Time for Japan to ditch LDP's
one-party rule By Yoel Sano
Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi,
celebrates three years in office. This in itself is a
remarkable achievement, since only five of Japan's 27
post-World War II leaders have survived for three years
or longer. These are Shigeru Yoshida (1946-47 and
1948-54), Nobusuke Kishi (1957-60), Hayato Ikeda
(1960-64), Eisaku Sato (1964-72), and Yasuhiro Nakasone
(1982-87). Indeed, Japan's prime ministers are famous
for their turnover and short tenure, with postwar
premiers averaging terms of just over two years.
Yet Koizumi, marking his third year in office on
Monday, April 26, clearly doesn't want to be remembered
as merely another faceless resident of the Kantei (the
prime ministerial office), like most of his dour
predecessors. From the outset, he has sought to "change
the [governing Liberal Democratic Party] LDP, change
Japan!" by bringing about the revival of Japan's economy
through financial and business restructuring, and
getting Japan to play a more active role on the world
stage.
It was with this in mind, then, that
Koizumi, on taking office three years ago, singled out
two key changes that he wanted to enact during his
tenure. First, he proposed changing the constitution to
allow direct elections to the post of prime minister.
Second, he wanted to amend the constitution to nullify
the famous Article 9, which renounces the country's
right to wage war.
Although the two proposed
changes are seemingly unrelated, they in fact go hand in
hand with Koizumi's overall goal of boosting Japan's
global standing. If he succeeds in pushing these
changes, then Japan could become a very different
country - both at home and abroad.
Revolving-door premiers undermine Japan's
standing Although geopolitics, social and
historical currents, and megatrends far surpass and
transcend most national leaders, there is no doubt that
the world stage is dominated by personalities. All the
world's major powers - the United States, Russia, China,
the United Kingdom, France and Germany - have strong
executive leaders, most of which have taken a strong
stand on one issue or another, and actively promoted
their countries' interests in one way or another.
By contrast, hardly any postwar Japanese prime
minister has played a notable role on the world stage.
One reason for this is that with such short tenures,
Japanese leaders are literally here today and gone
tomorrow.
This makes it difficult for a world
leader to take Japan's prime ministers seriously at
international summits, or build any sort of long-term
rapport with them. During the 1990s, US president Bill
Clinton had to deal with no fewer than seven Japanese
premiers in his eight-year presidency, while French
president Francois Mitterrand (1981-95) liaised with
nine.
During the 1990s, of Japan's friends in
the Group of 7 (G7), the US, Germany, France and the UK
changed their heads of government just once, and Canada
twice, while Japan changed its premier eight times, one
more than Italy's seven switches. It is probably no
coincidence that Italy has also punched below its
economic weight in world affairs.
LDP has
ruled longer than Chinese Communist Party The
reason for such a high turnover of prime ministers lies
mainly with the nature of Japan's governing - "ruling"
is the more accurate term - Liberal Democratic Party.
Japan is in effect a one-party state, given that the LDP
has been in power continuously - except for a brief
period from August 1993 to June 1994 - since its
inception in 1955.
Prior to 1955, the LDP's two
constituents, the Liberals and the Democrats, alternated
in power from February 1948. So overall, Japan has had
the same group in power for about 55 years. Indeed, the
LDP has been in power for longer than any party has held
power in any democratic country, and has ruled for even
longer that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which
came to power in October 1949.
Because the LDP
is the political system, its own rules determine
how long Japan's prime ministers may stay in office.
There is nothing in Japan's constitution stating that a
prime minister can only serve for two or three years,
but the LDP's own charter has traditionally limited the
party president (who automatically becomes prime
minister, owing to the LDP's majority in the Diet, or
parliament) to two terms of two years each. More
recently, it has relaxed this to two three-year terms.
Koizumi, elected to his current LDP term in September
2003, must therefore vacate his post in September 2006,
according to party rules.
