Japan: Don't rock the cross-Strait
boat By Jamie Miyazaki
With just over a month to go before
Taiwan goes to the polls in its first "defensive"
referendum - on nearly 500 Chinese missiles targeted at
the island - the rhetoric and smear campaigns from both
sides of the Taiwan Strait have been heating up.
Meanwhile, the rest of the world is observing
cross-Strait developments with some apprehension.
Far down in the southern Japanese island of
Ishigaki - less than 200 miles east of Taiwan -
residents are watching the referendum more closely and
nervously than most. The island's port authority is
heavily dependent on the bizarre status quo of
China-Taiwan cross-Strait relations. Goods shipped from
mainland China to Taiwan can sail "direct", as long as
they pass through nearby Ishigaki's waters, netting the
port authority a US$3,000 port clearance fee per vessel;
when nearly 1,000 vessels pay these fees every year,
Ishigaki makes a tidy profit from its geographical
location.
Nobody in Ishigaki is particularly
keen on a war breaking out, or for that matter, on a
sudden breakthrough in truly direct cross-Strait
transport links between China and Taiwan that would
eliminate the value of the port.
Ishigaki
perhaps most visibly demonstrates the awkward diplomatic
and strategic tightrope Japan walks when it comes to
cross-Strait relations. China is the new export market
of choice for Japanese companies. Nonetheless, Taiwan is
Japan's fourth-largest trading partner and Japan is
Taiwan's third-largest export destination and its
largest source of imports. Throw in close cultural and
political ties between Taiwan and Japan, Japan's
considerable strategic stake in cross-Strait stability,
and the three-way Tokyo-Beijing-Taipei relationship
becomes trickier still.
So, it's not surprising
that Tokyo's criticisms of the March 20 referendum - on
the same day as the presidential election - have been
more muted than those of other nations.
Japan
calls for 'cool heads' to prevail "Cool heads are
needed for cross-Strait stability," said an editorial in
the liberal Asahi Shimbun on February 14. "Neither Japan
nor the United States - nor any of its neighboring
countries in Asia - wants tension across the Taiwan
Strait to rise. When recent remarks by [Taiwan
President] Chen [Shui-bian]about the referendum put
added strain on China-Taiwan relations, the Japanese
government, in an extremely rare move, urged caution on
the President's Office in Taiwan," it said.
The
newspaper added: "The Japanese government called its
word of caution to the Taiwanese government 'a piece of
advice given out of goodwill'. If that is the case, it
would also be wise to call on the Chinese government to
remain calm as it watches the elections unfold on
Taiwan."
A former Japanese colony, from
1895-1945, Taiwan's relationship with Japan has been
generally good and never subject to the same strains as
the often stormy China-Japan relationship. Taiwan's
references to Japan's imperial past and its criticisms
of Prime Minister's Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the
controversial Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo to commemorate
the war dead have been noticeably lacking - in contrast
to Beijing's.
Likewise, while some Japanese
politicians and sectors of the Japanese media have made
good mileage out of the apparent hordes of mainland
Chinese criminals eroding Japan's treasured sense of law
and order, the crimes committed by Taiwanese residents
by and large have not registered on the radar screen of
Japanese public consciousness.
Japan's
pro-Taiwan lobby spans the political spectrum - from the
governing Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) venerable
Japan-Republic Of China (Taiwan) Diet members'
Consultative Council, or Nikkakon, to the opposition
Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Japan-Taiwan
Parliamentary Friendship Consultation Association.
Prominent public figures - including Cabinet Secretary
Yasuo Fukuda, DPJ party grandee Yukio Hatoyama and Tokyo
University academic Mineo Nakajima - have backed
Taiwan's entry into the World Health Organization, a
Japan-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement and outright Taiwanese
independence. All this has angered China, which
considers Taiwan a renegade province and which is
expanding political and economic ties with Japan.
Japan's cabinet weighted with pro-Taiwan
ministers Japan's current cabinet is weighted
with pro-Taiwan ministers who transcend the
fractionalized nature of the LDP. A number of members of
the pro-Taiwan (anti-Pyongyang, and to some degree,
anti-Koizumi) Eto-Kamei faction occupy important cabinet
posts, such as hawkish Shoichi Nakagawa, the minister
for economy, trade and industry. Prime Minister Koizumi
himself comes from the Mori faction, headed by his close
friend and hapless prime ministerial predecessor Yoshiro
Mori - an avowed friend of Taipei who issued former
Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui a visa to Japan, much
to Beijing's irritation.
