Richard
Armitage is president of Armitage International, a
consulting company based in Virginia. From 2001
through 2005, Armitage served as deputy secretary
of state. The following interview is excerpted,
with permission, from the March issue of The Oriental Economist
(TOE).
TOE: You came to
office in 2001 looking to modernize the US-Japan
relationship. The October 2000 "Armitage Report"
put forward a clear agenda. But September 11 and
the subsequent Iraq war complicated the plan. On
balance, how much progress has been made?
Richard Armitage: Actually,
Joe Nye from Harvard and the Clinton
administration was the co-chair, so it was the "Armitage-
Nye"
report. It was bipartisan. Having said that, I
think we've exceeded the goals we put forward in
that report. Think about it. Japan has troops on
the ground in Iraq, engaged in vital
reconstruction work. Japanese politicians, and the
public at large, are now able to openly discuss
the possibility of removing the constitution's
article 9 prohibitions on military operations
abroad.
We've clearly come a long way. But
it certainly wasn't my report, or Joe Nye's
report, that led to this. On the US side, lots of
people agreed with what we wrote in that report,
especially President [George W] Bush himself. And
we found a very energetic prime minister on the
Japanese side, Prime Minister [Junichiro] Koizumi,
together with very competent bureaucrats. So, many
things came together to make this work. Bottom
line is that the US-Japan defense relationship is
functioning very well.
TOE:
How much of the improvement depends on
personalities, and how much is dependent on
permanent institutional upgrades?
Armitage:The US and Japan share
national interests, and that is institutional for
the foreseeable future. But personalities are very
important in foreign policy. President Bush would
say that Prime Minister Koizumi is one of his best
friends, if not his best, on the international
scene. This is well known within the Japanese and
the American bureaucracy. Thus, within the US
internal policy debates, over trade or other
issues, Japan tends to get the benefit of the
doubt. So, on a day-to-day basis, personalities
play a very important role. But, they never take
the place of national interests.
TOE: For many years, you argued
that Japanese legal restrictions prevented
effective military co-planning with the US, and
many American officers agreed with you. There was
a lot of tension at the operational level. Has
that improved?
Armitage: It
clearly has improved. There are Japanese officers
in Florida at the Centcom (Middle East)
headquarters of the US military. The word is out
among all levels of the US State Department and
the Pentagon that Japan is a good ally. The
Japanese government has performed in what we call
a "standup" way in response to the September 11
crisis. The SDF [Japan Self-Defense] forces have
been great, providing fuel, working well in Iraq,
helping in Afghanistan, performing other roles
that our troops really appreciate.
TOE: How do you evaluate the
"history" controversy raging in the region?
Armitage: It is very
troublesome. But it's become bigger than it should
be. The "history" issue is, it seems to me, a
symptom of a divisive nationalism that exists
throughout Northeast Asia. China, Japan and the
two Koreas are all caught up in this. But behind
this is a process we've never seen before in the
region: two major powers - roughly equal -
occupying the same space at the same time. So for
many, it is uncomfortable.
In the face of
arguments from China, it has become very difficult
for a Japanese prime minister to not visit
Yasukuni shrine. But, if China were to pull back
from much of its rhetoric, I would hope that
Japanese politicians and the public would
correspondingly respond.
Having said that,
I really think Tokyo should resolve the textbook
issue. I know that not many of the controversial
books are purchased. But even those few distorted
books affect the minds of young Japanese, and that
is not healthy. If the textbook issue were clearly
dealt with, it would dramatically show that Japan
has moved on, accepted its past without in any way
justifying the past, and is now concentrating on
building new relations with its neighbors.
TOE: Let's talk about North
Korea. Were you angry in 2002 when Koizumi
suddenly announced that he would visit North
Korea?
