Take a deep breath. Repeat after me:
"Japan is not going to develop nuclear weapons."
Repeat. Feel better?
Yes, North Korea's
reported nuclear test is a blow to the regional
security order. It is a bitter defeat for
diplomacy. And yes, Japanese (and Chinese and
Americans and South Koreans and others) are
concerned about its implications, but the fear -
the assumption? - that Japan will develop its own
nuclear weapons as a consequence is pure fantasy.
Japanese understand that the
nuclear option is a last-gasp
desperate move that will create more instability
and insecurity than it will eliminate.
To
be sure, North Korea's test complicates Japanese
national-security planning, compounds popular
insecurities, and provides ample fodder for
conservatives and nationalists who demand a more
robust defense posture. It will certainly be cited
by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and others as they
campaign to revise Japan's constitution. And over
a decade ago then-prime minister Hata Tsutomu
admitted that "Japan has the capability to possess
nuclear weapons".
But capabilities alone
do not determine a country's security policy;
intentions are even more important. Japan still
lacks the will to develop nuclear weapons – and
for very good reasons. Perhaps most powerful is
the resilience of the nuclear taboo in Japan. The
experience of World War II is still strong in the
popular consciousness and the Japanese public
remains highly allergic to the thought of
developing its own nuclear weapons capability.
(Expect a deluge of polls on this topic in the
near future but look closely at the wording of key
questions.)
Significantly, Japanese
security planners recognize that a national
nuclear arsenal would be destabilizing and would
actually diminish Japanese security. Building a
Japanese bomb would further erode the global
nonproliferation order, would generate greater
mistrust among neighbors and raise questions from
allies about its strategic intentions.
This is the logic animating former prime
minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's recent call for a
national study of the nuclear option. He is not
endorsing this course - as he explained "the first
priority is to keep being a nuclear-free state,
and the second is to reinforce the system under
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]" - but
he understands that a national debate on the
subject is good for Japan. It will lay the
foundation for a stable and credible national
security policy and help establish the consensus
needed to implement it.
Japanese must ask
how a North Korean nuclear weapon changes the
security landscape. It adds a new wrinkle, but it
is hard to see how Pyongyang's bomb transforms it
in any fundamental way. The US nuclear umbrella is
still in place, and it is unclear why deterrence
wouldn't work against North Korea - with a tiny
arsenal - when it worked well enough against the
former Soviet Union despite its inventory capable
of destroying the world several times over.
In fact, Japan has already studied the
nuclear option. In the 1960s, the Sato cabinet
examined the possibility, and used the willingness
to proceed down that path to secure a place under
the US nuclear umbrella. Some three decades later,
a study conducted at the behest of the Japan
Defense Agency after the first Korean nuclear
crisis concluded that a Japanese nuclear arsenal
made little strategic sense.
It would
damage the country's image, undermine the NPT,
prompt countermeasures by other countries in the
region (including development of their own nuclear
arsenals), potentially threaten the alliance with
the US (by raising questions about the need for a
US commitment to Japan when Tokyo could defend
itself), and provide very little security for
Japan in return. The country is too small, and the
population too concentrated. It would remain
vulnerable no matter who had their finger on the
trigger.
That logic hasn't changed. A
nuclear weapon wouldn't add to Japan's defense
capability but would do real damage to its core
security interests. To their credit, the Japanese
recognize that. As Abe explained to a Diet
committee earlier this week, "We have no intention
of changing our policy that possessing nuclear
weapons is not our option. There will be no change
in our non-nuclear arms principles. We want to
seek a solution through peaceful and diplomatic
means."
The only wildcard is the US
commitment to Japan's security. If Tokyo felt the
Washington was wavering, then a homegrown bomb
might make some sense. The answer, then, to
growing unease after North Korea's test is
continuing efforts to strengthen the alliance - by
both governments. To their credit, they are doing
that too.
Brad Glosserman
(bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com) is executive director at
the Pacific Forum CSIS.
