Page 2 of 3 The strengthening Japan-India
axis By Chietigj Bajpaee
US and
communist China. Nonetheless, India is neither a
member of the current six-party or the larger
10-party framework on the North Korean nuclear
issue, even though India has a number of vested
interests in a peaceful Korean Peninsula.
Most notably, Pakistan has assisted North
Korea with its nuclear program (by providing
uranium-enrichment technology) through the Abdul
Qadeer Khan network in exchange for North Korean
assistance to Pakistan's ballistic-missile program
(by providing it
with
the Nodong/Ghauri missile). Beyond this, North
Korea's nuclear brinkmanship serves to delay
India's formal membership to the nuclear club by
demonstrating the "dark side" of nuclear
proliferation, even though India has a strong
record in nuclear non-proliferation.
Japan, as Asia's leading and the world's
second-largest provider of foreign aid, also has a
vital role to play in South Asia, which remains
the continent's most impoverished region. For
example, Japan has pledged significant aid to Sri
Lanka under the condition that both parties - the
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam - cease hostilities and return to the
negotiating table. As its first deployment under
the new Ministry of Defense, Japan will also send
peacekeepers to Nepal this month to monitor the
ceasefire between the government and Maoist
rebels.
South Asia remains a relatively
"safe" region politically for Japan to increase
its presence, unlike Southeast Asia, where the
memories of Japanese imperialism are still alive,
or the Middle East and Africa, where numerous
international players - such as the US, the
European Union and increasingly China - are
already prominent players. The benign view of
Japan in South Asia was demonstrated during
Tokyo's bid for a permanent seat on the United
Nations Security Council last year when the only
Asian states that supported it were in South Asia,
namely Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives.
India and Japan also have the potential to
develop a more visible presence on the
international stage, including playing a more
active role in resolving humanitarian and security
crises in the developing world, such as the
Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Iran's nuclear
ambitions, the deteriorating security situation in
Iraq, and the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur
region of Sudan. As thriving, non-Western
democracies, one of which is undergoing rapid
growth (India), while the other is a developed and
modern state (Japan), both countries offer an
alternative to China's model of economic
development without political representation.
Together, Japan's economic influence in
the form of overseas development assistance and
India's cultural influence and role as the leader
in the developing world can be used to make
inroads in the developing world.
Both
states have already made limited progress in
exercising influence beyond their immediate
regions. India's economic diplomacy at the Davos,
Switzerland, World Economic Forum and Prime
Minister Abe's visit to Europe and address to
North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in
January, the first by a Japanese prime minister,
have demonstrated India's and Japan's desire to
exercise influence beyond their neighborhood.
Abe's visit to Europe also illustrates
Japan's desire to exercise a more independent
foreign policy. In Myanmar, India and Japan have
adopted a "middle path" approach of remaining
engaged with the military regime (unlike the
West), while at the same time putting pressure on
the regime to institute reforms (unlike China).
Nonetheless, both states have failed to
live up to their full potential. For instance,
India's amicable relations with both Israel and
the Arab world, its geostrategic location between
the Middle East and East Asia, and its significant
Muslim population have given it both the
credibility and motivation to play a more
significant role in the Israeli-Palestinian
dispute, a part it has so far failed to adopt
fully. Similarly, given its amicable relationship
with both Tehran and Washington, India has the
potential to play the role on the Iran nuclear
issue that China played on the North Korean
nuclear issue as mediator in the six-party talks.
In Africa, Japan has hosted the Tokyo
International Conference on African Development
since 1993, although China has made further
progress in developing relations with Africa;
Sino-African trade, for instance, amounted to $40
billion in 2005 versus total Japan-Africa trade of
$18 billion. Furthermore, China's debt relief,
infrastructure investment, and aid have come
"without conditions" on human rights, governance,
or democratic and economic reforms, which has been
welcomed by some states in the region.
Similarly, despite India's attempt to
re-engage with Southeast Asia under the aegis of
its "Look East" policy, New Delhi remains second
fiddle to Beijing's growing presence in the
region, as demonstrated by the fact that China's
trade with Southeast Asia exceeded $160 billion in
2006, while India's trade with the region was less
than $30 billion.
These developments
suggest that India and Japan should develop a more
aggressive and cooperative foreign-policy
approach. For instance, India could potentially
act as a bridge between Japan and Russia, whose
relations remain strained as a result of the lack
of a peace treaty between both states ending the
hostilities of World War II, fueled by their
long-standing territorial dispute over the South
Kurils/Northern Territories.
Beyond
realpolitik concerns over China's growing
influence, India's and Japan's foreign-policy
activities in the developing world should also be
driven by the fact that they are major energy
consumers. India is the world's sixth-largest oil
consumer, while Japan is the world's third-largest
consumer and second-largest importer. India
imports more than two-thirds of its needs, while
Japan imports almost all of its oil and is the
world's leading importer of liquefied natural gas
(LNG), accounting for more than 40% of total
global imports. As such, India and Japan have a
shared interest in tapping into energy resources
in the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, Russia
and Latin America.
Japan's New National
Energy Strategy released last May committed it to
increase the proportion of oil developed and
imported from domestic companies - known as
"Hinomaru oil" - from 15% to 40% by 2030.
Nonetheless, this target remains unrealistic given
Tokyo's recent losses in the energy sphere,
including reducing its stake in Iran's Azadegan
oilfield in October because of tensions over
Iran's nuclear program, Indonesia cutting LNG
exports to Japan when its supply contracts expire
in 2010, uncertainty over access to Russian oil
from the Sakhalin-2 project, and the route of a
proposed oil pipeline to Daqing or
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