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Yasukuni Shrine: Old
wounds still fester
By
Sean Curtin
A month before Beijing and
Tokyo prepare to commemorate the highly sensitive
60th anniversary of Japan's World War II surrender
on August 15, relations between the two neighbors
are dangerously strained over a host of
historical, territorial and economic disputes.
The current focal point of bilateral
tension is the annual pilgrimage of Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Tokyo's Yasukuni
Shrine, which serves as a memorial for Japan's war
dead, including 14 Class-A war criminals, among
them wartime leader General Hedeki Tojo.
Despite being at the center of China-Japan
friction, Koizumi and his supporters'
justification for his Yasukuni forays remains
largely a mystery to most non-Japanese. This is
because arguments in favor of the shrine
excursions are generally not presented in the
English media in a coherent and detailed manner.
However, analyzing these explanations offers
significant insights into key issues at the heart
of current China-Japan tensions, something which
will become increasingly important if bilateral
dialogue deteriorates further.
Koizumi
said in May he planned to visit the shrine again
this year though last month he told South Korean
President Roh Moo-hyun that he would consider
building another site to honor the bulk of Japan's
war dead. A poll released this week suggests that
63 per cent of Japanese favor establishment of a
new shrine to replace the notorious current
memorial. The poll, as well as another earlier
one, suggests that about half of Japanese oppose
further visits to the shrine by their prime
minister.
The following arguments
represent the unadulterated pro-Yasukuni case as
it is presented in the nationalist Japanese
language press and by supporters of the prime
minister's shrine pilgrimages.
The
pro-Yasukuni camp says Japan is truly remorseful
about the pain and suffering it inflicted on China
and other Asia countries during World War II.
Japanese prime ministers and officials have on
many occasions made extensive public apologies for
the country's wartime occupation of its neighbors.
Koizumi, speaking at the Asia-Africa summit in
Indonesia in April, expressed his "deep remorse
and heartfelt apology" for Japan's colonial rule
and wartime aggression, giving one of the fullest
and sincerest apologies ever by a Japanese prime
minister.
The Yasukuni advocates say it's
absolute nonsense to claim that Japan hasn't
apologized to the people of Asia and is not
thoroughly repentant for its past acts of
aggression.
Instead, shrine defenders say
there is a lot of misinformation and ignorance
about the Shinto establishment. Foremost, they
point out that Yasukuni is primarily dedicated to
the country's war dead, claiming it is the
Japanese equivalent of America's Arlington
National Cemetery or the United Kingdom's
Cenotaph, and as such is a natural and proper
place for Japanese political leaders to pay their
respects in a traditional manner to those who died
in the service of their country.
The
shrine adheres to the standard Shinto practice of
forgiving the sins of all those who have died and
honoring the memory of everyone who fell in the
service of Japan regardless of what they actually
did when they were alive.
Like other
religions, the Shinto faith cannot reasonably be
expected to change the fundamental tenets of its
teaching because another country finds them
inappropriate. To suggest that it should is highly
insensitive and demonstrates a complete lack of
respect for deeply held Japanese religious
beliefs.
On each occasion Koizumi has
visited the Yasukuni Shrine, he has made it
absolutely clear that his intention is to pray for
peace and show respect for the war dead, as would
any elected prime minister or president in a
democratic country. Nationalists argue that just
because Japan lost the war does not mean that its
people and leaders should forfeit the right to pay
their respects in a traditional manner to those
who made the ultimate sacrifice for their country.
Immediately after his visit to Yasukuni in
January 2003, Koizumi stated his motives, "I
prayed for peace and prosperity at the Yasukuni
Shrine." He added, "Japan's peace and prosperity
are not only the result of the efforts of people
today, they are also built on the sacrifice of
those who lost their lives in the war even though
they did not want to die."
He has also
diplomatically explained why such visits are
purely a domestic matter, saying, "I don't think
the people of any country would criticize the
people of another for paying respect to their own
history, traditions and customs."
After
his January 2004 visit, an editorial in the
Yomiuri Shimbun (newspaper) elaborated: "The issue
of when and in what manner a prime minister of a
nation should pray for the war dead is, primarily,
a domestic issue to be decided on the basis of the
country's traditions and customs. Other countries
are in no position to say anything about it."
The nationalists ask: Why does China
object so strongly to a democratically elected
Japanese leader solemnly praying for peace and
simply honoring the war dead of his country?
