Japan's opposition flexes its muscles
By Richard Tanter
The defeat of the ruling Liberal Democratic party-led coalition by the
Democratic Party of Japan in the House of Councilors election on July 29 has
already sent shockwaves to people concerned about the US-Japan security
alliance. Surprising many who saw only his bullying style and right wing
policies, opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa moved quickly to set the Democrats on
a course deeply antagonistic to US hopes for Japan as a global military
partner.
The opposition used its new parliamentary dominance immediately after securing
the election victory in four telling ways. First the Democrats and their
coalition partners appointed long-standing liberal social democrat Eda Satsuki
as president of the
upper house - the first non-LDP president in half a century - giving the DPJ
the power to control proceedings in the chamber for the first time. [1]
The second move was to notify the LDP that it would require prior Parliamentary
approval of all overseas deployments, rather than the present comfortable
requirement of confirmation after the fact. [2] The third was to give notice
that the Democrats were opposed to any extension of the Air Self Defense Force
deployment in Kuwait, and was considering introducing a bill to end the
deployment. [3]
The fourth was to give notice to both the LDP and the United States that the
party was opposed to any extension of the long-running Maritime Self Defense
Force deployment in the Indian Ocean beyond the expiry of the current
legislative authority on November 1st under the 2001 Special Antiterrorism
Measures Law. [4]
It says a great deal about the deep penetration of the Japan-US alliance
structure into Japanese domestic politics that Ozawa's most salient and
vociferous public critic was not the prime minister but the US ambassador in
Tokyo, Thomas Schieffer. Ozawa and Schieffer share a reputation for blunt
hectoring styles of intimidation. Following reports that the DJP was
considering opposing a fourth extension of the Indian Ocean deployment,
Schieffer stridently and publicly demanded DPJ support.
Schieffer came to Japan following a controversial posting as representative of
the George W Bush administration in Australia, where he had gained a reputation
for highly visible overbearing interventions in Australian political life.
After Ozawa's announcement that the DPJ was considering opposing another
extension of the Indian Ocean mission, Schieffer met with Ozawa, proclaiming
the question of Afghanistan an issue which "should be above partisan politics".
Schieffer then insisted that Ozawa was wrong to maintain that Afghanistan was
an American war without UN sanction, in particular arguing that the operation
is covered by UN Security Council Resolution 1746 passed on 23 March this year.
[5]
The apparent effect of Schieffer's public attack on the Japanese opposition
leader was not only to strengthen Ozawa's resolve on the Indian Ocean
deployment, but to broaden the argument to the point of a rejection of
participation in US coalition global operations.
"Our interpretation of the constitution is that the right to self-defense is
made only when Japan is attacked," Ozawa said in the open-door meeting with
Schieffer in Tokyo. "If I am in the position of decision-making, unfortunately
I don't think we'll be able to participate in the operations led by the United
States." [6]
The Nikkei news service noted that "the ambassador, appearing slightly agitated
by Ozawa's remarks that US President George W Bush launched the "American war"
on Afghanistan without waiting for international consensus, reminded the
opposition leader that '90% of the oil Japan uses comes through this area and
that Japanese nationals also died in the September 11, 2001, attacks'."
Two days later in a meeting with Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Schieffer's
assessment of the consequences of Ozawa's supposed irresponsibility had
expanded, since he now considered the maintenance of the Indian Ocean coalition
"so important to the security of not only the United States and Japan but to
the whole world". [7]
In the meeting with Schieffer, held with the press present, the pugnacious and
generally somewhat nationalist Ozawa expressed views shared by many of the now
marginalized conservative doves in the LDP he once directed. Ozawa reiterated
his view that the war in Afghanistan was a war in America's interests started
by the United States without United Nations authorization. Japan, argued Ozawa,
should participate in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping, but should not cooperate in
what he presented as an American war.
It is yet to be seen whether or not Ozawa will maintain this position in the
face of American pressure and internal party disagreement. It may be that this
stance is only a negotiating tool to batter the flailing Abe administration, on
the one hand, and push the United States toward taking Japan less for granted
on the other. Post-war parliamentary oppositions in Japan have usually folded
when push comes to shove, and Ozawa has important pro-American critics in his
party, such as his predecessor Seiji Maehara.
But Ozawa has placed the question of the real role of the Indian Ocean
deployment on the public agenda in a way it has not been in the past six years.
Whatever his ultimate goal may be Ozawa has raised the strong possibility that
by not renewing authority for the small ASDF deployment in the Gulf, Japan will
join the increasingly long list of former US coalition partners in Iraq.
