The need to dwell on Japan's
past By Ralph A Cossa and Brad
Glosserman
What was he thinking? That is
the question most thoughtful observers of the
US-Japan alliance grappled with last week as
Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo fumbled
questions about the imperial Japanese government's
role in recruiting "comfort women" during World
War II.
His responses came close to
undoing the progress he had made in restoring
relations with China and South Korea and
threatened to drive a wedge between Tokyo and
Washington. They reveal uncomfortable truths about
Japan - but facts that the US must
nonetheless acknowledge when
dealing with its ally.
The controversy
began on March 1 when Abe was asked about a
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) group that wanted
the government to revisit - rescind - a 1993
statement by then chief cabinet secretary Kono
Yohei. Kono's comment, put forth as official
government policy, followed a multi-year study by
the government into relations between the imperial
Japanese military and women forced to work as
prostitutes (aka "comfort women") during World War
II.
Kono declared: "The then Japanese
military was, directly or indirectly, involved in
the establishment and management of the comfort
stations and the transfer of comfort women ... The
government study has revealed that in many cases
they were recruited against their own will,
through coaxing, coercion, etc, and that, at
times, administrative/military personnel directly
took part in the recruitments."
Conservatives object to two related
points: the role the military played in the
comfort-women operation and the degree to which it
actually "coerced" women. Abe said then, as he had
noted in Diet (parliament) testimony several
months earlier, that the meaning of "coercion" was
unclear and the accuracy of the statement depended
on how the word was defined. Ignored was his
comment that either way, his government stood
behind the 1993 statement. Four days later at the
Diet, Abe reiterated support for the Kono
statement.
The readiness to challenge the
conclusion that the government had "coerced" the
women unleashed a firestorm of controversy, not
least because the US House of Representatives -
during hearings on a resolution that called on
Japan to apologize for its actions - had days
before heard testimony from former comfort women
that seemed to confirm the charge. Abe's response
sparked fierce condemnations from leading US and
foreign newspapers. It seriously undercut those
arguing against the resolution, in at least one
instance turning a Japan supporter into a bill
co-signer.
Why did Abe fan the flames,
especially when it threatened to undercut
diplomacy that promised "a new start" for Japanese
foreign policy and had offered such promise for
the new administration?
First, it should
be noted that the prime minister wasn't
volunteering for controversy: he didn't choose to
make this an issue. He was responding to questions
triggered by the actions of others (the LDP group
and the US hearings). This does not excuse or
fully explain the response, however, or the
bumbling since it was originally uttered.
One explanation is that Abe, like many
other conservatives, genuinely believes that the
Kono statement was wrong. They challenge the
factual basis for the conclusion that the
government was involved in coercion. This argument
rests on the definition of the word "coercion", a
legal distinction that is jarring given the
long-standing insistence that Japan is not a
"legalistic culture" and operates according to
flexible principles.
It also attempts to
trump a moral argument with a legal one. Whether
the army actually coerced the women or left that
job to independent contractors (as one legalistic
argument asserts), there is little doubt that
women were forced into servitude at the army's
behest.
This argument also rests on a
sense of nationalism. Many conservatives chafe at
the judgment of the Tokyo Tribunals and don't like
to see their country singled out for criticism.
The Kono statement implies that Japanese behavior
was somehow different from that of other countries
and Tokyo must apologize for things that other
governments have done.
Underlying that
conclusion - and obliging Abe to defend it - is
domestic politics. The prime minister believes
that Japan should be a more assertive country, one
that is judged by its record of the past 60 years
rather than for the sins of its forefathers. His
domestic political base agrees, and they resent
being told what to do by any country - even the
US. (Interestingly, China's response to this flap
has been low-key. This suggests that Beijing is
committed to rapprochement with Tokyo and is smart
enough to let other governments beat up Japan on
this issue.)
Ironically, there are many in
the US and Asia who agree that it is time to stop
dwelling on the past and that today's Japan should
be judged by its postwar history. Unfortunately,
Abe's comments - like his predecessor Koizumi
Junichiro's visits to Yasukuni Shrine - make it
impossible for even Japan's supporters to move
past the history debate.
The phenomenon
drives home the rising significance of domestic
politics in Northeast Asia and the transition that
all countries are experiencing as the
international environment evolves and a new
generation comes to power. No country is immune to
these pressures and no relationship inoculated
from their effects.
While the US-Japan
relationship has been strengthened in recent
years, both countries must still be acutely
sensitive to developments in the other and ready
to challenge assumptions about how the
relationship works.
For example, the
presumption that a US House of Representatives
judgment on Japanese history would be above
challenge is plainly wrong. Japan will give that
vote the same deference it gives to any other
country that seeks to interfere in its domestic
politics. Gaiatsu (outside pressure) no
longer works, even when it comes from Tokyo's
closest ally.
Yet the Japanese assumption
that the alliance would counterbalance domestic
politics in the US - the increasing strength of
South Korean interest groups or growing unease
with historical revisionism - is equally mistaken.
The usual group of alliance handlers didn't - or
couldn't - quash this tempest. Moreover, this
chain of events also suggests that Japan has to do
more to reach across the aisle of the US Congress
to Democrats. Decision-makers in both
countries must recognize that the good relations
of the past few years buy a limited amount of
political capital. There is no resting on laurels.
There is no substitute for continuing efforts to
overcome increasingly powerful domestic political
interests. That needs to be foremost in the minds
of alliance supporters in both countries.
Abe is not the first politician to put the
need to appeal to his domestic base above his
country's international image or long-term
national interest, but it could not come at a
worse time. As the first Japanese prime minister
to be born after World War II, Abe had an
opportunity to pursue a forward-looking agenda.
Instead he (and his more conservative colleagues)
have forced us once again to dwell on the past.
Does this really serve Abe's (or Japan's)
interest?
Ralph A Cossa
(pacforum@hawaii.rr.com) andBrad Glosserman
(bradg@hawaii.rr.com) are president and
executive director, respectively, of the Pacific
Forum CSIS.
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