Page 2 of 3 Okinawa and the 'beautiful
country' By Gavan McCormack
state, giving priority to state
over citizen, US over Japanese, military over
civilian rights, and dismissing unheard the claims
of the internationally protected species,
including the dugong and the sea turtles, that now
thrive in the bay waters.
When it came to
a Japanese promise to the government of the United
States, all stops would be pulled out to ensure
compliance. While prime minister Hashimoto in 1998 promised
that
"the heliport [as the massive structure was then
described] will not be build without local
consent", and prime minister Koizumi chose to
abandon the project in 2005 rather than resort to
force to implement it, Abe was not to be deterred.
He would cross a line on Okinawa at which previous
Japanese conservative administrations had stopped.
The SDF dispatch was thus unprecedented.
The Japanese force whose sole constitutional
justification was for the defense of Japan
"against direct or indirect threat" was deployed
instead to intimidate and impose the government's
will on a local community. The SDF dispatch was
illegal (in breach of the purposes specified under
the Self-Defense Law), rode roughshod over
Okinawan sentiment, [5] and was in breach of the
constitution's guarantees of local self-government
autonomy.
Even the conservative Okinawan
governor, Nakaima Hirokazu, whose candidacy in
2006 had been strongly supported by the governing
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the national
government, is on record as opposing the base
construction plan (albeit "in its present form")
and spoke of the Bungo dispatch as "likely to stir
in Okinawan minds memories of living under [US]
bayonets". [6] Military-affairs critic Maeda
Tetsuo remarked that if the SDF could be used on
this occasion with impunity, then it would be able
henceforth to be used in any way the government of
the day chose. [7]
The SDF dispatch also
appeared to contravene the law relating to
environmental-impact assessment. The Cape
Henoko/Oura Bay "preliminary survey" did not
constitute the environmental-impact study required
by law. It had no claim to be a serious or
independent scientific survey, since the
government was firmly committed in advance and at
the highest diplomatic level to delivery of this
base to the Pentagon.
Independent
scientific opinion could therefore have no role to
play, let alone local or international
environmental groups. The company entrusted with
the task well knew how important a positive
evaluation was, and could be relied on not to
disappoint or shock its employer; the outcome
could not be in doubt.
For the US and
Japanese governments, the attractiveness of this
site stemmed from the assumption that local
opposition could be bought off and/or crushed and
from the physical proximity and therefore
usefulness for the projection of force against
North Korea and/or China. Neither paid serious
attention to the dugong and turtles, or to the
implications for the environment as a whole of
building massive military installations in such a
location. For both, this was a project already 10
years delayed because of the stubborn opposition
of Okinawan (and some mainland Japanese) citizens.
This time, they reckoned, the deal would be
implemented whatever the cost.
While the
government thus defied the law and treated
Okinawans with contempt, the opposition movement
continued, as it had since 1996, to rely on
democratic and legal means. Despite all the
pressure, no opinion survey has ever found any
majority accepting the Tokyo position. Despite the
exhaustion of a decade of sustained struggle in
defense of the constitutional principles of
democracy and pacifism, the movement continues to
come up with innovative strategies.
One
major action (still continuing) was launched in
2003 in a San Francisco court against the US
defense secretary and Department of Defense
seeking an order to halt the project on
environmental grounds. In a similar vein, a
coalition of environmental groups this year
launched an international campaign calling for
public hearings as part of a serious and
transparent environmental-impact assessment. [8]
The special-measures law and the covert
SDF action were necessary, in the view of the Abe
government, because of the widespread opposition
on the part of local governments and people, not
only in Okinawa but also elsewhere, to the
military reorganization. More than 20 local
administrative authorities throughout Japan refuse
to cooperate in the reorganization despite the
blandishments and pressures. The new law would
multiply the pressures on such regions.
Nago city, the administrative district in
which the new base site was included, was one
such. When it opposed the decision of the two
governments in 2005-06, it was told that in
consequence, the budgetary tax allocation for the
city might be zero. [9] Tax allocations had
hitherto been distributed on an impartial basis
according to general principles, and such sanction
would in effect make local administration
impossible; it would be tantamount to imposition
of a blockade.
Faced with that threat, and
even before the new law came into operation, the
Henoko District Administrative Committee withdrew
its 1999 resolution against the "heliport"
construction plan [10] and the Nago city
authorities, by agreeing to the "preliminary"
survey, were deemed to have given consent to the
project within the terms of the law and thus to be
entitled to the first installment of the
designated subsidy. [11] Having thus tasted the
fruits "of the subsidy for the obedient", it would
be more difficult in future for it to withhold
cooperation.
As for Iwakuni city in
Yamaguchi prefecture, when it was told that, under
the "reorganization", it had to host 59
carrier-borne US fighters to be transferred from
the naval air facility in Atsugi, Mayor Ihara
Katsunosuke, following the 1997 Nago precedent, in
March 2006 conducted a plebiscite. He found a
solid local majority (89% of those voting, 51% of
eligible voters) saying "no", and shortly
afterward was also returned to office.
The
national government's response to the rebuff
followed last December (ie, even before the
passage of the new law): it cut off funds promised
for the building of new municipal offices. [12] As
Ihara put it, the choice was: submit and gain 500
billion yen (US$4.1 billion), or oppose and be
plunged into bankruptcy. [13] This March, the
Iwakuni assembly buckled to the pressure and
passed a resolution asking him to take "practical
and effective measures". [14] After the passage of
the May law, Ihara's position continues to erode
under intense Tokyo pressure. Like Okinawa,
Iwakuni is required to pay a heavy price to be
made "beautiful".
The situation is similar
in Yokosuka, Kanagawa prefecture, reluctant "home
port" for 34 years to a US aircraft carrier. The
mayor and assembly were shocked when told that
under the "reorganization" from 2008, the existing
conventionally powered carrier would be replaced
by a nuclear-powered one. Under heavy pressure,
persuaded that defense matters had to be the
exclusive preserve of the national government and
local sentiment should play no part, the Yokosuka
mayor agreed - despite a unanimous declaration of
opposition by the municipal assembly.
For
their part, however, the mayors of the cities of
Zama and Sagamihara, both also in Kanagawa
prefecture, declared their determination to resist
reorganization, in the case of the mayor of Zama
even if a cruise missile were sent against him and
in the case of the mayor of Sagamihara even if he
were run over by a tank. [15]
Reliance on
money and force under the May law was a recipe for
dividing local communities, entrenching an
opportunist and/or dependent mentality on the part
of local officials, and reinforcing the priority
of military over civilian, US over national
priorities. As the Tokyo Shimbun put it on May 24,
the threat of force was intended to deter local
resistance. Such threats were only effective when
accompanied by a readiness actually to use force.
In that context, the dispatch of the Bungo was
ominous.
Okinawan people have other
reasons to be angry with the Abe government. It
has been known for decades that the government of
Japan lied about the agreement for the "reversion"
of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, and that the
"reversion" was really a "purchase", the
government of Japan paying the US substantially
more, about $685 million, for the "return" of
facilities (which under the agreement actually
remained under US control) than it had paid in
1965 to South Korea as compensation for four and
half decades of Japanese colonialism, plus untold
millions in subsequent subsidies. [16]
It
lied too by referring to the deal as one for
Okinawa to be placed on a kaku-nuki
hondo-nami (without nuclear weapons and on
a
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