Armitage: Absolutely
no. In fact, he was kind enough to inform me of
his plan, and we really appreciated that. We knew
before many in Japan knew. Ambassador Howard Baker
and I promptly informed secretary of state [Colin]
Powell. The prime minister assured me that none of
our interests would be harmed. Secretary Powell
quickly informed President Bush, and then the
secretary called me and said that the Bush
administration was confident that Prime Minister
Koizumi would protect our joint interests.
TOE: Would you clarify a
controversial episode regarding North Korea
policy? Early on, you testified to Congress that
the Bush administration would eventually hold
bilateral talks with North Korea. Bush was said to
be very angry with you. Is that true?
Armitage: Some people in the
administration were very angry. But members of
Congress were very happy. All of our allies in
Asia were delighted. And, what I said eventually
became our policy. But it is true that after I
initially made my comments, I knew that some
people in some quarters of the administration were
very unhappy.
TOE: So, what
is the relationship between the six-party talks
and the bilateral talks with North Korea?
Armitage: I was very clear
in that testimony that, in the context of the
six-party talks, of course we would have bilateral
talks with the North Koreans. And that is exactly
what has happened. We've had bilateral talks with
the North.
It took a while. Some people in
the administration are frightened that diplomacy
is a signal of weakness. I disagreed. I was
convinced that if we knew who we are, and we know
what we are and what we are about, we can make
diplomacy work for us. In the end, diplomacy is
the art of letting the other guy have our way.
TOE: Will the six-party talks
work?
Armitage: They are a
good exercise. We have five of the six parties of
a common mind, that North Korea should not have
nuclear weapons. That's a good starting point. It
provides a good reason for us to get together a
talk. I think the process is very worthwhile.
Having said that, it is not going very far, very
fast. The same splits that existed in the Bush
administration when I was in office still exist.
I give my highest compliments to Chris
Hill, the State Department's new Asia chief. He is
doing a tremendous job. But he has the same
problems that we faced when Jim Kelly and I were
there.
TOE: What problems
did you face?
Armitage:
There is a fundamental disagreement over how to
approach the North Korea problem. There is a fear
in some quarters, particularly the Pentagon and at
times in the vice president's office, that if we
were to engage in discussions with the North
Koreans, we might wind up with the bad end of the
deal. They believe that we should be able to
pronounce our view, and everyone else, including
the North Koreans, should simply accept it. This
is not a reasonable approach.
Those of us
at the State Department concluded: from the North
Korean point of view, the nuclear issue is the
only reason we Americans talk with them.
Therefore, the North Koreans would be very
reluctant to let go of the nuclear program. We
knew it was going to be a very difficult process.
But you have to start somewhere. You start by
finding out what their needs and desires are, and
seeing if there is a way of meeting those needs
and desires without giving away something this is
sacred to us.
TOE:
Ultimately, will we have to live with a nuclear
North Korea?
Armitage: That
is a very real possibility. North and South Korea
are getting closer and closer. No question about
that. And China is enormously investing in North
Korea, and North Korea has become somewhat
stronger economically. It is not tottering on the
edge of collapse as it was a few years ago.
South Korea has become more and more
involved in the North's economy. Many people in
the South have concluded that Pyongyang would
never attack South Korea. So, slowly on a de facto
basis, we are seeing unification taking place
between the two Koreas. There is nothing official
about this process. It is facts on the ground, and
the facts are visual to the naked eye.
TOE: Will China put pressure
on North Korea to end the nuclear program?
Armitage: China wants the
nuclear weapons issue resolved. I don't doubt
that. The Chinese worry that the nuclear weapons
issue in the North could ultimately bring a
foreign power into the North, which China very
much does not want. So, China will be consistent
in its desire to eliminate the North Korean
nuclear programs.
Having said that, the
Chinese do not want to break ties with the North
Korean government. China needs a good relationship
with both Koreas, but especially with the North,
for many reasons, including their shared border.
TOE: How big a rift is there
between the US and South Korea?
Armitage: We are in better
shape now than we were a few years ago, when there
was a terrible accident involving two school
children run over by one of our military vehicles.