Reflecting the deep psychological structure of alliance dependence
characteristic of American allies such as Japan and Australia, one media
criticism of Ozawa's move was that by not immediately acceding to US demands,
Japan would run the risk of "isolating itself". [8] A Nikkei editorial feared
that "such a development could also harm Japan's alliance with the US". [9]
The risk of "isolation" is to be overcome by over-performance of "global
responsibilities", a senior naval officer told the Yomiuri newspaper: "I
believe that our mission is a passport into the international community in its
continuing fight against terrorism." [10]
Most importantly, the LDP's election defeat and Ozawa's high profile attack on
the Indian Ocean deployment have delivered a fatal blow to the US campaign to
push the government to deploy air and ground troops to Afghanistan. For at
least the past year, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)have been calling for an increased Japanese military
commitment to Afghanistan.
The US and the NATO hardline members on Afghanistan have called with increasing
asperity on other NATO countries for more troops on the ground in the losing
fight in Afghanistan, with fewer restrictions on their use in combat. Japan,
like Australia, is regarded by NATO and the US as a key "non-NATO partner
country" [11], and Prime Minister Abe indicated that closer cooperation with
NATO in Afghanistan was one of his goals. [12] At the same time as the Afghan
Vice President visited Tokyo in June, and called for further Japanese
assistance including an increased Self Defense Force role, a senior US defense
official was pressing the LDP to commit ground forces to Afghanistan. [13]
The Japanese security establishment, the US ambassador and the mainstream media
all assailed Ozawa's move as a threat to coalition solidarity over Afghanistan
as part of the "war on terror". An unnamed senior defense ministry official
told the Yomiuri: "Afghanistan is a hub for international terrorist groups. If
efforts to rebuild the country fail, all the world will continue to be scared
by threats of terrorism." [14]
The Nikkei scolded the DJP: "the Diet's refusal to extend this legislation
would call into question Japan's commitment to the international fight against
terrorism."[15] At the same time as the possibility of a US invasion of
Waziristan was being debated, Thomas Schieffer lectured Ozawa at their meeting
that taking the Maritime Self Defense Force out of its Indian Ocean role, at a
time when Pakistan's navy has taken its turn in command of the coalition
operation, would weaken Pakistan's commitment to the coalition cause.
"It is very important to keep Pakistan, the only Muslim country in this
coalition because that sends a strong message to everyone in the Middle East
that the war on terror is not a war on Muslims." [16]
The United States clearly sees Ozawa's shift as a serious threat to its
capacity to maintain a coherent coalition presence in Afghanistan. The Japanese
presence is important politically rather than militarily. In March, 2007, the
supply ship Hamana set off for its Indian ocean station for the sixth time
escorted by the newly commissioned destroyer Suzunami. [17]
While these deployments over the past six years have been useful to the MSDF in
its quest for coalition experience in distant ocean operations, actual demands
on the refueling operation have diminished in recent years. [18] The Japanese
material contribution could easily be replaced.
For the United States, the loss of a possible recruit to the ground war in
Afghanistan is more threatening. The Iraq War has been effectively written off,
but the demands of the equally serious but less questioned war in Afghanistan
are escalating. When US deputy undersecretary of defense for Asia and Pacific
security affairs James Shinn pressed former LDP vice president Taku Tamasaki
over further SDF deployments in the Afghanistan theater, Tamasaki warned him:
"It's very difficult. It will take a great deal just to have the special
antiterrorism measures law extended at the extraordinary Diet session to be
held this fall." [19] Clearly, Tamasaki was right in his reading of the
Japanese political landscape, and equally clearly the US was not prepared to
take "no" for an answer.
That it should be Ozawa Ichiro who led the most important challenge to US
presumption to direct Japanese security policy may surprise many. But perhaps
this was due to a misunderstanding of the full ramifications of Ozawa's
well-known championing of the rightwing nationalist agenda slogan of Japan
becoming "a normal country".
The process of remilitarization is the best-known consequence of the success
story of that agenda: the effective abandonment of half a century of "defensive
defense" and its replacement with a policy of military preparedness
commensurate to perceived threat, the normalization of overseas deployment of
the SDF, and the move toward "great power realism" and closer integration into
US global military planning. [20]
The nationalist agenda always had the restoration of full Japanese sovereignty
as one of its goals: hence it is hardly surprising that Ozawa should be so
sharp about US unilateralism and its presumption that Japan will automatically
follow the US. Ozawa did not dismiss the possibility of collaboration with the
US against terrorism, but only from a position of "a bond of equals" [21] - not
a term that could ever have been applied to the Ampo alliance relationship at
any time in its half century history.