Mori's trip to
neighboring Taiwan in December 2003 makes him only the
second former Japanese prime minister to have made the
visit. To claim Mori made the visit as a private citizen
seems somewhat disingenuous considering his previous
office and his close links with Koizumi, and it is hard
to believe that Mori would have gone ahead with his
visit without at least tacit cabinet approval. Mori
admittedly warned Taiwan's current president, Chen
Shui-bian, to be "careful" about his referendum plans,
but this reproof was tame in comparison to French
President Jacques Chirac's tirade about the damage the
referendum could do to cross-Strait international
relations.
The referendum, on which President
Chen has staked his career, will ask voters whether
China should be asked to redirect nearly 500 missiles
targeted at Taiwan from the mainland, and, if China
refuses, whether Taiwan should seek to buy advanced
defensive weapons and technology. It also asks whether
talks with China should be resumed.
At the
unofficial "embassy" level, Japan-Taiwan ties remain
strong. Taiwan's de-facto ambassador to Japan, Lo
Fu-chen, accompanied Mori on his trip to Taipei in
December, and Katsuhisa Uchida, head of the Taipei
office of the Interchange Association, Japan's de-facto
diplomatic mission, is one of the most pro-Taiwan
Japanese envoys ever. Uchida even went so far as to hold
the first local celebration of Japanese Emperor
Akihito's birthday since Japan severed diplomatic ties
with Taiwan in 1972, when it established full diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China and ended
official, but not unofficial, ties with Taiwan. The
emperor's birthday party drew heavy criticism from
Beijing.
However, now that a genuine separatist
agenda is being pushed by Taiwan's President Chen and
his Democratic People's Party (DPP), Tokyo has become
cooler to the idea of an independent Taiwan and keener
on maintaining the status quo.
Taiwan
strategically important to Japan Taiwan,
straddling major shipping lanes to and from North Asia,
is of strategic importance militarily and economically
to Japan. Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be
highly destabilizing for Japan's maritime security and
economy. The worst case scenario would be a Chinese
conquest of Taiwan, for the fear is that Beijing could
use its dominance of sea routes to Japan as leverage.
This fear has been further heightened by Chinese
naval ambitions to transform itself from a "green water"
navy capable of power projection in the "first island
chain" stretching from the Aleutians in the North
Pacific down to the Spratly Islands in the South China
Sea - to a "blue water" navy with a presence stretching
far into the Pacific. Implicit in this force
transformation is the fact that Japanese geography and
sea power pose an inherent obstacle to Chinese expansion
into the Pacific as long as Taiwan remains free of
mainland control.
A Chinese-occupied Taiwan
would make Beijing's Pacific naval vision more feasible
and it would become even easier to force the issue of
the disputed sovereignty of the Senkaku (in Japanese) or
Diaoyu (in Chinese) islands that lie between Okinawa,
Taiwan and China. The far-flung Senkaku's territorial
waters would considerably extend their owner's claims
over the surrounding, potentially resource-rich sea
beds. Japan is already nervous about China's Pinghu Oil
Field located about 400 kilometers northwest of Okinawa
and has flown reconnaissance aircraft near the area.
Earlier incidents involving Chinese activists trying to
land on the Senkaku islands have made Japan more nervous
still. Any Chinese naval activity in the Taiwan Strait
would only aggravate Japanese suspicions and fears.
It is not surprising that despite being a close
friend of Taipei and skeptical about Beijing's long-term
strategic objectives, Japan has been more concerned
about Taiwan President Chen's pro-independence
sentiments and actions that inflame Beijing, especially
the referendum. China calls the referendum illegal, and
is wary because a referendum system might one day mean
that Taiwan voters are asked about independence.
US bases in Okinawa not that far from
Taiwan China also says it will never renounce the
right to use force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland,
if Taiwan delays too long. Any China-Taiwan military
conflict would almost certainly involve the US. Under
the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US Third Marine
Expeditionary Forces are stationed close to China - on
Japanese bases in Okinawa prefecture. The Okinawan
archipelago extends southeast of Taipei, a reminder of
Japan's possible entanglement in any US-China conflict
arising over Taiwan.
Nonetheless, in the best
tradition of military planning - hope for the best and
plan for the worst - Japan has been pursuing steps to
guard against the fallout from any Taiwan conflict.
Japan's navy, the Maritime Self Defense Force, has
always been more preoccupied with Taiwan than with the
North Korean nuclear and missile threat, and it has been
acquiring new submarines and aircraft carriers to guard
Japanese interests in the area.
Tokyo's recent
decision to go ahead with a Missile Defense shield can
also be seen through this lens: a Japan-based missile
defense shield would geographically cover at least
northern Taiwan and would further incorporate Taiwan
into Japan's sphere of influence.
In the
meantime, just keep those cargo vessels going through
Ishigaki's waters, docking at its port and paying those
fees.
Jamie Miyazaki is a freelance
journalist specializing in North Asia. He has traveled
extensively in the region and worked for a variety of
publications and security companies.
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