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Alternative nuclear tack for Japan
By Anthony DiFilippo
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
Deterring attack is usually cited as the
main motivation for states to keep or acquire
nuclear weapons. Yet today's nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stalemate involves
both security and economic concerns. Nuclear and
non-nuclear weapons states alike have associated
nuclear-energy-generating capabilities with
economic growth. By far the biggest problem that
the NPT faces is that nations have come to see and
use it as a self-serving accord.
The NPT
is also hampered by two other problems: the
nuclear states' studied neglect of the treaty's
obligations on them to disarm, and the
substitution, especially since September 11, of
counter-proliferation for non-proliferation. In
addition to being accusatory and demanding, too
often in a unilateral way, the trouble with
pursuing a counter-proliferation policy is that it
invites serious challenges to the NPT regime. By
casting some countries as rogues while ignoring
the behavior or weapons stockpiles of friends, a
counter-proliferation policy provokes a
confrontational environment that highlights
differences and minimizes the prospects for prompt
resolution.
Breaking the stalemate
There are several things that the
international community can do to strengthen and
universalize the NPT. Without amending and
reinforcing the NPT, nations will continue to use
the accord to serve their national interests, thus
sustaining the stalemate.
Article X, which
gives countries the right to withdraw from the
NPT, needs to be amended to make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for any country to
retract its commitment to the accord. This
"divorce clause" threatens and undermines the
disarmament and non-proliferation objectives of
the NPT.
Universal participation in the
NPT needs to be encouraged and ultimately
mandated. Any country that refuses to become a
party to the NPT should be regularly informed of
the expectation to explain to the United Nations
General Assembly its reasons for not acceding to
the accord. A majority vote by the General
Assembly will determine if a country's reasons are
valid. Invalid reasons will automatically cause
the matter to be taken up by the Security Council,
which will immediately issue a formal request for
the country to accept the accord.
After a
specified period, any nation that continues to
resist becoming a party to the NPT should face
sanctions imposed by the Security Council, which
should also work to coordinate the international
efforts of other multilateral organizations to
gain a country's acceptance of the accord.
Complete acceptance of and compliance with
the Additional Protocol, which allows for
short-notice and comprehensive inspection of
countries' nuclear facilities, needs to exist.
This will go a long way to ensuring that countries
are not clandestinely using their nuclear programs
to build nuclear weapons.
Article VI,
which obligates the nuclear powers to disarm,
needs to be given momentum so that it can be
implemented, as intended by the NPT. Since 1970,
the nuclear powers have shunned the responsibility
of eliminating their nuclear weapons. What is
more, at least three other nuclear-weapons
countries have not even confronted this
responsibility, since they remain outside of the
NPT.
Giving momentum to article VI will
require the committed involvement of the
international community. Considerably more
pressure must be brought to bear on the
nuclear-weapons powers, given their sustained
reluctance to part with their arms. An amendment
to the NPT needs to require that all
nuclear-weapons countries biannually report to the
UN General Assembly the status of their
disarmament efforts. When progress has not been
made, a specific and unequivocal explanation
should be required so that the General Assembly
can offer suggestions and direction to realize
disarmament. Ideally, this amendment should
include a target date of 10 to 15 years for the
nuclear weapons states to have eliminated all of
their nuclear weapons.
More countries need
to become associated with the New Agenda Coalition
(NAC). Currently comprised of only seven
countries, Brazil, New Zealand, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, South Africa and Sweden, NAC, which has
worked to expedite nuclear disarmament since India
and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, has
been insisting that the nuclear weapons states
have not fulfilled their obligation to eliminate
their arms. The more countries that join NAC, the
more international pressure will be directed at
the nuclear weapons states to conform with their
obligation to abolish their nuclear arms.
