Tokyo's war with its peace
prefecture By Gavan McCormack
The election for governor of Okinawa on
Sunday is unique among prefectural elections in
Japan in its national, regional and even global
implications. The Japanese state has been
struggling for more than a decade to secure the
compliance of Okinawan people with an agenda whose
core is priority to the US alliance over the
constitution and priority to military
(songun) over civil or democratic
principles, something that it abhors when
practiced by North Korea.
Struggling to
resist, the Okinawan people tire and grow old, while
the
state continually rejuvenates, as most recently
under the Shinzo Abe government. If their
resistance is defeated now, the nationwide
processes of constitutional revision and military
reorganization will gain momentum. If they are
victorious, the deals done under President George
W Bush and former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi
will have to be renegotiated.
Throughout
the postwar era, Okinawa has been the
quintessential child of the US-Japan relationship.
In it, the nature of both is best revealed. As the
rest of Japan faces the implications of US
pressure to become a fully fledged ally, the
"Great Britain of the Far East", and as forces
associated with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
relish and seek to advance this prospect, Okinawa
presents a frame within which possible national
futures are contested.
In the one, Japan's
"war state" and "peace state", sundered since
1945, would be rejoined with Okinawa leading the
country along the path of militarized dependence
on the United States, alienation from Asia,
priority of military over civil affairs, and
retreat from constitutional democracy. In the
other, Japan's civil society and its committed
democrats would assert constitutional sovereignty
and regain the initiative in determining state
policy from the United States and its servants in
Tokyo, with important consequences for Japan's
role within an emerging Asian community.
Sunday's election will not determine the
outcome of this process, but it will certainly
modify its outcome. It will also constitute a
major test of whether the doctrine of military
reorganization enunciated by former US defense
secretary Donald Rumsfeld will survive the firing
of its leader.
In modern Japanese history,
no locality has ever contested authority with the
national government in anything like the
determined way in which Okinawa contests it, and
has contested it, with considerable success, for
the past decade. While Tokyo insists that the
constitution is outdated and must be revised,
Okinawa protests that it has yet to be implemented
and demands attention especially to its clauses on
peace (Article 9) and local self-government
(Articles 92-95). The stakes in this contest are
large.
Modernity and always being
disposed of Within the modern Japanese
state, the status of Okinawa has always been
ambiguous. It was in essence an "attachment" and
therefore "expendable, under duress, if thereby
the interests of the home islands can be served
advantageously". [1] Okinawa's modern history has
been seen by Okinawans as a series of acts of
shobun, or disposal, in which they had no
say and their interests were disregarded, first in
1879, when the Ryukyu kingdom was abolished and
the islands incorporated, as Okinawa, in the
Japanese state.
The second was in 1952,
when sovereignty was restored to the rest of Japan
but Okinawa was left as a US military colony,
"keystone of the Pacific", a center for the
cultivation of "war potential", and preparation
for "the threat or use of force" such as was
forbidden under Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution. The third was in 1972, when the
islands were returned to Japan, but with bases
intact; and fourth in 1996, when the return of
Futenma base was promised "within five to seven
years", but with the catch that it would have to
be replaced, the replacement facilities would also
have to be located in Okinawa, and Japan would
have to foot the bill.
Today, 10 years on
from that promise, absolutely nothing has changed.
The huge and sprawling Futenma Marine Air Station,
which has played a major role over half a century
in wars in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, still sits
incongruously in the middle of the densely
populated township of Ginowan, close to Okinawa's
capital, Naha, and Okinawans continue to resist
the proposed base extension at Henoko. Sunday's
election constitutes a renewed attempt to solve
the festering Futenma problem. Will Okinawa be
"disposed of" a fifth time?
The Futenma
10-year war Okinawa has experienced the
past decade as one of unrelenting struggle to
redeem the original base-removal promise, and to
free itself from the burden of enforced
militarism. The central government in Tokyo tried
by every means to break the Okinawan will,
confronting a coalition of local fishermen and
farmers, teachers, shopkeepers, small-business
people, elected representatives of local
governments and, by no means least, the
ojii and obaa (the old men and women
of Okinawa), now in their 80s and 90s, whose
experience of the calamity of war in 1945 made
them resolute opponents of any military role for
Okinawa.