The pro-Yasukuni forces say a major part
of the answer lies in the fact that China is not a
democracy and is run by an unelected and
"autocratic Communist Party." Its "secretive
leaders" are not accountable to the people and
freedom of speech is severely restricted. At the
moment, there are many serious social issues in
China that people are not allowed to discuss
openly. Beijing has found that deliberately
whipping up anti-Japanese sentiment is an easy way
to divert attention from these problems and allows
its suppressed citizens to vent pent-up anger that
might otherwise be directed at the Communist
Party. Generating nationalist sentiment also helps
the Communist Party shore up its grip on power
during a period of difficult social change.
In the past, China did not complain when
Japanese prime ministers Masayoshi Ohira and Zenko
Suzuki visited the shrine, and Yasukuni advocates
say it is just doing so now in an attempt to
intimidate Japan. Another element of this strategy
is Beijing's rapidly expanding military, which is
also attempting to menace Japan with incursions
into Japanese territorial waters. Tokyo cannot
afford to bow to these threats, because it would
be seen as a sign of weakness and Beijing would
only make further unreasonable demands and
increase incursions into Japanese territory.
History clearly demonstrates that it is
not in the interests of a democratic country to
bow to political, military or economic pressure
exerted by undemocratic regimes.
Nationalist lawmakers say paying homage at
Yasukuni is not the real the issue at the heart of
Sino-Japanese tensions. China is merely utilizing
it as a tactic to coerce Japan into submission as
part of its broader strategy for expanding its
regional power. Yasukuni supporters point out that
Koizumi recently remarked, "I do not think
Yasukuni shrine is the core issue of Japan-China
and Japan-South Korea ties. The core issue is that
we should enhance our ties with future-oriented
views."
The Yasukuni camp believes that
like the leader of any other democratic country,
Koizumi should continue to pay his respects in a
traditional manner to the war dead at the national
monument dedicated to them. Japan should not make
concessions regarding the key principles of
non-interference in domestic affairs and the
separation of political and economic issues.
The nationalists argue that if Tokyo
remains firm on Yasukuni then Beijing will
eventually realize that its bullying tactics are
unproductive. When it understands this, the two
countries can create the basis for a new and more
meaningful bilateral relationship.
The
moral and economic cases against the
shrine
The arguments of those who oppose
Yasukuni visits can be divided into two distinct
categories: moral and economic. Fully
understanding both aspects is becoming
increasingly vital as tension between Beijing and
Tokyo continues to rise.
The moral
anti-Yasukuni case acknowledges that under normal
circumstances how a country honors its war dead is
usually a purely domestic matter, in which other
countries have no right to interfere. However,
they point out that in this particular case it is
not so straightforward for a number of important
historical reasons.
First, during the
1930s and 1940s the shrine served as the spiritual
pillar for Japanese nationalism and is
inextricably linked with the wartime military
regime responsible for the suffering of millions
of people in neighboring Asian countries.
Second, in 1978 the Shinto priests at the
establishment secretly enshrined the names of 14
Class-A war criminals, including wartime leader
Tojo, into the memorial. This clandestine ceremony
was only made public in 1979 and it is from then
on that Yasukuni really began to attract domestic
and international controversy.
This act
meant it was no longer possible for the emperor to
go there personally, although imperial envoys are
still regularly sent. While the last imperial
visit occurred on November 21, 1975, political
leaders have been far less cautious.
Prime
ministers Masayoshi Ohira (December 1978 to June
1980), and Zenko Suzuki (July 1980 to November
1982) visited the shrine after the announcement of
the secret enshrinement ceremony, but the
significance of their low-profile pilgrimages was
not fully understood by the international
community in the days before the 24-hour global
media age. Since the world could not physically
see them paying homage and the controversy of the
enshrinement of Class-A war criminals was still
relatively unknown, the excursions were largely
ignored. Furthermore, Suzuki's 1982 visit appears
to have been in a purely private capacity.
It was not until August 15, 1985 that an
official visit by Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
caused neighboring Asian countries to protest
strongly. Nakasone did not visit the shrine again
as prime minister out of consideration for
Japan-China relations and neither did any other
prime minister in an official capacity until
Koizumi resurrected the practice on August 13,
2001. Since then he has visited the shrine each
year, causing a storm of international protest on
each occasion.
While nationalists have
questioned the motives of an undemocratic Chinese
regime in raising the Yasukuni issue, the same
argument cannot be applied to South Korea, which
enjoys a vibrant democracy. Yet criticisms by
Seoul and Beijing about Yasukuni are almost
identical.