The short duration of
the LDP presidential terms reflects the fact that the
party does not treat the national leadership role
seriously. The idea is that the party presidency rotates
frequently among the heads of the LDP's four or five
main factions, which are in essence
parties-within-a-party. Even on becoming prime minister,
the incumbent must follow directives set by the leader
of the LDP's largest faction, who functions as a
behind-the-scenes party kingmaker.
Prime
ministers lack democratic mandate Understandably,
this system, combined with the one-party LDP state
structure, bodes rather ill for Japan's claim to be a
democracy. Although it is true that voters keep
returning the LDP to power (with the exception of the
1993 election, when the LDP lost its majority, and a
seven-party opposition coalition took power), the reason
is that Japan's opposition - which for decades was the
Socialist Party - has never been seen as a viable
alternative. It remains to be seen whether the main
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), despite its
strong showing in last November's election, can build on
its success.
Moreover, after decades in office,
the LDP has developed a considerable network of
patronage and support - the so-called "iron triangle"
that links the party with the bureaucracy, big business,
the powerful construction industry, and the
rural/agricultural lobby - that makes it difficult for
new parties to compete effectively.
Further,
Japanese society is notoriously risk-averse, with voters
often preferring stability and known quantities, at
least on national-level politics.
Because the
LDP is a party of entrenched and vested interests, and
because economic reforms involve breaking up those
vested interests, the party unsurprisingly has blocked
the economic reforms that are said to be necessary for
Japan to restore the economy to long-term growth.
Instead of promoting change, the LDP thus functions as
an automatic-pilot mechanism.
This is fine when
the airplane is flying smoothly, but for much of the
1990s Japan was in a downward tailspin and some real
political and economic aerobatics and dogfighting were
called for. With only the steward at the controls,
unable to do anything, it is no wonder, then, that many
Japanese prime ministers have left office with a support
rating of less than 10 percent - as was the case for
Koizumi's bumbling predecessor, Yoshiro Mori.
How to break this stranglehold by the LDP and
make Japan's politics more responsive to voters? The
direct-election method of choosing the prime minister
offers the best solution. Since Koizumi proposed this
idea in May 2001, several governmental research panels
have studied this, but without forming conclusions.
Indeed, the idea has been frozen, most probably
because Koizumi feels secure in office. His support for
the idea reflected the fact that Koizumi's popularity
surged to more than 80 percent shortly after he became
premier, meaning that he would have overwhelmingly won a
direct election.
South Korea and Taiwan
offer Japan models Luckily, for inspiration Japan
need look no further than its neighbors South Korea and
Taiwan. Both countries experienced the same problem of
undemocratic one-party rule for decades, yet both have
moved on to a more competitive two- or three-party
democratic system.
In the case of South Korea, a
conservative establishment ruled the country for almost
37 years between Major-General Park Chung-hee's military
coup of May 1961 and the first peaceful transfer of
power to the opposition in February 1998, when Kim
Dae-jung became president. Although this was not
formally one-party rule, the parties that governed the
country during this period - the Democratic Republican
Party (1963-80) and the Democratic Justice Party
(1980-98) - were both founded by the military
leadership, adopted a strong pro-US and anti-North Korea
position, and favored close ties with big business. (The
Democratic Justice Party was renamed the Democratic
Liberal Party in 1990, the New Korea Party in 1995, and
the Grand National Party in 1997.)
Both South
Korea and Taiwan adopted a system of direct elections
for their presidents, in 1987 and 1996, respectively.
Both countries also hold legislative elections: every
four years in South Korea, and every three years in
Taiwan. These allow for checks and balances on the
powerful executive branch of government that exists in
the two countries.
These electoral systems did
not develop automatically, however. Because South Korea
was a military-led state for so long, a genuine
pro-democracy movement developed, which fostered two
pro-democracy opposition parties centered on two
leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Kim Young-sam
teamed up with the Democratic Justice Party in 1990 and
became the party-of-power's candidate for the presidency
in the 1992 elections, which he won. He thus became
South Korea's first civilian head of state (excluding
interim president Choi Kyu-hah, 1979-80) in 30 years.
