongyang; blocking conciliatory diplomacy toward it; deriving
emotional satisfaction from indulging hallowed themes of national
victimization; establishing themselves as an alternative to the allegedly
pro-appeasement Foreign Ministry; and ultimately lighting the fire of national
pride that will burn away liberal constraints on Japanese diplomacy.
As for their tactics, a key step has entailed the forging of exclusive links to
the victim's families and their support groups. Ishihara did so early on, and
since last year, "every right-wing politician ... has jumped on the bandwagon",
says Johnston. The conservatives have lambasted the Foreign Ministry for
dismissing reports of the abductions for years, convincing many Japanese that
the diplomats are both soft-headed and hard-hearted and that only the right has
the fortitude and compassion to press North Korea.
Also, the right has apparently covered the funding base. Johnston alleges that
they benefit from "a highly organized, highly motivated, and secretly funded
group of supporters" of the abductees. "The money comes in from individual
donors. While many donors are just ordinary citizens who want to support the
families, many others have ulterior motives and are tied to the textbook
revision issue, the Yasukuni Shrine-as-a-proper-war-memorial issue, and various
right-wing causes."
Johnston notes that "the largest individual donors are unknown, and nobody
knows if donations have been made by right-wing groups or the extremely
powerful, and extremely secretive, Izokukai, or Association of War Bereaved
Families. Some media have hinted this, but no proof has been found. A
government audit of the supporters and the group of families, and media
investigation, is desperately needed." Yet this is unlikely.
Applying his fluent language skills to monitor the right's arguments, Johnston
has found that many rightists, defying the stereotype, are "often gifted,
eloquent and very persuasive speakers who seem to have all of the facts at
their fingertips. They are able to use selected facts about Japan's actions in
Korea to construct a larger argument." His baleful observation confirms what
other Japan experts started noticing in the mid-1990s about younger Japanese
politicians: many have studied Western debating techniques and even English,
but to help them articulate chauvinistic opinions. For example, Eisuke
Sakakibara, an official of what was then the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, was lauded within Japan 10 years ago for his Western style -
English, colored shirts, and University of Michigan degree - in defense of his
traditionalist perspective.
Among the conservatives, one cardinal meta-theme is "that Japan, as the first
modern Asian nation, went into Korea and China, built railroad stations,
sewers, hospitals, and provided doctors, nurses, training, engineering
know-how, etc ... that ultimately improved the lives of the ordinary people".
However, ungrateful Asians only recall Tokyo's "alleged'' crimes.
Therefore, Japan must "recover its 'lost' history of benevolent actions in
Asia, a history that was suppressed by the United States and sycophants in the
Japanese government; then Japanese can become 'whole' again".
The right must neutralize their interlocutors, such the imperial-era victims
who often demand a proper apology and compensation from Tokyo. Johnston notes
that "they are dismissed with the alibi, 'Well, everybody does it. Just look at
America in Vietnam, El Salvador, Chile, Iraq, etc.'" Or the accuser is himself
reproached for trivializing the pain of the abductee Japanese. Either way, says
Johnston, discussion of Japan's even more abominable acts become ever more
difficult.
As for the professional historians at home and abroad, Johnston says that while
old documents are declassified or new ones discovered globally, these are often
"twisted or turned into arguments" from the right about how other countries
also started the war and committed atrocities. Of course, these rebuttals are
true, but they are screens to deflect or squelch discussion, not to further it.
In fact, the same organization that sponsored distorted history textbooks in
2001 is now insisting that North Korea's crime be cited as a human-rights
abuse.
Japan's progressive opinion leaders also find themselves vociferously
countered. When they endorse Korean and Chinese demands that Tokyo face the
past, the tactic backfires. "The right wing has seized upon these demands as
proof that Japan is being 'bullied' by its neighbors," Johnston said.
Conservatives have scored partial success in the political arena too. Veteran
Social Democratic Party head Takako Doi "was defeated in the recent election by
a man who was a strong supporter" of the abductees. In recent parliamentary
elections, the candidates vied to appear as champions of the abductees and
their families.