But perhaps most importantly in the long run for both Japanese democracy and
for the possibility of Japan taking its place in global politics "as a normal
country" without further militarization, either within the alliance or beyond
it, is Ozawa's other longstanding demand for Japan: that Japanese elected
representatives, both as legislators and ministers, take full and proper
responsibility for their decisions.
For too long, Ozawa has argued, Japanese politicians have been prepared to
allow unelected senior officials to wield power over policy while elected
politicians simply looked on, providing electoral legitimacy but not taking
responsibility. [22] Foreign policy and security policy are prime examples, and
Ozawa's use of the DJP's new Upper House power is a case of practicing exactly
what he has preached.
The results are already visible. Ozawa's attack on Middle East policy in terms
of "alliance business as usual" undoubtedly has many motives and may well not
be sustained. But for the first time he has positioned the parliamentary
opposition to hold the government to account, and forced the US to move from
behind the scenes pressure to direct public intervention, and put paid to any
US hopes of a Japanese military contribution to the war in Afghanistan.
Notes
1. "With new Upper House majority, Ozawa steps up attacks on govt," NikkeiNet,
August 8, 2007.
2. "Ruling parties to accept DPJ's demand on troop deployment," NikkeiNet,
August 7, 2007.
3. "Ozawa to mull submitting bill to cancel SDF dispatch to Iraq," NikkeiNet,
August 7, 2007.
4. Ibed. 5. UN Security Council Resolution 1746 (2007).
6. "DPJ rejects Schieffer's request to extend antiterrorism operations,"
NikkeiNet, August 8, 2007.
7. "Japan, US conclude pact on protecting shared military info," NikkeiNet,
August 10, 2007.
8. For example, Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan, reinvigorated
opposition shouldn't hinder antiterror law extension," Daily Yomiuri Online,
August 7, 2007.
9. "Newly powerful DPJ must avoid partisan gamesmanship," NikkeiNet, August 8,
2007.
10. Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan, reinvigorated opposition
shouldn't hinder antiterror law extension," Daily Yomiuri Online, August 7,
2007.
11. Masako Ikegami, "NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian stability," NATO
Review, Summer 2007.
12. "Japan and NATO: Toward further collaboration," Statement by Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe to the North Atlantic Council, January 12, 2007.
13. "Incoming US official hopes Japan will dispatch SDF to Afghanistan,"
Afghanistan News Center, June 29, 2007 (Kyodo).
14. Hidemichi Katsumata, "MSDF mission key for Japan," Yomiuri, August 7, 2007.
15. "Newly powerful DPJ must avoid partisan gamesmanship," NikkeiNet, August 8,
2007.
16. "Japan's DPJ won't back extension of anti-terror law, Ozawa says," Keiichi
Yamamura and Stuart Biggs, Bloomberg, August 8, 2007.
17. The best systematic coverage of the MSDF deployment chronology and
composition is "Jieitai Indoyo haken (Dispatch of SDF to the Indian Ocean) at
Wikipedia (Japanese).
18. Richard Tanter, "The MSDF Indian Ocean deployment - blue water
militarization in a 'normal country'," Japan Focus, May 15, 2006.
19. "Incoming US official hopes Japan will dispatch SDF to Afghanistan,"
Afghanistan News Center, June 29, 2007 (Kyodo).
20. Richard Tanter, "With eyes wide shut: Japan, Heisei militarization and the
Bush Doctrine," in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (eds.), Confronting the Bush
Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Routledge,
2005) , and Richard Tanter, "About face: Japan's remilitarization," CLSA
Asia-Pacific Markets, Tokyo, November 2006.
21. "DPJ's Ozawa talks tough in meeting with US envoy Schieffer," NikkeiNet,
August 9, 2007.
22. See for example Ozawa "Ichiro, Nihon kaizo keikaku" (Plan for Japan's
reconstruction), (Tokyo: Kodansha,1993).
Richard Tanter is senior research associate at Nautilus Institute for
Security and Sustainability and director of the Nautilus Institute at RMIT and
a Japan Focus associate. He has written widely on Japanese security policy,
including "With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization and the Bush
Doctrine" in Melvin Gurtov and Peter Van Ness (eds), Confronting the
Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Routledge,
2005). His most recent book, co-edited with Gerry Van Klinken and Desmond Ball,
is Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor
in 1999.
(Republished with permission from Japan Focus)
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