When one focuses on the contest
between those at the center of power in the
Japanese state and the men and women who make up
the Okinawan opposition alliance, the Association
to Defend Life, the fabric of Japanese democracy
has a distinctly imperial look. The members of the
local movement must look to Tokyo somewhat as
Asterix and Obelix (of Rene Goscinny's and Albert
Uderzo's comic series on ancient Gaul) to the
rulers of the Roman empire, a maddening,
provincial nuisance rather than a serious threat.
Yet they have held the Japanese state at bay for
more than a decade, and when the polls open on
November 19, it is their voice that Tokyo most
fears.
The design for the Futenma
replacement base in its initial 1996 version was
for something described as a "heliport". The word
was suggestive of something like a city rooftop in
area, but the plan was for something that would
rival Osaka's Kansai Airport, built on an
artificial offshore island, in size, with a runway
1,500 meters long and 600 meters wide, on an
offshore, pontoon floating base, resting on steel
poles encased in the seabed. [2]
Assuming
any opposition could be either bought off or
bullied, Tokyo resorted to grand-scale financial
inducements and political pressures. Yet when the
people of Nago City conducted a plebiscite in
1997, the outcome was a resounding "no". Despite
the unambiguous outcome, the pressure from Tokyo
was implacable. Bizarrely, the mayor promptly flew
to Tokyo, pledged his support for the construction
(ie overruling his constituents), and then
resigned.
Two months later, when
prefectural Governor Masahide Ota endorsed the
plebiscite, overruled Nago City's administration,
and declared there would be no heliport, relations
between his administration and Tokyo plummeted.
Then-prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto refused to
see him again, and the Tokyo "cold shoulder" and
withdrawal of resources were key factors in his
electoral defeat 10 months later.
The
first phase of the 10-year war ended with the "Ota
rebellion" crushed and the customary dependent
relationship between Tokyo and Naha restored. But
it was to prove merely an introductory skirmish in
the epic Futenma struggle.
Believing that
the opposition could be blunted by economic
incentives, ie, that Okinawans must have their
price, Tokyo showered blessings on the new
governor, Keiichi Inamine, an Okinawan
businessman. Money was poured into special
Okinawan Development and Northern Districts
Development funds, the latter concentrated on
"social and economic revitalization" projects in
the vicinity of the planned new base, in and
around Nago City.
It was 1999, however,
before Inamine agreed to the planned new (Futenma
replacement) base construction, and then only on
three conditions: it would have to be a joint
civil-military-use airport, US military use would
be restricted to 15 years, and there had to be
appropriate assurances that the construction and
use of the airport would not result in
environmental damage.
By this time, the
airport itself had become a grander structure than
originally conceived. Its runway had grown to
2,500 meters; it would take more than a decade to
complete at prodigious expense (estimated at about
a trillion yen - US$8.5 billion), and sit astride
the relatively unspoiled coral off Okinawa's
northeastern shores. A serious environmental
assessment should have been enough to kill the
plan, because the seas were known to be home to
the internationally protected dugong, a kind of
sea mammal, the shores to a colony of sea turtles,
and the reef to comprise some of the island's few
remaining live, relatively healthy, coral
colonies.
But Tokyo assumed the survey
would be perfunctory, and that it would be enough
to come up with a scheme to "protect" the dugongs
and turtles and to plant more coral. Futenma would
only be returned when the new facilities were all
in place, and the Japanese taxpayer had met all
costs. Not until 2002 did the two governments even
sign off on a basic plan for construction.
Rumsfeld grew impatient.
Local residents
and opposition groups, however, mobilized once
again to thwart the government plans. When
government survey vessels appeared off Henoko just
after sunrise on April 19, 2004, to commence
test-drilling etc, [3] a sit-in protest was
launched, which then continued without let-up for
more than one and a half years at the site.
At a makeshift tent headquarters, Okinawan
elders, some in their 80s or even 90s, mingled
with fishermen and townspeople from around the
island, while fishing boats, canoes and even hardy
swimmers conducted an offshore "blockade". All
that the state's survey team could manage to
accomplish in that time was to count the dugongs
(between 30 and 50) and erect four lighting
beacons, which had to be dismantled with each
typhoon. [4]
In October 2005, faced with
the continuing opposition blockade at Henoko,
prime minister Koizumi acknowledged that the
government had been "unable to implement the
[initial] relocation [plan] because of
opposition". [5] The Henoko offshore plan, like
the heliport before it, was dropped. It was an
admission of defeat by the state, and a tribute to
the determination and persistence of the local
coalition. It deserves to be recorded as one of
the remarkable events in recent Japanese history:
in a decade-long contest, Okinawa's Asterix and
Obelix had defeated the nation-state.