Japan's contribution to the NPT regime
One of these countries should
definitely be Japan. A Japan outside of NAC is an
anomaly. Tokyo's refusal to join NAC since its
inception centers on its inherently contradictory
position toward nuclear disarmament: seeking the
abolition of nuclear weapons while refusing to
relinquish Japan's perceived security under the US
nuclear umbrella, and opposing a nuclear free zone
for northeast Asia. The continued existence of
this contradiction in Japanese policy has caused
Tokyo to accept a gradualist path to
nuclear disarmament, much preferred by the US and
the other nuclear weapons countries than the
more expeditious course advocated by NAC.
The gradualist position is fully consistent
with virtually all politicians' views that
nuclear weapons should be abolished - some day.
Tokyo cannot continue to accommodate the
nuclear-weapons states if it is genuinely
committed to nuclear disarmament. By joining NAC,
Japan will not only be creating more pressure on
the nuclear-weapons states to abolish their
arsenals, but it will also be sending a much
stronger signal to the international community
that it is ready to accept the moral authority to
help direct the world toward disarmament.
Tokyo understands the importance of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the NPT
regime. Indeed, Tokyo's continued commitment to
the CTBT, despite Washington's aversion of the
accord, is commendable. However, Tokyo needs to
reintroduce a specific time for the CTBT to come
into force, similar to what appeared only in
Japan's 2000 nuclear disarmament resolution to the
General Assembly, which called for the accord to
come into effect before 2003. Although Tokyo has
been a reasonably strong advocate of the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, here, too, it must
overcome its reluctance to push harder for this
accord because of balking by Washington,
precipitated by a disagreement with Beijing on
missile defense.
Tokyo's overriding
concern with strengthening the US-Japanese
security alliance and maintaining the American
nuclear umbrella afforded to Japan has caused it
to abandon its efforts to normalize bilateral
relations with North Korea. Moving away from
supporting Washington's hardline position toward
Pyongyang and working just as hard to normalize
relations with North Korea is the best way for
Tokyo to ensure Japan's security. Had Pyongyang
believed that Tokyo was fully committed to
rapprochement and to nuclear disarmament during
the North Korean nuclear crisis that emerged in
October 2002, this would have assuaged regional
tensions and distrust and helped with negotiating
a resolution, perhaps before North Korea announced
its objective of increasing its nuclear deterrent
force.
Tokyo has long assumed that its
position under the US nuclear umbrella is central
to Japan's security. However, the extension of the
US nuclear umbrella to Japan offers far less
security than the assurance of non-proliferation
and the abolition of nuclear weapons. If North
Korea does possess nuclear weapons and if it makes
the wrong choice of proving this by conducting a
nuclear test, Tokyo should look critically at
whether being under the US nuclear umbrella with a
regional arms race perhaps imminent is better for
Japan's security than a denuclearized Korean
peninsula and normalized relations with Pyongyang.
The best way to reduce threats to Japan's
security is not to be seen as a threat. Tokyo's
insistence to strengthen its military alliance
with the US and its determination to seek a
"normal country" status for Japan rather than work
unreservedly to promote nuclear disarmament has
meant that it has compromised the widespread
Japanese sentiment supporting the abolition of
nuclear weapons. By following Washington down the
counterproliferation trail, Tokyo has moved off of
its self-identified path of nuclear disarmament
and, like the nuclear powers, has accepted the
justification that nuclear weapons exist to deter
potential adversaries.
While Tokyo has
stressed the importance of universalizing the
Additional Protocol, it has not done much to
persuade and push the nuclear powers to comply
with the NPT's article VI. Nor has it promoted
other substantive ways to fortify the weakened
NPT. If Tokyo really believes that nuclear weapons
need to be abolished, then it must begin to show
its leadership skills by seriously seeking
creative ways to improve and strengthen the NPT.
Anthony DiFilippo is professor
of Sociology at Lincoln University in
Pennsylvania, US. His most recent book is The
Challenges of the US-Japan Military Arrangement:
Competing Security Transitions in a Changing
International Environment, M E Sharpe, 2002.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus) |
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