SPEAKING
FREELY Japan should
keep its eye on the bomb By Anthony DiFilippo
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
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It is a puzzle why
Japan's public seems much more concerned about
North Korea's abduction of some of its nationals
during the 1970s than it is with possibility that
North Korea may have acquired nuclear weapons and
the means to deliver them against Japan. A Cabinet
Office survey conducted in 2005 showed that nearly
88% of the respondents selected the abduction
issue as being most important to them.
It
is certainly no secret that Pyongyang has a
reasonably advanced missile program, with missiles
capable of striking
Japan. Yet only 52% of
the respondents in the Cabinet Office survey chose
the missile issue as being important.
Notwithstanding Pyongyang's announcement in
February 2005 that it had produced nuclear
weapons, survey showed that just below 64% of the
respondents expressed an interest in North Korea's
nuclear development work.
It is true that
the Japanese public's interest in North Korea's
nuclear-weapons activities has increased since
2002, when it stood at just under 50%. It is also
true that Pyongyang's February 2005 announcement
appears to have prompted additional interest in
this matter among the Japanese public.
However, this growing concern with the
North Korean nuclear crisis since 2002, the year
Tokyo first sought to normalize relations, can
probably be explained by the media attention given
to Pyongyang's dramatic announcement that it has
developed nuclear weapons and by the persistent
failure of the six-party talks to resolve the
North Korean nuclear crisis.
For the past
few years, Tokyo has often maintained that the
nuclear, missile and abduction issues are equally
important to Japan and that all three must be
resolved before it can normalize relations with
North Korea. However, just before the
normalization talks in 2002, and again this year,
Tokyo made clear that the abduction issue would be
the "top priority" of Japan during discussions
with Pyongyang.
This elevation of the
abduction issue to the top of Tokyo's list of
problems that must be settled before normalized
ties can be established brings credibility to
those who have linked the public fascination with
the kidnappings to growing political conservatism
in Japan.
Even Tokyo's typical claim that
the nuclear, missile and abduction issues must all
be resolved prior to the normalization of
relations with North Korea must be understood in
its proper political context. While Tokyo can win
commitments from Pyongyang about its missiles and
even settle the abduction issue (though that is
very unlikely in the present political climate),
it cannot resolve the nuclear crisis on its own.
This requires Washington's involvement.
Thus as long as existing conditions
remain, normalized ties between Japan and North
Korea can only occur after Washington and
Pyongyang settle the nuclear crisis. This is not
an especially good indicator of Japan having a
North Korea policy independent of that of the
United States, given that the administration of
President George W Bush is clearly in no hurry to
settle the nuclear issue.
It has been
argued that Tokyo would be inclined to focus more
on the nuclear and other security matters with
North Korea if it were not for the Japanese
public's insistence that the abduction issue must
be settled. In other words, the government is
simply following the will of the Japanese people.
However, Tokyo has rarely, if ever, let public
opinion stand in the way of doing what it believes
is necessary for Japan's security.
Tokyo
hardly conformed to the public's will when it
decided in late 2003 to send Self Defense Forces
to Iraq. The enduring public endorsement of the
constitution's no-war Article 9 has not kept the
government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
from seeking revisions in this revered clause.
Moreover, the odds are still quite high that if
one were to question Okinawans about the presence
of US troops, most would prefer them to leave the
island.
Why all of the political ballyhoo
about the abduction issue just prior to the start
of normalization talks with North Korea? Just as
in Pyongyang, there are conservative hardliners in
Tokyo who do not want to see normalized relations
between North Korea and Japan. In North Korea,
this hardline position pushes Pyongyang to rant
about its destructive military power and to take
provocative steps that worsen the security
environment in Northeast Asia.
In Japan,
the hardline position that is committed to
resolving the abduction issue to the complete
satisfaction of conservative forces not only makes
it nearly impossible to establish ties with North
Korea but is also consistent with conservative
efforts to make Japan a "normal country", one with
a sophisticated military that is actively involved
in regional and international security problems -
and that, in the final stage, could lead to Japan
to acquire its own nuclear weapons.
The
abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea is
certainly a serious matter. Indeed, Japanese
people have every right to be concerned about
these illicit actions perpetrated by North Korea,
especially since they undermine the safety and
security of ordinary citizens. Moreover, the
kidnapping of young Megumi Yokota is a
particularly disturbing matter that most people
can easily empathize with.
But today Tokyo
must also be concerned with the security of the
127 million Japanese people. Having acknowledged
its culpability, Pyongyang is unlikely to abduct
any more Japanese. This therefore makes the North
Korean nuclear issue the most pressing security
matter facing Japan today. While Tokyo cannot
resolve the nuclear issue - certainly not without
Washington - it can commit Japan to normalizing
relations with North Korea, something that
Pyongyang wants to see happen.
With so
many problems standing in the way of normalized
ties between Japan and North Korea, Tokyo and
Pyongyang must recognize that obstinacy only
serves to justify the positions of conservative
hardliners in both countries. Tokyo would serve
the Japanese people well by working as hard as it
can to normalize ties with North Korea, even if
this means postponing the settlement of the
abduction and nuclear issues.
Anthony
DiFilippois professor of sociology at
Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. His most
recent books are The Challenges of the
US-Japan Military Arrangement: Competing Security
Transitions in a Changing International
Environment (M E Sharpe, 2002) and Japan's
Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the US Security
Umbrella (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming
2006).
(Copyright 2006 Anthony
DiFilippo.)
Speaking Freely is an
Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say. Please click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
