Preparing for Japan's post-Koizumi
era By Brad
Glosserman
WASHINGTON - As expected, the
"Sayonara Summit" went very well. Japanese Prime
Minister Junichiro Koizumi's last visit to the US,
replete with a 19-gun salute and a visit to
Graceland, set a new standard for diplomatic
intimacy. It was a fitting farewell to a
remarkable five years in US-Japan relations and a
well-earned reward for Koizumi.
No doubt
Koizumi benefited greatly from a decade of
preparations. The evolution of Japanese security
policy began in the aftermath of the Gulf War and
was nudged along by his predecessors as well as
the Clinton administration. But the friendship
Koizumi built with US President George W. Bush was
instrumental and helped elevate the bilateral
relationship to new heights. The so-called
"George-Jun relationship"
will arguably be the standard by which all others
will be judged.
Consider: over the past
five years, Japan made unprecedented overseas
deployments of its self-defense forces to aid the
US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and
reconstruction in Iraq. The Security Consultative
Committee (the SCC, also known as the "2+2"
Committee because members include the heads of the
two governments' defense and diplomatic
bureaucracies) produced common strategic
objectives for the alliance and, against high
odds, this year agreed on a plan to restructure
and realign the two militaries. Tokyo and
Washington are cooperating closely on key security
issues, including the high stakes standoffs with
North Korea and Iran, despite some basic
differences in outlook.
At their White
House meeting, Bush and Koizumi together heralded
a new, "US-Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation
for the 21st Century." This document identifies
shared values and shared interests and reaffirms
the two countries' intentions to work together to
combat problems ranging from the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction to energy security to
climate change. It also called for the two
governments to explore ways to deepen their
economic relationship and enhance cooperation on
various regional and global issues.
Critics have worried that the two leaders
are well ahead of public opinion (at least in
Japan) and that there is a risk of a backlash.
Thus far, the critics have been wrong. Throughout
the Koizumi era, Japan has surpassed virtually all
US expectations. And while some argue that the US
has gotten significantly more out of the
refurbished alliance than has Japan, opinion polls
show rising public support for the alliance on
both sides of the Pacific.
It seems, then,
that the strong relationship will survive the
Koizumi era. The pieces are all there: the vision
exists, the plan to strengthen the military
dimension of the alliance is in place, nettlesome
economic issues have been dealt with, and both
governments appear ready to explore new
possibilities for economic relations. Some
supporters of the alliance even talk about a free
trade agreement.
Potential
obstacles Still, there are reasons for
concern. The immediate worry is the agreement to
realign US forces in Japan. While the Japanese
approve of any proposal that reduces the US
military footprint, relocation raises the
so-called NIMBY problem - not in my backyard.
Communities in Japan are upset about hosting
military forces and afflicted areas enjoy
widespread sympathy. Japanese politicians will
have to spend political capital to get the plan
implemented, something they - including Koizumi -
have to date been extremely slow to do. That
reluctance is likely to increase when the next
administration tackles other pressing domestic
issues, such as fiscal reform and the mountain of
government debt.
There is also a sense of
imbalance. Despite their support for the alliance,
many Japanese still feel that the US benefits more
from the relationship than they do. The list of
grievances is varied. Some fret that reckless US
policies might entangle Japan in conflict. Others
complain that the US has not been sufficiently
supportive of Tokyo's bid for a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council - perhaps even
in deference to Beijing's opposition to that bid.
Some charge that Koizumi was overeager to please
Bush by lifting the ban on imports of US beef, a
move that critics contend potentially endangered
Japanese consumers. Nor have US threats of trade
retaliation helped to build favorable public
opinion on the Japanese street.
Oddly
enough, despite all the accomplishments, there are
still Japanese fears of abandonment. These
concerns are not as pronounced as they were during
the Clinton administration, but they still exist.
Those fears were most evident at the start of the
second George W. Bush administration, when many of
the administration's seasoned Japan experts were
resigning. Given recent developments, their
persistence suggests that there is an element of
irrationality involved, but the fears must still
be acknowledged and dealt with.
Over the
long term, there are two structural concerns. The
first is Japan's aging population. The country is
already one of the oldest in the world - 20% of
the population is over the age of 60 - and the
social and economic costs of this demographic
shift are wholly unpredictable. Priorities will
have to change and it is unlikely that an aging
society will be prepared to spend the money needed
to maintain a robust military alliance over other
priorities.
The second concern is the
development of the broad Asian economy and Japan's
deepening integration with the region. Today, the
US is the final market for heaps of products built
in Asia. As Asian economies mature, a middle class
will emerge that will decrease Japan's, and
arguably the region's, current reliance on the US
market. This threatens to create a divergence in
Japan's security and economic interests that could
undermine the US alliance.
While there is
no quick fix for any of these problems, they are
not insurmountable. The single most important
thing Japanese leaders can do is to vigorously
make the case for the alliance. The Japanese
public must be convinced of the benefits from a
strong partnership with the US. In fact, the US is
often cast as demanding while Japan passive.
Japanese politicians may score points by claiming
to fend off US demands, but such tactics undermine
the sense of partnership that is essential to the
alliance's survival.
Second, the US should
be very careful about making future demands on
Japan. More diplomatic energy should be devoted to
locking in the gains of the last decade, rather
than continuing to expand Japanese
responsibilities. To Washington's credit, that
appears to be the current strategy. Finally, the
two countries have to institutionalize an economic
relationship that balances Asia's economic
development and integration. The development of
deeper economic relations envisioned in the
alliance of global cooperation for the 21st
Century is a positive step in that direction.
Brad Glosserman is executive
director of Pacific Forum CSIS.
