As
many predicted, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
dissolved Japan's House of Representatives after
the House of Councillors defeated the postal
reform bill by 17 votes. A general election is now
scheduled for September 11. While it is risky to
predict the outcome of the vote, the dissolution
of the Lower House has profound implications for
Japanese politics and for the US-Japan alliance.
The rejection of the postal bill, the
cornerstone of Koizumi's reform initiatives,
indicates that the traditional consensus-based,
decision-making mechanism within the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has almost
completely broken down. Although criticized as
opaque and driven by parochial-factional - rather
than national - interests, this unofficial
coordination mechanism allowed factions to broker
deals behind the scenes.
As unseemly as
this process is, it works. While Koizumi appeared
to take the initiative on a range of issues, he in
fact relied a great deal on such coordination
processes within the LDP
to
work out details. Without them, no one knows how
the LDP or the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
will be able to move policy initiatives forward at
the political level.
Immediate impact
on US-Japan alliance These coordination
mechanisms have been critical to Japan's efforts
to be a reliable US ally in recent years. Senior
LDP diet members played an essential role in
unifying LDP decision-making and bridging
differences with opposition parties on defense and
security policies. For instance, the contingency
legislation to revise Japan's post-war pacifist
constitution was able to pass the diet largely
thanks to LDP former defense minister Kyuma Fumio,
who was the point man in the ruling coalition to
move the bills forward.
Japan's decision
to introduce ballistic missile defense also became
politically possible because of similar
below-the-radar coordination between the LDP and
other major parties. These behind-the-scene
political efforts allowed Japan to dispatch
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to support US-led
coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
With that mechanism weakened, pushing
initiatives critical to the US-Japan alliance will
be harder. Negotiations over US force
realignments, including implementation of the
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)
process, is the first issue that will be affected.
Japan Defense Agency Director General Ohno
Yoshinori indicated that the interim report on the
negotiations, originally expected next month, will
likely be delayed at least until October.
The process can be further delayed, or
even derailed, depending on the September 11
election outcome. This will frustrate the
Pentagon, which wanted to reach agreement by June
this year. With so many bases and facilities under
consideration for realignment, Japan needs a
strong coordination effort at the political level
to wrap up the bilateral agreements - it is simply
impossible for government bureaucrats to work out
deals with different localities, prefectural
governments and other interested groups without
robust political backing. With a much-weakened
political coordination mechanism, the negotiations
risk significant delay, which could be a major
irritant in the alliance.
Or take the
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) deployment to
Iraq . The US hopes Japan will extend the
deployment another year after the current
authorization expires in December. This will set
off a fierce political battle: the DPJ has already
said it will bring the troops home if it wins a
majority in September. Since Washington expressed
its support for China's position on the debate
over United Nations Security Council reform, a
number of politicians, both inside and outside the
LDP, have questioned Japan's need to maintain JSDF
deployments to support the US-led coalition.
Again, without a political force that can unify
the ruling coalition and reach out to the
opposition, it will be extremely difficult for
Japan to extend the deployment.
Lack of a
political-coordination mechanism will also
complicate efforts to pass a "permanent law" -
legislation that would provide a consistent set of
standards for Japan to use to decide whether it
can (and should) deploy the JSDF overseas.
Constitutional revision will be put on the
backburner as well.
Washington's
patience tested Between now and September
11, there will be as much political jockeying as
in 1993, when the LDP lost its majority to a
seven-party coalition led by Hosokawa Morihiro.
Even after the election, it will take a while for
the political turmoil to end. Japan will be
distracted by internal affairs for some time.
Some argue the election's impact on
Japan's foreign policy, including US-Japan
relations, will be minimal, regardless of the
outcome. The difference, they assert, is merely
one of emphasis: will future Japanese political
leaders remain as committed to the alliance with
the US or will they sometimes veer away from the
alliance?
Many in the US will welcome the
turmoil as necessary for Japan to become a nation
with a more timely decision-making process and
greater transparency. This is necessary for Japan
to revitalize its political structure.
Many foreign policy issues, including
those important for the long-term health of the
US-Japan alliance, will be shelved during this
period, however. The urgency and salience of these
issues can turn a lack of progress into sources of
major tension between the allies. Alliance
managers in Washington must be patient in the
months to come.
Yuki Tatsumi is
Research Fellow of the East Asia Program at the
Henry L Stimson Center in Washington, DC. She can
be reached at yukitatsumi@hotmail.com
