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Japan-US not so cozy in the
future
By David Isenberg
At a
time when Japan, at the behest of the United States, is
crossing its Rubicon by dispatching as many as 1,000
armed troops to Iraq in their first combat zone
deployment since World War II, to participate in the
post-war occupation of Iraq, one might think that the
traditional US-Japanese military alliance is in sound
shape. But that's not necessarily so.
A
monograph by the US Army War College's Strategic Studies
Institute said: "Japan is now in the midst of a
fundamental reexamination of its security policy and its
role in international relations that will have a
dramatic impact on East Asia and the Pacific. Within
Japan, many see the traditional means of security policy
as being out of balance and vulnerable."
According to the author, Lieutenant Colonel
William E Rapp, the current tightening of the alliance,
due to a convergence of interests over Korea, China, and
counter terrorism, does not portend an even closer
alliance two decades from now. He writes, in a paper
released last month, "Although the alliance is arguably
in the best shape in decades following the Japanese
support for the United States in the second Gulf War,
the euphoria potentially masks an underlying divergence
of interests over the next several decades and demands
that hard choices must be faced and compromises be
made."
The interests about which choices will
have to be made include differing conceptions about the
role of international institutions, burden sharing in
ensuring international peace, the role of military
force, and a familiar concern - the future of China.
There are two main reasons why Japan needs to
change its approach to the security alliance. First, the
security environment in which Japan now finds itself has
changed dramatically so that Japan cannot maintain the
safety of its people without changing the way it thinks
of self-defense.
Second, Japan increasingly
desires to shape its future in ways that are liberal and
multinational. But in order to have a real voice in
shaping that future, it must participate more actively
and substantively in international efforts. That means
active participation in peace operations - not just
writing a check.
US will need to share power
with Japan
While Rapp does not believe that the
required changes will necessarily require the
negotiation of a new treaty, he does think that the US
needs to accept a relative loss from time to time in
policy leadership and that it will need to share more
power with Japan. Specifically, the US will need to
trade some bases, force structure, and policy voice in
exchange for greater Japanese acceptance of new roles,
missions, and risks in the alliance.
Regarding
the alliance, Rapp sees three options for the US:
Try and maintain the current asymmetrical power
structure with Japan for as long as possible by
maintaining Japanese dependencies and reluctantly
compromising on peripheral issues.
Rapidly cede substantive power to Japan, most likely
by dramatically reducing forward-based military
capabilities - meaning getting out of Okinawa - and
building alternative basing options in the Western
Pacific.
Take the middle road, and middle roads are usually
those most often followed.
Why would America do
this, take the middle road, given its current bent
toward unilateralism? Rapp writes: "History teaches that
hegemonic states do not retain such overwhelming power
forever. As the United States focuses on
democratization, free trade, security, and human rights,
the provision of such collective goods worldwide will
increasingly take a toll on America's material, human,
and psychological resources."
For Japan's part,
more substantive legal change, concerning how the
country can react to crises and the manner in which its
Self-Defense Forces can be deployed, will be necessary.
Such changes could require modification of the 1946
Constitution and the "Yoshida [Shigeru] doctrine", a
cornerstone of the governing Liberal Democratic Party,
that consisted of focusing the country's resources on
economic production supported by well-trained workers
while adopting the US's stance on issues of security and
international politics.
Japan deploys
destroyer, AWACS
Of course, to some extent Japan
has already overcome the constitutional barrier against
collective self-defense. It has deployed an Aegis-class
destroyer in the Indian Ocean and uses Airborne Warning
and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft to protect American
RC-135 reconnaissance flights in the sea of Japan.
In fact, in January 2003, Japan's Cabinet
Legislative Bureau announced that preemptive strikes
against North Korean missile bases by the Japanese
military would be legal.
The study by the US
Army War College notes that Japan's 1960 security
structure and norms - even as modified as late as 1997
in its Revised Guidelines - leave Japanese-American
interests in East Asia vulnerable to those trying to
change the status quo. For example, although the
guidelines expanded the geographical boundaries of the
treaty to situations in areas surrounding Japan, the
actual limits are vague, especially after the Diet in
1999 modified the wording to commit Japan to "situations
in which the peace and safety of Japan are gravely
threatened".
Japan's current military and
contingency capabilities are not fully capable of
dealing effectively with 21st century threats to its
regional interests. Capabilities such as rapid
contingency decision-making structures, intelligence
collection and analysis assets that support those
structures and consequence management teams are
inadequate in the event of a weapons of mass destruction
attack. Although the US has taken significant, albeit
insufficient, steps in those areas since September 11,
2001, the rules under which the alliance with Japan
currently operate prevent timely and effective
cooperation outside the immediate area of Japan.
David Isenberg, a senior analyst with
the Washington-based British American Security
Information Council (BASIC), has an extensive background
in arms control and national security issues.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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