Japan's Abe takes one for the
team By Brad Glosserman
While the decision by Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe to resign may end his
political career, it is a brilliant tactical move:
it robs the opposition Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) of political momentum and gives the ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a chance to
reconnect with voters.
Abe announced his
resignation on Wednesday afternoon in Tokyo.
Despite widespread agreement that he should have
resigned after his party's rout in the July
election to the House of
Councilors, the decision
still stunned many, especially since it came only
two days after he had vowed to "stake his job" on
extending the Maritime Self-Defense Forces' (MSDF)
mandate to refuel vessels in the Indian Ocean.
Much depends on whom the LDP picks to
succeed Abe. The party is determined to ensure
voters will opt for an older, known quantity, even
though that may herald a return to the old LDP and
a retreat from the dynamism of the Junichiro
Koizumi years.
Traditionally, a Japanese
prime minister would have resigned after his party
took the beating the LDP received in the July
parliamentary vote. That Abe didn't step down as
expected was taken as proof that the prime
minister truly had a "tin ear" for politics. While
he pledged to refocus in his new administration,
the daily drip of scandals that forced the
resignation of cabinet ministers and other party
officials quickly ended any hopes for a fresh
start. (There are now reports that Abe himself is
involved in financial wrongdoing.) After a brief
reversal, his new cabinet's approval ratings had
been sliding.
Ichiro Ozawa, president of
the DPJ, has exploited every misstep to realize
his goal of forcing the LDP from power. His
brilliant electioneering (along with the
government's blunders) produced the July victory.
Ozawa has vowed to fight the extension of the
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which permits
the MSDF to refuel North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and other coalition naval vessels in
the Indian Ocean, to bring the government down and
force a general election. Thus far, the wily
opposition leader has outfoxed the government.
Abe's resignation changes the dynamic.
Stepping down eliminates a lightning rod for
criticism. Giving up the Prime Minister's Office
is the sort of sacrifice Japanese expect from
their leaders. It changes the focus of the
political debate from Abe to Ozawa, who many
believe is making a technical argument against a
deployment that he would have supported under
other circumstances.
The MSDF is refueling
ships from many countries (only 30% of the fuel
has gone to US vessels this year), supporting a
multinational force that is struggling to defeat
the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and
making precisely the type of international
contribution that Ozawa fought hard for in the
first Gulf War.
Abe's retiring from the
scene means that Ozawa's arguments, rather than
Abe's behavior, will be the focus of debate. (The
speed with which Abe reversed gears also feeds
speculation that a deal may have been struck with
the DPJ on the MSDF issue; such backroom maneuvers
are not unknown in Japan.)
Much will
depend on whom the LDP selects as the new prime
minister; the vote is scheduled for next
Wednesday. The front-runner is LDP general
secretary and former foreign minister Taro Aso. He
is viewed as a more experienced politician and has
the gravitas for the office.
He also made
several verbal gaffes while serving as foreign
minister, and his views on foreign policy are
close to Abe's, which may be too conservative for
many Japanese. He also belongs to a small faction,
which means he may not be able to muster
sufficient support among party heads to win the
office.
If the LDP is looking for a figure
who can reassure voters alarmed by Abe's youth and
outlook, then former chief cabinet secretary Yasuo
Fukuda, 71, may get the nod. He is rooted in the
LDP's more pacifist traditions and would project
the competence and seniority that voters seek.
And if the Upper House result was more of
a vote against the LDP than a vote for the DPJ,
then the presence of a more statesmanlike figure
in charge, coupled with (residual) sympathy for
Abe, could be all Japanese voters need to stick
with the party they know and have historically
trusted. (Fukuda is also likely to get support
from party leaders who prefer that party posts be
allocated the traditional way - by decision among
elders, rather than by an empowered party
president as Koizumi did.)
The
foreign-policy implications of Abe's decision are
likely to be muted. No prime minister - even Aso -
would embrace an openly confrontational policy
toward China, absent a provocative gesture by
Beijing.
Tokyo still seeks better
relations with Seoul, but there is agreement that
top-level initiatives will have to await the
results of the South Korean presidential election
in December. Abe's resignation could open the door
to movement in relations with Pyongyang, which is
much needed as other components of the six-party
process move forward.
Nor would relations
with the United States be hurt. Japanese security
decision-makers and analysts remain committed to
the alliance: external developments have
underscored the vital role the US plays in Japan's
security. And even though Ozawa has picked a fight
over the Indian Ocean deployment, he, like most
Japanese, believes the country can and should do
more internationally - the debate is over the
terms of that contribution. Progress in relations
with North Korea would help reduce frictions
between Tokyo and Washington in the six-party
process.
The US will have to be prepared
for indecision and perhaps even paralysis among
decision-makers in Tokyo on a host of issues.
Patience will be essential. In one sense, Japan is
entering uncharted territory with the opposition
ascendant and in control of one house of the Diet
(parliament). At the same time, however, this
situation may result in a Japan that is all too
familiar: hesitant in its policy, insular, slow to
respond, and dominated by bureaucrats.
Or
Koizumi may come back, in which case all bets are
off.
Brad Glosserman
(bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com) is executive
director of Pacific Forum CSIS and co-editor of
Comparative Connections, the quarterly electronic
journal of East Asian bilateral relations.
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