Eventually, though, voters became fed up with
the same conservative group after 36 years and elected
the center-left opposition leader Kim Dae-jung to the
presidency in December 1997. Admittedly, though, it took
an economic meltdown - the Asian financial crisis of
1997-98 - and massive corruption scandals involving big
business and politicians for voters to look to
alternatives to the Grand National Party.
This
raises the unfortunate question of whether Japan must
itself go through such a sudden economic collapse before
voters there finally ditch the LDP. The Japanese
electorate has long had to put up with massive political
corruption, and so a full-scale economic collapse could
be the tipping point. Up until now, though, Japan's
decline during the "lost decade" - the 1990s, in which
the country went through four recessions - has been too
gradual, and the pain too mild, to prompt popular
discontent.
In the case of Taiwan, the
Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party took over the
island state in 1949 after its leader, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, fled there after losing the Chinese
civil war. The KMT maintained heavy authoritarian rule
for decades under martial law. It was only after
president Chiang Kai-shek died that his son and
successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, gradually relaxed
opposition political activity in the late 1980s. Martial
law was only lifted in February 1987, a year before
Chiang Jr died. The introduction of legislative
elections was gradually phased in after pressure from
pro-democracy movements.
Even then, the KMT won
the first direct presidential election in 1996, when its
candidate, Lee Teng-hui, was voted in. The KMT finally
lost the presidency in March 2000 after holding it for
51 years, when the opposition Democratic Progressive
Party's (DPP) Chen Shui-bian was elected. It would take
another 18 months before the KMT lost its majority in
the Legislative Yuan (parliament) in December 2001.
In both Taiwan and South Korea, the ruling group
only lost power after direct elections for the post of
national leader were introduced. The new presidents were
initially faced with hostile legislatures, but voters
rallied around their presidents' reformist agendas and
punished the long-dominant parties by reducing their
parliamentary standing. This happened in Taiwan in
December 2001, when the DPP became the largest party,
and recently in South Korea, on April 15 when President
Roh Moo-hyun's supporters, the Uri (Our Open) Party, won
a parliamentary majority.
Because both South
Korea and Taiwan were ruled by dictatorships, strong
pro-democracy movements emerged against them, which
later became strong opposition parties. By contrast,
Japan's LDP has never been a dictatorship, and so the
public urgency to build a more genuine democracy has
been lacking.
Of course, South Korea's and
Taiwan's political systems are far from perfect.
Corruption continues to plague politicians in both
countries, and some say the presidents have too much
power. Yet if it comes to a choice between a corrupt
system that brings about change and economic reforms,
and can respond to changing geopolitical environments,
and a corrupt system that does not, then the former must
still serve any country better.
Both South
Korea's and Taiwan's hostile geopolitical settings -
vis-a-vis North Korea and the People's Republic of
China, respectively - have necessitated strong executive
leaderships. Meanwhile, with Japan facing a greater
threat from North Korea, and possibly even al-Qaeda (as
evidenced by hostage-taking in Iraq), in the short term,
and potentially China in the long term, stronger
leadership will become necessary.
As an example
of poor crisis management, the rescue operation
surrounding the devastating 1995 Kobe earthquake was
criticized for poor planning, bureaucratic rigidity, and
confusion over decision-making and who was in authority.
This initial paralysis may have contributed to a higher
death toll of 6,400.
Blueprint for Japanese
reforms If Japan is to emulate the "success" of
South Korea and Taiwan, for one thing its popular
election should mean giving the prime minister a fixed
term of four or five years. This would remove the
spectacle of ridicule and save the wasted political
capital when prime ministers are the revolving-door
types. Meanwhile, the Diet would also have fixed terms
of three or four years, so that legislative elections
could serve as a de facto mid-term test of support of
the prime minister's policies. This is already the case
in South Korea and Taiwan.
Additionally, there
should be a separation of executive and legislative
powers, so that anyone can have a run at the
premiership. If the prime-ministerial candidate can only
hail from the Diet, then this automatically locks out
all but 727 (480 Lower House members, plus 247 Upper
House members) of Japan's 128 million population. The
Diet is too narrow a talent pool for the nation's top
job, and would result in popular elections merely
forcing voters to choose between two or three party
hacks.