The
state, however, would not concede defeat.
High-level inter-governmental (US-Japan) talks led
to a two-part agreement, a general statement of
principles in October 2005 and a detailed
"roadmap" at the end of the following April.
Futenma was a key issue. In the finalized
base-relocation plans of May this year, a
"roadmap" for the relocation of US facilities was
agreed with a target date of 2014 set for the new
facility and for the transfer of 8,000 marines to
Guam. By then, however, 10 years had passed since
the promise of Futenma return, and instead of
return, military flights had been substantially
increased, [6] while return in 2014, or any time,
remained a remote prospect.
Like the
reversion of 1972, the crucial point in the
Futenma negotiations has been Japanese government
determination to serve US military design. The
Japanese government had in 1968-72 gone to great
lengths to keep the shameful details of those
negotiations secret, but they amounted in essence
to the payment of the vast sum of $685 million for
the "return" of what belonged to Japan in the
first place, substantially more than it paid a few
years earlier as compensation to an entire country
(South Korea) for 40 years of colonialism.
In addition, Japan promised to continue
indefinitely paying a kind of reverse rent to the
US, Japanese landlord paying American tenant, for
continuing to occupy Okinawan lands. Japanese
officials, including then-chief cabinet secretary
and now prime minister Shinzo Abe, lied in the
parliament to cover up the deal, and those who
tried to reveal what was going on were savagely
prosecuted. [7] In similar vein, once again the
Japanese government now promises to pay huge sums
for the Futenma "reversion".
In the 2006
version, the replacement facility would comprise a
large new base complex, to be built at Japanese
expense at Camp Schwab, an existing US facility on
Cape Henoko in close proximity to the abandoned
offshore site. It would include a V-shaped runway
of 1,800 meters, partly on land reclaimed from
Oura Bay and partly on the reef, plus a pier and
storage facilities where US nuclear aircraft
carriers could be comfortably accommodated. [8]
The heliport of 1996 had thus become a vast air
and marine military complex, with its own port and
two runways instead of one.
The reaction
in Okinawa was universally negative; "outrage"
would not be too strong a word to describe it.
Hitherto, governments in Tokyo had always pledged
consultation, at least gone through the motions of
honoring local sentiment, and promised that no
deal would go against Okinawan wishes. This new
agreement was reached over the heads of Okinawans
and without consultation.
Governor
Inamine, a conservative and supposedly a reliable
ally for the LDP authorities in Tokyo, described
it as "totally unacceptable" and said that
"everyone in the prefecture and in Nago City
opposes it". [9] Watching Inamine's fury and
bitterness, it was hard to recall that this was
the man put in place by the Tokyo government only
six years earlier to replace the recalcitrant Ota.
Around the island, local government
authorities, the mayor and local governments of
Ginowan and Nago (the existing and projected base
sites) prominent among them, denounced what they
saw as Tokyo's unjust, high-handed, and
unconstitutional demands. During 2004 and until
October 2005, prefectural opposition to the
Futenma transfer to Henoko, or indeed to any place
in Okinawa, had been running at around 80%. After
announcement of this agreement, it jumped at the
end of October to 85%. [10]
Respected
Okinawan scholar Teruo Hiyane described the
islands late in 2005 as in a state similar to that
of the shimagurumi toso, the islandwide
struggles of resistance that marked the seizure at
bayonet-point of agricultural lands for base
construction during the 1950s. [11] The government
was reported to be considering dealing with its
own Okinawan nominee, Inamine, as it had with Ota:
by passing a "Special Measures Law Concerning US
Bases" to bring him in line, specifically by
stripping him of his constitutional authority over
the open seas and by simplifying (read: obviating)
environmental-assessment procedures, so that the
reclamation of the waters adjacent to Cape Henoko
could proceed with or without his approval. [12]
In January, when a mayoral election was
held in Nago City, all three candidates took an
anti-base construction stance, but the victor, LDP
candidate Yoshikazu Shimabukuro, wasted little
time after the election in reversing himself, like
his predecessor in the aftermath of the 1996 Nago
plebiscite. When he did so, 68% of his electorate
opposed him, according to an Okinawa Times survey,
[13] and the prefecture-wide opposition to the
construction plan stood at 71%. [14]
As
after 1996, "economic incentives" were again
employed in an effort to buy off or divide the
opposition. Defense Agency chief Fukushiro Nukaga
hinted at the vast economic benefits that
Okinawa's business groups (Inamine's support base)
could expect to flow once they had submitted:
"Japan paid through taxes about 1 trillion yen at
the time of the Gulf War and about 500 billion to
help the reconstruction of Iraq. This time, taxes
will be used to lessen the burden on the people of
Okinawa." [15]
The prospect of a trillion,
or even half a trillion, yen must have sounded
irresistible in relatively backward Okinawa.
