Opportunity for Japan over North
Korea By Masako Toki and Mary
Beth Nikitin
Editor's note:
Three weeks after its nuclear test, North Korea
said on Tuesday it was returning to six-party
talks because Washington had agreed to discuss
financial sanctions that Pyongyang says drove it
from the negotiating table to start with. The
talks also involve China, Japan, Russia, the US
and South Korea.
The shock wave from
North Korea's nuclear-weapon test of October 9
still reverberates, resulting in renewed debates among
Japan's high-ranking
governmental officials over whether Japan should
go nuclear itself.
Concern over the
regional instability caused by North Korea's
nuclear crisis has been felt all over the region
and the entire world. In parallel with this
concern, Japan's reaction, or overreaction, to the
test is being watched by the international
community as another potential aftershock to
regional security.
Following on the heels
of the missile tests in July, the nuclear test
excited anti-North Korea sentiment among Japanese
citizens. In addition to the security crisis, the
Japanese public's resentment over the abduction of
its citizens by North Korea has not abated. Given
this background, the Japanese people have
increasingly come to support harsher punitive
actions against North Korea.
As a response
to the nuclear test, the Japanese government
imposed strong unilateral sanctions against North
Korea that went even further than United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1718. They ban all
North Korean imports and stop ships from entering
Japanese waters.
As expected, there have
been some remarks from top-ranking officials
encouraging the Japanese people to debate Japan's
policy concerning nuclear weapons. However, given
the robust US-Japan security arrangement and,
moreover, Japan's nuclear allergy, there is no
need to worry seriously about Japan going nuclear
as an immediate response to the North Korea's
nuclear test. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has since
clearly reiterated that Japan will adhere to the
three non-nuclear principles of not possessing,
not producing and not permitting the introduction
of nuclear weapons into Japan.
It is
understandable that such debates may periodically
arise in response to the changing regional and
global security environment. Japan's occasional
"nuclearization" debate has been a hot topic among
security specialists and policymakers. Media
interest in the pro-nuclear side of this debate
has at times appeared to outweigh Japan's clearly
stated no-nuclear-weapons policy and a largely
anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese
population.
It has also provided a
disservice by heightening the perception
internationally that Japan may be leaning in the
direction of developing its own nuclear arsenal.
Despite the controversy, Japan's core policy and
its mentality remain irrevocably against going
nuclear.
North Korea's nuclear test
nevertheless has had an inevitable impact on
Japan's security policy. Even though Japanese
nuclear armament is out of the question, the
ongoing debate over rewriting Article 9 - the
constitutional renunciation of war - indicates a
mood among its people favoring the right to
collective defense and pushing the country toward
becoming, or recapturing, its status as a
so-called "normal nation".
Going nuclear
is one thing and becoming a normal country is
quite another. While many who are familiar with
Japan's security policy and public opinion do not
seriously consider nuclearization as an option,
changing Article 9 is much more probable.
Japan's neighbors obviously would not like
to see the country go nuclear or even change its
constitution. As things stand today, neither will
happen in the near future, but these debates may
become more serious and realistic in response to
regional developments.
Considering the
serious security situation in the region, a
"rethink" response from the Japanese government is
understandable. North Korea's nuclear test
definitely gives Japan the opportunity to consider
seriously the country's future security policy,
which also inevitably leads to debates over
Japan's relationship with its neighbors.
In addition to bolstering defenses,
policymakers should also consider how Japan can be
more proactive and effective in helping solve the
North Korean nuclear crisis and strengthening
regional stability by using its soft power. As
International Atomic Energy Agency director
general Mohamed ElBaradei suggested recently,
"Dialogue is an essential tool to change behavior.
Without dialogue you cannot move."
This
could be a good opportunity for Japan not only to
underscore its unchanging commitment to nuclear
disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), but also to make efforts to facilitate
dialogue among the relevant parties. This could
start with improving Japan-China relations.
Prime Minister Abe's trip to China after a
five-year gap in such visits and his statement to
mitigate the soured relationship between the two
countries were praiseworthy. Part of improving
this crucial relationship is building trust and
showing consistency, which means demonstrating to
China that Japan does not want to live in a world
that has more nuclear weapons in it, be they North
Korean, Chinese or Japanese.
Many analysts
have said the threat of Japan going nuclear is the
main impetus for China taking a tougher stand on
North Korean nuclear weapons, and finally getting
serious about convincing Pyongyang to give them
up. A nuclear-weapons capability will always
remain a technical option for Japan, but
politically it is important for regional stability
that Japanese officials not confuse their
neighbors by even implying that the bedrock of
their non-nuclear security policy could change.
In this sense, Abe's frankness on Japan's
adherence to the three non-nuclear principles
should be given due credit as a clear expression
of Japanese policy in the spirit of openness.
Since he has been known for his hawkish
inclinations and once stated that Japan's
acquisition of a small and defensive nuclear
arsenal would not contradict the Japanese
constitution, some people may have entertained
concerns lest their government would take more
provocative stance against North Korea.
As
opposed to the prime minister's unambiguous
statement, a few officials occupying important
cabinet posts have made remarks that sounded as if
they were advocating Japan's going nuclear.
Shoichi Nakagawa, the Liberal Democratic Party's
policy chief, and Foreign Minister Taro Aso hinted
at the advisability of making Japan a
nuclear-weapons power. These remarks have spoiled
Abe's clear statement and diluted Japan's moral
authority on nuclear disarmament.
Although
neither of them is officially advocating Japan's
going nuclear, words of such influential cabinet
members are very likely to send a wrong message to
Japan's neighbors and the world. Symbolically,
Japan occupies a unique place in the
non-proliferation system, having advanced
technologies that could be used to produce nuclear
weapons but are strictly peaceful, as well as
having been a victim of a nuclear attack.
They make Japan's role as a champion of
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament even
more important. At a time when confidence in the
NPT is at an all-time low, the debate in Japan is
magnified on the world stage. Besides the impact
on the world's confidence in the non-proliferation
regime, careless statements such as these may do
unnecessary harm to Japan's relations with China
or South Korea, countries that are extremely
sensitive to Japan's military conduct. These
statements by Japan's top ranking officials are
inappropriate and unhelpful while Northeast Asia
is tackling a nuclear crisis.
Instead of
hinting at support for a debate on the nuclear
option, the government of Japan should demonstrate
even stronger adherence to the three non-nuclear
principles. Why is there not much serious
discussion about legislating the
no-nuclear-weapons policy into Japanese law rather
than leaving it as a "national policy" that is not
legally binding?
Japan should demonstrate
its unflinching commitment to nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation and clearly show its
dedication to the three non-nuclear principles
domestically, and internationally reiterate its
strong support for the NPT and for the six-party
talks.
Japan needs to continue to be the
responsible member of the nuclear-power club by
sending a strong message that nuclear weapons
should not be a pillar of national security, and
should be more vocal in insisting on the
inhumanity and immorality of nuclear weapons, and
their common threat to all human beings. This will
serve Japan's own security interests as well.
Masako Toki is research
associate at the Center for Non-proliferation
Studies in Monterey, California, and is a native
of Kobe, Japan. Mary Beth Nikitin is a
fellow at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies in Washington, DC.
(Copyright 2006 Center for
Non-proliferation Studies.)
