SPEAKING FREELY Japan and Pakistan move closer
By Michael Penn
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.
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KITAKYUSHU, Japan - Virtually unnoticed in the international media has been
Tokyo's recent effort to clear away impediments in the Japan-Pakistan
relationship and to rebuild its links with the South Asian power. The motives
suggested are fascinating, and serve to confirm the direction of recent changes
taking place in Japanese foreign policy.
The subtle yet distinct signs that Tokyo is rethinking its policies toward
Pakistan began to appear shortly after Shinzo Abe replaced Junichiro Koizumi as
prime minister last September.
The first sign of new activity came from Seiji Kojima, the Japanese ambassador
to Islamabad, who offered himself for
interviews to the local media, making such comments as "Japan is of the view
that the peace and development of South Asia is becoming increasingly important
for the stability and prosperity of Asia and the international community."
Such anodyne diplomatic rhetoric was soon followed by more concrete action. In
late October, Ambassador Kojima offered to assist Pakistan in exploring for oil
and gas resources, and rapidly thereafter a small delegation from the Japanese
trading house Itochu arrived in Islamabad for discussions on energy
cooperation.
In December, it was announced that the Karachi Circular Railway project would
be revived with technical assistance from the Japan External Trade Organization
and an US$872 million loan from Japanese financial institutions. The same month
saw the provision of additional Japanese aid for the Indus Highway Construction
Project and another item that would help provide electricity for certain areas
in Balochistan.
As 2007 dawned, the momentum toward rebuilding Japan-Pakistan relations
increased. The "Pakistan-Japan Joint Public and Private Dialogues" were held in
Karachi in January, in which a whole host of items were discussed, including
issues related to export insurance for Japanese companies, measures against
fraud and smuggling, human resources development, and quality control. The
Daily Times of Pakistan suggested that the overall purpose of these dialogues
was "to finalize a roadmap for expansion in the trade and economic cooperation
between the two countries".
At the meetings themselves, the two sides agreed to begin negotiations on a new
bilateral tax treaty in late February, and there was also a strong call from
Pakistani Commerce Minister Humayun Akhtar Khan for Tokyo to begin negotiations
on a Japan-Pakistan free-trade agreement (FTA).
The motives of the Abe administration
Why has Tokyo suddenly put a higher priority on developing Japan-Pakistan
relations? Several motives may be deduced.
In the first place, Japan - like every other country - is always concerned
about expanding its foreign trade and building new markets. This motive was
clearly enunciated last month by Toru Tsuji, chairman of the Japan-Pakistan
Business Cooperation Committee, when he noted, "Pakistan with its population of
150 million people is an attractive trade and investment partner."
Second, unlike Iran and some other countries in the region, the Pakistani
government maintains good relations with the US as many in Washington regard
the regime of President General Perez Musharraf an ally in the "war on
terrorism". In recent years the Japanese government has grown increasingly
deferential to Washington's political priorities in the Islamic world, but
stronger Japan-Pakistan ties are not currently regarded as likely to raise
"alliance complications" for Japanese policymakers.
However, the real urgency may come from the third factor: the competition for
regional influence between Japan and China. On November 24 - just two months
after the Abe administration came into power - China and Pakistan signed an
FTA. There is some evidence that this event alarmed the current Japanese
government, which is already noted both for its hawkish views toward Beijing
and its interest in building strong relations with Pakistan's neighbor and
sometimes rival, India.
Clearly, Commerce Minister Khan - who presided over Pakistan's FTA negotiations
with China - was not shy about playing the China card during his January
meetings with the Japanese delegates to the policy dialogues. He reportedly
told them rather bluntly that they could expect to lose their footing in the
Pakistani auto-parts and machinery markets unless they moved to sign their own
FTA soon.
Despite the momentum that has been growing toward a tighter relationship
between Japan and Pakistan, there remain difficulties that should logically
serve to limit the bilateral rapprochement.
From Islamabad's perspective, Beijing is likely to be a much more reliable
partner than Tokyo. Although Japanese technologies may still be more useful
than Chinese technologies for the development of Pakistani industry, a tight
link with Japan is ultimately too politically dependent on US goodwill. As one
of its very first acts, the Abe administration pulled out of a major
oil-development project in Iran almost entirely in deference to sensitivities
in Washington.
While it may be true that Pakistan and the United States currently enjoy a
period of warmth linked to Islamabad's strategic decision to back some aspects
of the "war on terrorism", there is little reason to believe that this
bilateral relationship will always be quite so close. Until Tokyo can
demonstrate that it is an independent player in world affairs, its usefulness
as a long-term partner for Pakistan will be limited.
Not unrelated to these issues is the major contradiction that faces Tokyo
itself in this regard: a tight connection with Islamabad would make an even
bigger mockery of Japan's supposed principles against nuclear weapons. It was
the 1998 nuclear test that put the chill into the Japan-Pakistan bilateral
relationship in the first place.
Islamabad's nuclear arsenal is no less illegal under the framework of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty now than it was at that time. And Japan is - after all
- the country that often likes to remind the world that it is still the only
nation to have suffered the horrors of the atomic bomb, and thus has a special
moral status on this issue.
Indeed, it was suspicion that Tehran had a secret military nuclear program that
served as the cover story for Japan's withdrawal from the Azadegan project in
October. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tomohiko Taniguchi told reporters then,
"Nuclear proliferation is the first-, second-, and third-most-important thing
for Japan to care about."
Another high-ranking Japanese official told the press at that time that the
withdrawal from Azadegan "will be a strong message to the international
community about our intolerance of Iran's nuclear-arms development".
In light of such a principled public stand only four months ago in regard to
Iran, what will the "international community" make of Tokyo's newfound
tolerance of Pakistan's (and India's) illegal nuclear arsenals now? How far can
competition with China really be pursued in South Asia by a country that still
self-righteously claims to be the moral torchbearer for a world without nuclear
arms?
Michael Penn is executive director of the Shingetsu Institute for the
Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations.
(Copyright 2007 Michael Penn.)
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say.
Please click hereif you are interested in contributing.
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