Governor Inamine shifted his position somewhat
from outright rejection to studied ambiguity. He
began to talk of the agreement as "reducing
Okinawa's base-hosting functions", so that "as
such I evaluate it highly", [16] and to suggest
that "the acceptance of the plan would be possible
on condition the Japanese and US governments reach
an agreement on a package of measures to reduce
Okinawa's burden in hosting the bases", [17] while
nevertheless continuing to decline the overtures
to participate in a council to oversee
implementation of the plan and to denounce the
national government's procedure as "extremely
regrettable". [18]
Okinawans were
understandably confused. Some suggested that
Inamine's opposition was humbug, his so-called
"three principles" intended to imply opposition
were understood in Tokyo as no more than a sop to
his constituents, and his delay tactics during his
last months in office designed merely to save
face, so that his successor could inaugurate a new
policy freed from any such constraints. [19]
Although Japan's Defense Agency chief ate
goat soup, the equivalent of humble pie, in his
efforts to impress his sincerity upon the key
figures in Okinawan local governments, Governor
Inamine persisted in refusing prefectural
participation in the council that Tokyo had set up
to supervise the construction plan. Instead, and
undoubtedly to Tokyo's great annoyance, he
continued to promote views they had long
dismissed, specifically by trying to revive the
idea of a small-scale heliport. [20]
With
Inamine completing his second term, elections for
a new governor were scheduled for November 19.
[21] Hirokazu Nakaima, the 67-year-old business
leader and former head of Okinawa Electric Power,
backed by the ruling coalition's LDP and New
Komeito, confronted former bus guide Keiko
Itokazu, 58, who had been elected to the House of
Councilors in 2004 and is supported by a coalition
including the Democratic Party of Japan, Social
Democratic Party, Communist Party, and Okinawan
Social Mass Party, together with labor and civic
groups.
Although running with the support
of the LDP government in Tokyo, even Nakaima could
not bring himself to endorse the base-construction
plan, calling instead for the Futenma replacement
to be built somewhere outside Okinawa.
In
short, opinion in Okinawa was so negative (around
70% opposition) toward the officially endorsed
plan that it would be political suicide for any
candidate to favor it. Nakaima struggled to focus
the election on non-base issues, especially the
economy. In that, he replayed the 1998 Inamine
campaign, which promised to reduce the Okinawan
unemployment level from its near 8% to the
then-mainland level of 4.4%. After the failure of
eight years of conservative rule, Nakaima had to
persuade electors that, given another four, it
could be done.
Polls suggested, however,
that the attempt to deflect attention from the
base issue and to rely on vague propositions about
the need for "change" to the national government's
plan might not be enough. From 1999 to 2006, Tokyo
had simply ignored Inamine's "three principles",
and the 2005-06 "reorganization" agreement had
been reached over his head. No one expected
Nakaima to take any stronger position than his
predecessor.
He might utter mild protest,
to placate Okinawan opinion, but then he would be
expected to yield and cooperate with Tokyo in
return for profitable business deals for his
supporters. As for Itokazu, a victory offered the
prospect of a return to the 1998 standoff between
national and prefectural governments. Where Ota
had then attempted to compromise, at least by
submitting to a Supreme Court order, it was
impossible to know how Itokazu might act. Women
have been the mainstay of the opposition movement,
however, and Tokyo might find a female governor
even more difficult to shift than Ota had been a
decade ago.