Time is also the reactionaries' ally. The war generation knows the truth, but
as it "dies or loses power, those with the moral authority to raise Japan's war
responsibility are rapidly disappearing".
As for the media, Johnston reproaches them for "amateurish reporting". They
have not tied North Korea's crimes to Japan's own, which includes abducting
hundreds of thousands Asian men and women. "Give us our families back" is still
the main message, he finds. Also, the media often foster the impression that
"North Korea was once again trying to extort money from Japan".
Sometimes, the media are plainly unprofessional, rues Johnston. Recently, a
group of volunteer activists added the names of 16 more Japanese to the list of
the abductees. News Station, a leading broadcaster, spent 10 minutes on the
story, interviewing the victim's brother.
"It was pure propaganda," judges veteran journalist Johnston, partly because of
the unposed questions. They include how the group - sincere, but composed of
amateurs - determined that North Korea had snatched the missing people.
Johnston deems that most reports avoid such "factual reporting" in favor of
"tear-jerking stories of loss and separation" in which the victim's families
dominate.
The overall result is that since the summit, the public has not debated the
issue much, and those who "offer even a mild counter-argument" to
anti-Pyongyang leaders have found it nearly impossible to get their message
out.
Finally, Japan's economy is the acrid soil in which the revisionist weed is
growing. "Since the collapse of the bubble economy, Japan has been in a bad
mood," said Johnston, which makes "people desire something to feel proud
about". As many of the despondent blame the malaise on Japan's alleged slavish
following of the United States, "they are nostalgic for a time when Japan was
both assertive, and did good things. The right-wing groups ... happily fill
this void with revisionist propaganda."
One worrisome outcome is that the narrowly accurate lesson that Japan is North
Korea's victim "is already well on its way to becoming institutionalized",
observes Johnston. He wonders "if it will end up like the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki ceremonies ... and, of course, August 15 at Yasukuni Shrine and
Koshien Stadium". Noon of that date is the anniversary of the emperor's radio
address admitting that World War II was lost. An air-raid siren blows and
everyone stands for a minute of silence.
"In short," evaluates Johnston, the abductee issue has "got all of the classic
ingredients for becoming institutionalized: (1) The victims were ordinary
Japanese; (2) The criminals were foreign; and (3) A clear solution that
satisfies everybody can never be found, which makes it a noble but losing and
tragic cause, a favorite theme of Japanese literature throughout the ages."
A second implication could directly impact Japan's diplomacy: the right is
trying to pass legislation that would impose sanctions. The bill "is a logical
outcome of years of momentum".
Prime Minister Koizumi must back the bill "because he's surrounded himself,
perhaps willingly, perhaps not, with right-wing hawks like Shinzo Abe and
Defense Minister Ishiba, both of whom want tough sanctions, although Abe has
noticeably toned down his rhetoric over the past few months".
The public seems ambivalent on the bill. Johnston senses that since the
Kim-Koizumi summit in 2002, when North Korea confessed its crime, "a large
portion of the public" has concluded that Pyongyang must be "strongly pressed
for answers". But Johnston doubts that most Japanese "are as hardcore" as some
pro-bill politicians.
Japan's media "are falling along traditional political lines" on the bill, says
Johnston. "The Yomiuri and the Sankei have indicated through their editorial
choices their support of the bill, but - to my knowledge - have not directly
come out in support for the sanctions. The Asahi is taking a cautious approach.
The Iraq debate has so completely overshadowed the sanctions bill that it's
impossible to say who supports" it.
If North Korea manages to mollify Japan's feelings, Johnston admits the bill
might die off. Also, Tokyo cannot afford to upset Seoul, Beijing and Washington
by obstructing diplomatic progress, isolating itself from its allies. Plus,
there are moderates around Koizumi.
Given the trends, Johnston believes that the issue will continue to be a
variable in national and regional affairs. A poll publicized by the Japan Times
last week bears this out: 90.1 percent of the respondents classified the
abductions as the priority issue with North Korea, decisively outnumbering
those who placed the missile threat first.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
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