|
|
|
|
COMMENTARY
Japan through
the looking glass
By Alexander
Bukh
TOKYO - The recent wave of
anti-Japanese protests in China and Korea has
drawn the attention of the English-language media,
with its extensive coverage of what is presumed to
be Japan's failure to deal with its past and the
effect this has had on relations with its
neighbors.
Speaking from the perspective
of somebody who is based in Japan, most of the
coverage seems to be focused on exploring some
imaginary "Japan" that has very little in common
with the Japan that I live in and interact with on
a daily basis. For me, the numerous articles that
discuss Japan's "whitewashing" of history and its
relations with its Asian neighbors, while having
some perceptive conclusions, tend to reflect the
strong anti-Japanese bias that dominates Western
perceptions of Japan and goes back to at least the
Japanese defeat of Russia in the 1904-1905 war.
An article by Martin Jacques published in
The Guardian on April 23 is a perfect example of
this trend. His article draws a picture of a Japan
where the traditional xenophobia still inhibits
every corner of society. It depicts a Japan that,
despite having been forced by the victorious
Allies to admit guilt for its imperial past and
colonial policies, has never sincerely
internalized this guilt and therefore never
expressed sincere remorse. This is a Japan that
holds the sole responsibility for the recent
demonstrations, burning of property and assaults
on Japanese nationals in China.
True,
there are numerous problems with Japan's
immigration laws and treatment of foreigners, as
well as several political issues in dealing with
its former colonies that need to be addressed, but
this is not the Japan that I, and the many others
that actually try to explore Japan from the
inside, know.
As of 2002, Japan had over
1.8 million foreign residents, most of them Korean
and Chinese. Tokyo is a multinational city. If one
were to visit the Shin-Okubo area in central
Tokyo, they would be more likely to hear Korean,
Chinese or Thai on its streets, than Japanese. If
one decided to visit Roppongi, the favorite
residential and recreational area of Western
expats, they would more likely be addressed in
English and see more Caucasians and Africans than
Japanese on the streets and in the bars and
restaurants.
No doubt there are plenty of
instances of discrimination that a foreigner,
especially of Asian descent, could come across in
his or her daily life. At the same time, unlike in
most Western countries, numerous governmental and
private scholarships are available for foreign
students, who comprise a large proportion of
foreign residents, which ease the hardships of
living in a foreign - and expensive - country.
What about Japan's ability to "deal with
the past", the second negative stereotype most
commonly evoked? It is important to clarify what
"Japan" is, in the focus of the debate. Is it the
government which has traditionally been
conservative, or is it the broader Japanese people
we are interested in? The issue of government
approval of a revisionist history textbook that
"whitewashes" colonial misdeeds has been at the
center of the recent debate. What is often
overlooked is the fact that an official approval
of a textbook, while possibly signifying a
political statement on behalf of the government,
does not actually mean that the book will be used
in classrooms across the country, and as such will
shape the historical memory of the new generation.
The process of choosing a particular textbook for
the following three years is conducted by the
local education committees, whose decision is
based on the recommendations of teachers,
principles and specialists.
The history
textbook in question was approved for the first
time in 2002, but only two schools in all of Japan
decided to adopt it. Furthermore, a brief
comparison between the history textbooks used in
the 1980s, when the issue of Japan censoring its
history first emerged, and in 2002, would show
that contemporary textbooks provide a much more
in-depth description of the suppression of the
Korean and Chinese independence movements and the
oppressive policies of the colonial government,
the killings of Korean and Chinese residents by
armed mobs in the aftermath of the Kanto
earthquake in 1923, the atrocities of the Japanese
army in Nanking and the deeds of the notorious 731
biological warfare unit.
The "German
analogy" which is often invoked in the debate is
also a simplistic attempt to project the horrors
of European history on a totally different region.
No doubt that Japan's imperial and colonial
policies, just like their European equivalents,
were brutal, discriminating and left a deep scar
in the hearts of the people of Korea, China and
other Asian nations. However, Japan never had the
well-designed and premeditated policy of genocide
that is the main characteristic of the European
trauma. Also, while Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi's persistent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine
cannot be described either as a sensitive or a
smart political move, it is also important to know
that the shrine is not Japan's equivalent of
Obersalzberg, which has become an area of Neo-Nazi
pilgrimage. It is not dedicated to war criminals,
but a memorial of all Japanese soldiers who have
fallen in the domestic and international wars of
Japan, and was built in the 1860s to commemorate
the victims of civil war.
While it is
possible to interpret not only history, but also
social and political trends in various ways, I
would like to present some statistical data which
supports a different view of Japan. In a poll
conducted in 2000, when posed with the question of
whether or not the Pacific War was a war of
aggression, 51% of respondents replied
affirmatively, with only 15% denying it. Fifty
percent of the respondents expressed belief that
the post-war generation bears responsibility for
the imperial past. In another survey of university
students, conducted by Dr Sven Saaler of Tokyo
University, over 70% responded affirmatively to
the same question.
By the late 1980s, over
70% of the Japanese population expressed positive
feelings toward China. Since 1989, these numbers
have continued to drop, but this development is
more likely a result of Japanese disapproval over
the Tiananmen incident and the Chinese nuclear
tests conducted in 1995, than to rising
nationalism, to which this drop has generally been
attributed.
No doubt Japan bears a certain
responsibility for the recent wave of anger in
China and Korea and the resulting diplomatic
frictions. The Japanese leaders seem not to
understand that certain acts send the wrong
signals to their neighbors. At the same time,
putting the whole blame on Japan simplifies the
issue and leads to a rather one-sided perception
of the situation. We must not forget that both in
Korea and China, the state plays a major role in
education, exercising complete control over what
textbooks are chosen for usage at schools and put
a strong emphasis on "patriotic education", while
in Japan the role of the government is much more
marginal as the writing is done by scholars not
affiliated with the government and the process of
choosing a textbook is conducted by local
committees.
The projection of the "self"
on Japan, in Korea and China, can be seen as one
of the reasons for the anger. It is also important
to remember that during the reign of Mao Zedong
and Deng Xiaoping in China, the view of history
presented to the Chinese citizens was that, while
Japanese military and government has been
responsible for the crimes, the Japanese people
were innocent. However, since the 1990s, the
historical narrative has been revised in order to
unite an increasingly fragmented Chinese society
through a nationalism that is strengthened by the
existence of a common enemy.
It is also
important to remember the unresolved territorial
disputes between Japan and China, which are
unrelated to the crimes of the Japanese empire,
but still serve as an important factor in the
frictions.
As Martin Jacques in his
Guardian article notes, in many ways East Asia is
frozen in time and, unlike Europe, many of the
issues from the previous century remain relevant.
However, the keys to solving this problem are held
by all the involved actors, and not solely by
Japan. It is only via a more in-depth
understanding of the situation, one which avoids
easy stereotypes and generalizations, that those
Western states that have strong political and
economic ties with regional players, will be able
to play a vital role in facilitating a defrost in
the cold relations that characterize the region,
and foster increased stability and normalcy.
Alexander Bukh is a research
fellow at Hosei University, Tokyo and a PhD
candidate in international relations, London
School of Economics. He has worked and studied in
Japan for nine years and in 2000 earned an LLM in
international law from Tokyo University.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact us for information
on sales, syndication and republishing.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
All material on this
website is copyright and may not be republished in any form without written
permission.
© Copyright 1999 - 2005 Asia Times
Online Ltd.
|
|
Head
Office: Rm 202, Hau Fook Mansion, No. 8 Hau Fook St., Kowloon, Hong
Kong
Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road, Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
|
|
|
|