On the eve of the elections, a
further aspect of US-Japan military cooperation
occasioned outrage in Okinawa. Last month, Tokyo
began deploying Patriot-3 anti-missile defenses
around US bases in Okinawa. Local mayors declared
themselves almost unanimously opposed. [22] They
saw the deployment as designed to reinforce the
military function of the bases, making Okinawa
even more of a military target than it already
was, and breaching the national government's
promise to reduce the burden of the bases on them.
They resented bitterly that Tokyo had once again
acted without any consultation. The mayor of
Okinawa City angrily remarked that it was as if
Okinawa remained under military occupation, even
61 years after World War II ended. [23]
Prospects From 1996 to 2006,
the Japanese state has twice had to abandon its
Okinawan airport-construction plans in the face of
local opposition. Tokyo officials talk of
patience, persuasion and sincerity, but their
patience and their persuasive powers ran low, and
their "sincerity" serves as a thin veil over a
combination of browbeating and bribery and the
implicit threat of force as last resort.
While the Abe government and LDP spokesmen
spoke of establishing new rights and advancing
regional autonomy under a new constitution, in
Okinawa (and indeed in other parts of the country
too) they moved to curtail local-government
autonomy, overcome restraints on the possession
and use of force, and demand that citizens
prioritize their duties to the state over their
rights from it and at the same time love it (by
compelling "patriotism"). The constitution that
Abe and others wanted to scrap and rewrite
embodied ideals for which Okinawans had been
struggling for a generation.
The pressure
on local communities stemming from Tokyo's
determination to foist the base on hostile local
communities has been unrelenting. Etsuko Urashima,
the chronicler-historian of the local Northern
Okinawa movement, writes: [24]
The base problem has been the cause
of unbroken anguish for us, setting parents and
children, brothers and sisters, relatives and
neighbors, at each other's throats. The base
problem and the "money" that goes with it have
torn to shreds human relations based on
cooperation and mutual help, relationships that
used to be so rich even though we were poor, or
rather, because we were so
poor.
Yasuhiro Miyagi, the key figure
in the movement responsible for the 1997 Nago
plebiscite that decisively rejected the idea of
constructing a new base in his city, remarks in
retrospect that he and his friends thought at that
time that they had fought and won a great and
principled fight, but looking back now after nine
years, see that nothing has changed other than
that the people have grown tired. [25]
Okinawan citizens and scholars began to
argue that only by insisting on their
constitutional rights, turning to maximum
advantage the Tokyo government's tentative, and so
far insubstantial, talk of increased regional
autonomy and ultimately pursuing the principle of
"self-government", could Okinawa begin to stand on
its own feet. They talked, mostly, of "autonomy"
and "self-government" rather than "independence",
but argued that there could be no other path for
Okinawa than to end its dependence on the
government's obsession with the bases and to build
a quite new kind of relationship, [26] with
Okinawa as a kind of "super-prefecture", with
enhanced self-governing rights.
They
pointed out that the national government was
anyway currently considering such plans because of
the crisis of national finances, and argued for
Okinawa to seize the initiative and try to have
Okinawa move one step beyond the government's plan
by aiming at a higher level of self-government,
special administrative status as an "autonomous
prefecture", [27] as a kind of Japanese Hong Kong,
rather than wait for whatever "disposal" Tokyo
might have in mind.
In similar vein,
prize-winning Okinawan novelist Shun Medoruma
wrote that Okinawa's problems would only be
resolved when its people stood up, overcoming
their fear of being cut loose by Japan and the US,
and themselves took active steps to remove the
Japanese and US heel from their islands. [28]
Sunday's outcome would be a pointer to how widely
shared that understanding might be.
In
Okinawa, more than anywhere else in Japan, the
precarious and one-sided nature of the supposedly
"mature" and "second-to-none" US-Japan
relationship is palpable. In his eagerness to
please his Washington friend, prime minister
Koizumi promised Bush something that he almost
certainly could not deliver: a solution to the
long-running dispute over relocating the Futenma
base; his successor, Abe, was left with the
obligation to deliver on that promise.
Tokyo under Koizumi (and lately Abe)
gambled that the magma of Okinawan discontent
could continue to be contained, as in the past, by
platitudes, promises, dollops of money, appeals to
the "national interest", and in the end insistence
on the prerogatives of state power. For its part,
Washington risks further alienating the population
that surrounds its most important Pacific base
installations, "the keystone of the Pacific".
