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3 The strengthening Japan-India
axis By Chietigj Bajpaee
In recent years, Japan and India have come
out of their self-imposed shells and constraints
of history to emerge as increasingly active
players on the international stage. Nonetheless,
further progress is required if these states are
to reach their full potential in the
foreign-policy spheres. Japan would have to escape
the shackles of its post-World War II pacifist
constitution, while India would have to break free
of its Cold War non-aligned mentality and
Pakistan-centric foreign policy.
With
their overlapping values and interests, Japan and
India have
the
potential to assist each other in their
foreign-policy objectives. As successful
non-Western democracies, they also offer an
alternative model or "third way" to conduct
international relations to Washington's model of
humanitarian intervention and preemptive action
and Beijing's model of aid "without conditions"
and call for a multipolar world.
In many
ways, Japan and India need to undergo a role
reversal - Japan needs to distance itself from the
United States to be seen as an independent actor,
while India needs to move away from its
non-aligned mentality, which has often left it
"sitting on the fence" of major foreign-policy
issues, to forge a closer relationship with the
United States. This does not imply that Japan
should abandon the alliance or that India should
become a "deputy" to the US in Asia. Rather, both
states need to adopt more flexible and proactive
foreign-policy approaches.
For instance,
India's fear of alignment has led it to sit on the
sidelines of numerous multilateral forums in Asia.
In recent years it has distanced itself from the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where it
is an observer. This was demonstrated most
recently by India being the only country not to
send its head of state to the last summit in
Shanghai in June.
Similarly, India has
been a reluctant participant of the
Sino-Russian-Indian strategic triangle for fear of
antagonizing the US. Meanwhile, it has also been
reluctant to join the Australia-Japan-US
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue or be seen as too
close to the United States for fear of undermining
relations with China. While such policies have
granted India a degree of strategic flexibility,
it has also left it on the periphery of major
foreign-policy issues, such as playing a more
significant role in Central Asia.
Playing
a more prominent role in the SCO does not
automatically translate into a deteriorating
relationship with the United States, as
demonstrated by the fact that in 2006 Sino-US
trade (US$263 billion) was almost 10 times
India-US trade ($29 billion), even though China is
a leading member of the SCO. Similarly,
participation in the Australia-Japan-US trilateral
dialogue does not equal a deteriorating
relationship with China, as demonstrated by the
fact that Australia is emerging as an increasingly
important supplier of raw materials and energy to
China and Sino-Japanese trade ($207 billion) was
10 times Sino-Indian trade ($25 billion) in 2006.
To be sure, limited progress has been made
by India and Japan in becoming more assertive
players in the foreign-policy arena.
Tokyo, for example, upgraded the Japan
Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense on
January 9, created the position of national
security adviser in the cabinet, and expanded the
"primary duties" of the Self-Defense Forces, which
had been confined to national defense and disaster
relief at home, to include the "supplementary
duties" of overseas operations, including
peacekeeping operations.
Japan has already
deployed its military to combat zones in
Afghanistan and Iraq to assist the US in its "war
on terrorism". Discussions are also proceeding on
revising Article 9 of the constitution to expand
the mandate of Japan's military to include
collective defense, in addition to its current
role of self-defense. There has even been public
debate within mainstream political parties on
reassessing Japan's three non-nuclear principles -
not to manufacture nuclear weapons, possess them,
or allow them on its soil - discussion that was
unthinkable only a few years ago.
Japan
led the way in condemning North Korea's nuclear
test on October 9 and applying sanctions on
Pyongyang. Shinzo Abe's visit to China in October
- his first visit abroad as prime minister of
Japan - and to the Meiji Shrine (rather than the
controversial Yasakuni Shrine) in January also
demonstrated Japan's attempt to improve relations
with China and other East Asian countries.
Japan's participation in numerous East
Asian forums that exclude the US, such as the
ASEAN+3 process and East Asia Summit, also
demonstrate its attempt to exercise an independent
foreign policy in Asia. Nonetheless, Japan remains
wedded to the US-Japan alliance under the Japan-US
Security Consultative Committee or "two plus two"
dialogue.
Meanwhile, the current
rapprochement in US-India relations is a far cry
from the low point in their relationship in
December 1971 when president Richard Nixon sent
the USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean as a
warning to India during its war with Pakistan. The
US-India nuclear-cooperation agreement signed last
March and the Henry J Hyde US-India Peaceful
Atomic Energy Cooperation Act signed in December
have opened the doors to India's purchase of
nuclear fuel from the United States and brought
India a step closer to finalizing the nuclear
agreement.
Beyond nuclear cooperation, the
administration of US President George W Bush has
pledged to assist India in emerging as a "world
power" with cooperation in the fields of maritime
security, information technology, space,
military-to-military relations, growing trade and
investment, and common positions on numerous
international issues ranging from Islamic
extremism to China's rise.
At the same
time, India retains its independent position on
numerous issues ranging from the war in Iraq to
relations with countries such as Iran, Myanmar and
Sudan, support for the G33 bloc at the World Trade
Organization, and vision of a multipolar world
with respect to the principles of sovereignty and
non-intervention.
Japan in South Asia,
India in East Asia Japan and India also
have the potential to assist each other with their
foreign-policy objectives - notably, Japan's
concern over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program
and India's concern over the numerous
conflict-prone and impoverished states along its
periphery. Japan's engagement with South Asia and
India's with Northeast Asia will also assist in
checking the growing influence of other powers in
both regions, such as China.
For instance,
many have forgotten the fact that India played an
important role during the Korean War as a mediator
between the
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