By opening up the premiership, Japan will
also be able to allow prefectural governors - who are
directly elected - to have a shot at the top. Indeed,
while Japan's national politics have been stagnating for
decades, voters in the 47 prefectures have in recent
years been electing independent, "maverick" candidates
to governorships, as a direct snub to LDP-led
vested-interest groups and their front-men.
Two
notable examples include Tokyo Governor Shintaro
Ishihara and Nagano Governor Yasuo Tanaka, although
there are many others. Opening the door to regional
leaders also allows for the possibility of a less
Tokyo-centric government emerging in a country where the
capital is overwhelmingly dominant, economically and
politically.
Direct elections for the
premiership could also open the door for women to play a
bigger political role by allowing them to bypass the
traditional greasy pole that LDP men have had to climb
to attain high office. One possible contender could be
Makiko Tanaka, who vied with Koizumi as the country's
most popular politician in 2001 and early 2002.
'Beat' Takeshi in the prime minister's
office? Critics of any shift toward the direct
election system warn that it would open the door to
populism and allow celebrities to dominate national
politics. There would certainly be the possibility of
the "Philippine-ization" of Japanese politics - the
Philippines' political system has long been the arena of
film and media personalities, most notably former
president Joseph Estrada and current opposition
candidate Fernando Poe Jr, both former action-movie
stars (see A Hero on the road to Manila?, March
22). Perhaps Japanese voters could one day elect someone
like actor, comedian and film director "Beat" Takeshi
Kitano to the Kantei, although such an outcome would not
necessarily be a bad thing, since he would at least have
a popular mandate.
One thing that is for sure is
that after decades of one-party rule, some creative
instability in the form of a maverick prime minister is
exactly what is called for. Of course, Koizumi likes to
consider himself such a maverick, but in many ways his
domestic agenda of economic restructuring has fallen
below expectations.
Many Japanese politicians
will oppose a move to direct prime-ministerial
elections, but this will merely be an acknowledgement of
the fact that they do not stand a chance of becoming
premier if they had to stand for public approval.
There is also the issue of whether a directly
elected prime minister might clash with the emperor
system, under which the emperor is head of state.
Others will warn against the concentration of
"power" in one person's hands. This is especially true
in Japan, where decisions are traditionally made by
consensus. But consensus means the lowest common
denominator of agreement, and can lead to paralysis,
which can be fatal in times of crisis. As Japan plays a
bigger role on the world stage, more "crises" will
unfold, such as the recent hostage situation in Iraq,
and possible future conflicts on the Korean Peninsula
and in the Taiwan Strait.
Ironically, South
Korean politicians have for some years been calling for
a Japanese-style parliamentary system in place of the
powerful presidency, because they dislike the strong
executive. Kim Dae-jung himself pledged to introduce a
parliamentary system when running for the presidency,
but conveniently forgot about this once in office. Yet
direct elections for Japan's premiership would hardly be
a call for the emergence of an autocrat or strongman.
Rather, it would be an attempt to give some clout and
authority to a post that has in essence been a
figurehead.
Japan has for some years now been
taking steps toward centralizing functions relating to
national-security issues. In early 1997, for example,
the separate intelligence services of the various
branches of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were
amalgamated into a Defense Intelligence Headquarters.
Recently, there have been calls for an upgrade of the
Defense Agency to full ministry status. And in February
the agency announced plans for the SDF's joint staff
council to be centralized along the lines of the US
military's Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2006. A stronger
national executive - backed by a popular mandate for a
fixed term - would be a logical step in making Japan a
"normal country" again.
With Japan increasingly
facing security threats, and expanding its global role
(see Japan's new army to rescue US
forces?, April 3), it can ill-afford the system that
has ruled it for so long. Meanwhile, though, the main
beneficiaries of Japan's new "presidential" politics
would be the voters themselves, since they would be able
to change the balance of political forces, as happened
in South Korea just the other day.
Yoel
Sano has worked for publishing houses in London,
providing political and economic analysis, and has been
following Northeast Asia for many years.
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