Meanwhile, it holds Okinawan feet to the
fire by making its promise to relocate 8,000
marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam
(at huge Japanese government expense) contingent
on a solution to the Futenma base problem.
Okinawans face their fifth shobun, but
despite their fatigue, with the confidence born of
a decade of successful resistance, they might yet
be able to avert it and write an Okinawan history
of the future.
Notes [1]
George H Kerr, Okinawa: The History of an
Island People, New York, Tuttle 1958, p 10.
[2] Masahide Ota, Okinawa - kichinaki shima
e no michishirube, Tokyo, Shueisha, 2000, pp
60-63. [3] This was almost certainly illegal,
in breach of the review and public-notification
procedures prescribed by Article 31 of the
Environmental Assessment Law. [4] Etsuko
Urashima, a local activist, author and
environmentalist, has written a powerful chronicle
of the local movement: Henoko - umi no tatakai,
Tokyo, Impakuto shuppankai, 2005. [5]
Takahara Kanako, "Japan, US agree on a new Futenma
site", Japan Times, October 27, 2005. [6] By
50%, according to Ginowan Mayor Iha Yoichi,
addressing a meeting at Meiji University, July 2,
2006. [7] These are matters dealt with in more
detail in my Client State: Japan in the
American Embrace, Verso, forthcoming May 2007.
[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo,
Security Consultative Committee Document,
"US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment
for the Future", October 29, 2005, by US Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs Nobutaka Machimura, and Minister of State
for Defense Yoshinori Ohno; Japanese text in Asahi
Shimbun, October 30, 2005. [9] Asahi Shimbun,
November 9, 2005. [10] Opinion surveys,
Okinawa Times, September 14, 2004; Ryukyu Shimpo,
June 22, 2005; and Okinawa Times, November 5,
2005. [11] Teruo Hiyane, "Kawaru kokka zo -
Okinawa no kiki", Ryukyu Shimpo, November 7
and 8, 2005. [12] "Kyoken - Okinawa
neraiuchi/hanron fusatsu ni tsuyoi ikari",
Okinawa Times, October 27, 2005. [13] Okinawa
Times, April 19, 2006. [14] Ryukyu Shimpo,
April 14, 2006. [15] Fukumoto Tatsuya and
Takashi Imai, "Okinawa torn over base plan", Daily
Yomiuri Online, April 11, 2006. [16] Japan
Times, May 5, 2006. [17] Daily Yomiuri Online,
April 14, 2006. [18] Asahi Shimbun, May 30,
2006. [19] Manabu Sato, "Futenma no
shikkoku," Gekkan Jichiken, August 2006.
[20] Takashi Imai, "Uncertainty surrounds base
relocation", Daily Yomiuri Online, August 29,
2006. [21] For electoral details, Eric
Johnston, "Okinawan election with US base plan in
the balance", Japan Focus, November 10,
2006. [22] "Patoriotto, 31 shucho, haibi
hantai", Ryukyu Shimpo, October 7, 2006.
[23] "Senryoka to kawarazu chubu shucho
issai ni hanpatsu," Ryukyu Shimpo, October 12,
2006. [24] Gavan McCormack, Manabu Sato and
Etsuko Urashima, "The Nago mayoral election and
Okinawa's search for a way beyond bases and
dependence", Japan Focus, February 16, 2006.
[25] Quoted in Shunichi Kawabata and Hiroki
Manabe, "Futenma 10 nen shima no sentaku",
Asahi Shimbun, October 23, 2006. [26] Masahide
Ota, "Beyond hondo: Devolution and Okinawa", in
Glenn D Hook and Richard Siddle, eds, Japan and
Okinawa: Structure and Subjectivity, London
and New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp 114-139,
at p 127. [27] Masashi Hamazato, Sato Manabu
and Shimabukuro Jun, "Okinawa jichishu - anata
wa do kangaeru?", Okinawa Jichi Kenkyukai,
Naha, 2005. [28] Shun Medoruma, Okinawa sengo
zero nen, Tokyo, NHK Seikatsu Shinsho, 2005, p
189.
Gavan McCormack is a Japan
Focus coordinator. His new book, Client State:
Japan in the American Embrace, will be
published by Verso in May 2007.