That was a very, very bad time. And that followed
a difficult visit to Washington by Kim Dae-jung,
who was then the president of South Korea.
The South Korean political structure is
undergoing a lot of change. It is developing, and
not always easy to work with. Also, keep in mind
that, from a historical perspective, the US and
South Korea have often had some tough moments.
It's true that we fought the Korean War together.
But some South Koreans remain bitter that, from
their view, the war started because we gave
indications that we wouldn't defend the South in
the event of an invasion from the North.
So, most Americans think that the South
Koreans should appreciate the support we gave to
protect them from the communist invasion. But,
many South Koreans don't see things in quite that
way. Their view is much more complex than simply:
"Oh, thank you for saving us." I think Americans
have to be more aware of that.
TOE: Kim Dae-jung's March
2001 visit was very contentious. What went wrong?
Armitage: Secretary of state
Colin Powell had briefed the press ahead of the
visit. The Washington Post ran a very good story,
but the headline was misleading. It said,
essentially: "Bush to follow Clinton policy." That
made the then-new Bush administration very angry,
forcing secretary Powell to face the press and say
that the administration was not following the
former administration's policy. The controversy
grew from there.
TOE: But
did you have any fundamental disagreement with Kim
Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy of opening to the
North?
Armitage: I was
somewhat critical, in this sense: I felt that to
have a policy of trying to enhance ties with the
North was not a bad idea. But to base his entire
presidency on that idea, to leave his fate in the
hands of a North Korean regime that might or might
not respond, was not the best way to proceed. He
could have had the Sunshine policy without making
it the centerpiece of his entire presidency.
TOE: You seem optimistic
about the two Koreas coming together.
Armitage: I wouldn't call it
optimistic. At some point, a unified Korean
peninsula could cause some complications for the
US-Japan relationship. Korea has a robust
population, relatively young. A unified Korea
would have a huge military. And Korea would be a
country that, very fairly, has often been
described as a "shrimp among whales". I wouldn't
blame Koreans if they were to decide that they do
not want to be a "shrimp among whales". The desire
to end that role that history seemed to impose on
them would be understandable.
TOE: Concerning China: Does
the United States fundamentally have a policy of
containing China, working with Japan and India,
and maybe Vietnam?
Armitage:
No. I really mean that. Look at the facts. Look at
the enormous level of American foreign direct
investment in China, for example. And look at the
fact that we have trained hundreds of thousands of
Chinese engineers and other technocrats in
American universities. We continue to do so. Our
actions hardly seem to be those of a country
trying to contain China. We do not have a policy
to contain China.
All of us involved in
the Pacific - Japan, South Korea, India, the
United States - all of us, have a big stake in
seeing China arise on the world stage in a
peaceful, benign fashion. None of us know how
China will emerge. China might choose a
neo-mercantilist approach - a zero-sum approach.
That attitude would amount to: "If it is good for
Japan and India, it is bad for China."
The
other approach would be: "A rising tide will lift
all boats". In that case, China would view the
economic vitality and strength of India and Japan,
and the US, as good for China. As long as all of
us involved in Asia have the latter view, there is
a good chance to integrate China into the system.
TOE: Where does India fit
into this big picture?
Armitage: India is a
multiracial, multireligious democracy, which is
something that Americans are accustomed to. It
made no sense that the US and India were not
close. So, I am very happy that the two countries
are coming closer.
India is a very young
country, and will soon have the largest and
fastest growing middle class in the whole world.
India is going to be a tremendous power in the
world. India's society is open, free, and
transparent, so it poses no threat to the
international community. India is precisely the
kind of nation that we - the US and Japan - should
be working very hard to develop close ties to.
The US and Japan should be working closely
together to deepen ties with India. The point is
not to contain China. The point is to embrace
India as a nation with which we share common
values of democracy and openness. India is looking
East, and political leaders in Washington and
Tokyo should embrace that.