For instance, after the January
2003 pilgrimage, South Korean Foreign Ministry
spokesman Shin Bong-kil, said, "Our government
expresses deep regret that Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi paid homage at the Yasukuni Shrine which
houses memorials to war criminals, who undermined
world peace and inflicted intolerable damage and
pain on our people."
Compare this to a
statement made after the January 2004 visit by
Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. He said, "We
will never tolerate an incumbent Japanese leader
going to a shrine enshrining Class-A war
criminals. There is no leader in Germany or Italy
who pays homage to the soul of Hitler or
Mussolini."
Indeed, these kinds of
Hitler/Mussolini comparisons, which are the most
damaging for Japan's international reputation, can
even be found in Koizumi's own junior coalition
partner. For example, on May 20 this year, New
Komeito lawmaker Junichi Fukumoto told Koizumi in
parliament, "I want you to think about how Jewish
people would feel if the German chancellor visited
the grave of Adolf Hitler."
To many
ordinary Chinese and Koreans, the Yasukuni visits
appear to be the same as a German leader visiting
a Hitler memorial and as such these views cannot
simply be ignored.
It is true that Shinto
traditions state that a person's sins are forgiven
once they are dead, and Tojo has the same right to
enshrinement as any other deceased soul. However,
a prime minister needs to remember he is the
international political representative of the
nation, not its spiritual sage or philosopher. In
a global world it has to be acknowledged that when
it comes to such sensitive issues, the feelings of
other countries have to be taken into proper
consideration by politicians, regardless of
domestic religious practices.
Former prime
minister Nakasone summed up this view recently
when he said, "I understand the prime minister
visits the shrine out of his personal beliefs …
however, a prime minister should also think how
his conduct will affect the national interest ...
a separate enshrinement of Class-A war criminals
will take time, I think it would be an admirable
political decision to stop visiting the shrine."
Chinese leaders have continually stressed
that they understand the need for Japanese leaders
to honor the war dead, but cannot accept the fact
that it is done at an establishment that also
honors the wartime leaders who were directly
responsible for inflicting immense suffering on
its people.
The other half of the Yasukuni
counter argument is purely an economic one.
Quite simply, the tensions generated by
the pilgrimages are threatening booming economic
ties that are essential to both countries.
Bilateral friction is already having an impact on
commerce, threatening billions of yen in
investments by Japanese companies.
In
April large anti-Japanese demonstrations swept
across China, last August there were disturbances
at the Asia Cup final and in 2003 an anti-Japanese
riot broke out in Xi'an in northwest China. The
increasing possibility that more of these kinds of
disturbances will occur is making Japanese
business people and their families feel
uncomfortable about working in China. And the
uncertainty is making Japanese companies hesitant
to launch new expansion plans. In such a
competitive market as China, Japanese business
cannot afford such distractions and poor political
ties are a potential threat to business.
Bilateral tensions are also negatively
affecting Chinese citizens living in Japan and
this is also hurting trade and cultural links.
In recent years, many ordinary Japanese
have invested a lot of effort into building up
good connections with both China and Korea.
Insensitive actions by the prime minister are
harming these hard-forged bonds and in extreme
cases even putting Japanese citizens at risk as
the spate of recent anti-Japanese demonstrates
illustrated.
Other contentious issues like
the revisionist Japanese history textbooks, the
status of Taiwan and various territorial disputes
are also becoming harder to resolve in a
continually strained atmosphere. This situation
also is feeding nationalist passions, which are
difficult to control.
There is a risk that
if Sino-Japanese ties remain tense, other issues
like Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands territorial
dispute could eventually lead to more serious
forms of confrontation.
Even if we accept
the nationalist argument that China is merely
exploiting the Yasukuni issue to pressure Japan,
it has to be asked: Why is Koizumi giving Beijing
such a valuable diplomatic card to play? The
Yasukuni issue is damaging Japan's international
image as it makes the country look insensitive to
the feelings of other nations and unremorseful
about its past.
Koizumi is also harming
Japanese economic interests in China. China-Japan
relations need to look to the future, not dwell on
the past. For both moral and economic reasons, the
Yasukuni pilgrimages should stop.
J
Sean Curtin is a GLOCOM fellow at the
Tokyo-based Japanese Institute of Global
Communications.
(Copyright 2005 Asia
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