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Losing heart and
Seoul
By Yoichiro Sato
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
On August 15, the 60th anniversary of the
end of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister
Koizumi Junichiro issued a statement, part of
which included yet another apology to China and
Korea . On the same day, South Korean President
Roh Moo-hyun celebrated his country's liberation
from Japanese rule and refrained from making
explicit reference to Japan's colonialism as he
did in the past two years.
China mobilized
its police forces to guard against anti-Japanese
riots, avoiding the widespread demonstrations that
occurred earlier this year. While
behind-the-scenes diplomacy has put a temporary
stop to the downward spiral of Japan's relations
with its neighbors, the explosive nature of the
"history" problem continues to strain Japan's
relations with both countries.
In fact,
prime ministers Murayama Tomoiichi and Koizumi
already apologized to South Korea and China, and
former premier Obuchi Keizo apologized to South
Korea. Yet, another apology to South Korea is
clearly needed to save deteriorating Japan-South
Korea relations. Koizumi's inclusion of China in
his recent apology would appear to be a setback to
the Japanese public, who proudly approved of
Obuchi's refusal to apologize during the failed
summit with Chinese president Jiang Zemin in 1998.
Japan needs differentiated approaches to
South Korea on the one hand and China and North
Korea on the other, favoring the country that
appears more likely to forgive. The diplomatic
gains from such a move far outweigh the cost of
alienating domestic voters –the impact of which
can be minimized with explanations.
Korean
history dramas will likely continue to portray
Hideyoshi (Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who sent an
invasion force against Korea in the 16th century)
as an early example of the villainous Japanese.
However, a heartfelt apology on the modern
invasion may put the story back where it belongs:
in history and popular entertainment, not
diplomacy.
Democratic consolidation of
South Korea
In the late-1990s, South Korean
democracy entered a period of consolidation. The
election of civilian leaders and the victories of
opposition parties brought about new sources of
political legitimacy in the South Korean polity.
During the Cold War, sources of legitimacy were
anti-communism, anti-Japanese sentiment and
economic growth.
The weight of
anti-communism declined after the collapse of the
Soviet Union, and democratic elections became a
new source of political legitimacy for political
leaders. Earlier leaders of South Korea suffered a
legitimacy deficit as a result of past ties with
the Japanese colonial administration and military,
and deliberately acted anti-Japanese. The new
generation of democratically elected leaders can
act without the mental baggage of their
predecessors.
President Kim Dae-jung's
relaxation of the ban against cultural imports
from Japan and Roh's call for forward-looking
relations with Japan reflect the new thinking of
this generation of politicians. When Roh launched
an investigation of wartime collaborators,
suspicions were raised that he, like his
predecessors, was using this issue to get back at
his domestic political opponents. Others have
interpreted Roh's initiative as an effort to put
this dark side of Korean history to rest and move
toward building a future-oriented relationship
with Japan.
US-South Korea
South Korea's alliance with the US has been
the backbone of its security policy since the
Korean War. The US has brokered quarrelsome
relations between South Korea and Japan through
its bilateral alliances with both countries. Since
the Cold War, North Korea has targeted its
propaganda inside South Korea at left-leaning
youths, who constitute a core voting group behind
the ruling party. Though communism was hardly a
popular sell, the idea that the US presence on the
peninsula prevented reunification of the two
Koreas penetrated the minds of the post-Korean War
generation.
With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the US has gradually shifted the
burden of defending South Korea to the South
Korean military. However, a combination of NIMBY
(not-in-my-backyard)issues in urban Seoul, the
traditional fear of abandonment by pro-US leaders
(which has been exacerbated by poor communications
over troop relocation issues), and the unpopular
Korean decision to dispatch troops to Iraq –and
the perception that the move was not appreciated
by Washington –contributed to worsening US-South
Korean ties. During the Cold War, downturns in
US-South Korea ties made South Korea turn to
Japan; today China is filling the void.
The six-party talks
Since the
1990s nuclear crisis, the US, South Korea and
Japan have attempted to coordinate policies and
present a unified front vis-a-vis North Korea.
However, South Korea's stubborn refusal to
consider economic sanctions against the North and
its decisions to go over the head of the US and
Japan and offer economic aid to North Korea have
demonstrated that South Korea is more willing to
appease North Korea than Japan and the US. South
Korea's failure to support Japan's insistence that
the abduction issue be addressed at the six-party
talks (despite the fact that far more South
Koreans have been abducted by North Korea ) also
attests to this view.
Just prior to North
Korea's announcement that it was ready to return
to the six-party process, South Korea announced
its offer to send electricity to North Korea in
return for abolition of its nuclear programs. The
offer was consistent with the US and Japanese
position in two ways: (1) any new offer of energy
aid should be non-nuclear, and (2) North Korea
must implement its side of the bargain first. As
the talks in Beijing went into gridlock and
recess, South Korean Reunification Minister Chon
Donyoung supported North Korea's right to peaceful
nuclear use, presumably to entice the North
Koreans back to the talks. South Korea has also
been more generous than Japan and the US in terms
of food and fertilizer aid to North Korea. To
assure South Korea's diplomatic coordination with
Japan and the US, Japan can, and should, play a
bridging role. Here, Japan-South Korea
reconciliation is essential.
East Asian
integration
Japan has long been South
Korea's number one trade partner. It is no
surprise then that Japan has started negotiations
on a free trade agreement (FTA)with South Korea.
While China signed FTAs with ASEAN members ahead
of Japan, there is no FTA negotiation between
China and South Korea. Nevertheless, the volume of
China-South Korea trade has been rapidly growing,
and China replaced the US as South Korea's number
two trade partner in 2003.
The recent
diplomatic feud between Japan and South Korea
resulted in the suspension of their FTA talks.
Delay in concluding the Japan-South Korea FTA will
give China an opportunity to take the leadership
in shaping East Asian integration. Politically,
Japan's interest in "open regionalism" in East
Asia –with a strong emphasis on links to North
America –has been challenged by the Chinese
version of regionalism that excludes the US. The
recent invitations to Australia, New Zealand and
India to attend the first East Asian Summit
meeting this fall in Kuala Lumpur is indicative of
Japan's preference to dilute Chinese influence in
this forum. A South Korea closely aligned with
Japan will provide a strong counterweight in this
forum.
Too early to push South Korea
away
Although some geopolitics enthusiasts
believe South Korea is going to shift its
allegiance to China, its traditional patron, it is
too early to give up on South Korea. Its growing
democracy looks at both North Korea and China with
great skepticism. There are strains in the
US-South Korea alliance, but the strain is partly
due to South Korea's fear of abandonment and a
sense of being under-appreciated, rather than
South Korean trust of China or elite hostility
toward the US. US-Japan-South Korea coordination
in the six-party process has managed to present a
unified front on nuclear weapons and energy
development issues, and prevented North Korea from
gaining a tactical advantage.
China's
economic growth is a great attraction to South
Korea, but the decline in the relative importance
of Japan for South Korea will be a slow process.
If Japan is eager to preserve its leadership in
Southeast Asia, there is more of a reason to
attempt the same in South Korea. Realizing the
prophecy of geopolitics on the Korean peninsula is
easy. In fact, it is so easy that it can wait
until after Japan tries one more time to win the
hearts of South Koreans.
Dr Yoichiro
Sato is an associate professor at the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Honolulu, Hawaii. The views expressed in this
article are personal opinions and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
Department of Defense, or the US government. He
can be reached at satoy@apcss.org
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS) |
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