Japan's new premier faces India
dilemma By Masako Toki
Japan is confronting a formidable dilemma:
whether or not to support the nuclear deal
concluded between the United States and India on
July 20. Japan's decision could risk discrediting
its carefully accumulated non-proliferation and
disarmament credentials. The decision could also
affect its national identity.
India has
never joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) or signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), both of which Japan values as cornerstones
of the international nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation regime. Japan is particularly
disturbed that the US-India
agreement does not include any specific
countermeasure in the case of India's
nuclear-weapons testing.
And yet despite
being the only country to experience nuclear
devastation, Japan has been extremely cautious in
expressing its attitude toward the nuclear deal.
It has merely repeated that it will "fully examine
and carefully consider the effects on the
non-proliferation regime". In other words, Tokyo
has been wise enough to avoid further controversy
but not strong enough to maintain its stance as a
champion of nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation.
Indeed, former prime
minister Shinzo Abe's recent visit to India
suggested that Tokyo was ready to support the
agreement. Although Abe cautiously avoided
mentioning the deal explicitly, the two countries
agreed in their joint statement that nuclear
energy is safe and important for sustainable
development. The leaders of the two countries also
agreed to enhance economic cooperation. That Abe
was accompanied by influential industrialists in
major nuclear-industry sectors suggests that Japan
intends to expand nuclear cooperation.
After the defeat of the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party in the recent elections for the
Upper House of the Diet (parliament) and Abe's
subsequent resignation, the Japanese cabinet was
again reshuffled. Under new Prime Minister Yasuo
Fukuda, the government has not signaled any
changes in its policy toward the US-India nuclear
deal. So far, this issue has not been adequately
debated between the ruling and opposition parties
in Japan.
India's pressure on Japan to
support the deal has been vocal from the
beginning. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit
to Japan last year, as well as External Affairs
Minister Pranab Mukherjee's visit this March,
proves India's eagerness to get Japan's consent.
The United States too is eager to win Japanese
approval for the pact. Whenever the relevant US
and Japanese governmental officials meet, they
discuss further cooperation in the field of
nuclear energy, which has included support for the
safe and secure expansion of nuclear energy in
interested countries.
Despite this
pressure, it is in Japan's - and the world's -
interest to treat the US-India nuclear deal with a
degree of skepticism.
Japan was
particularly critical of India after the nuclear
tests of 1998. It not only condemned the tests but
imposed sanctions against India. Japan also
sponsored the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Disarmament
and Non-proliferation and issued a historical
report that framed the nuclear tests in South Asia
as an attack on the NPT.
In the NPT
forums, Japan always reiterates the importance of
the universality of the regime among like-minded
countries. If Japan joins the US in accepting an
exception to this universality, the NPT will soon
be full of many other exceptions, including
disarmament obligations that could lead the treaty
to becoming a titular statement at best. Japan
must find a way to prevent the non-proliferation
regime from being further weakened.
At the
same time, India is an emerging economic power. So
it is natural for Tokyo to enhance its ties with
New Delhi, particularly during 2007, the year of
"Japan-India Friendship". By tightening its
relationship with New Delhi, Tokyo implicitly is
warning China, a strong regional rival to both
India and Japan. In his book Toward a Beautiful
Nation, Abe foretold that "it will not be
surprising if in 10 years' time, Japan-India
relations overtake Japan-US and Japan-China
relations".
However, the issue Japan is
now confronting is deeper than "friendship". Japan
is the staunchest advocate of the
non-proliferation regime. If Japan supports this
deal at the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), the rest of the undecided members could
easily follow suit.
Japan's options
Sooner or later, Japan needs to express
its attitude more explicitly. Japan's commitment
to disarmament and non-proliferation should be
preserved even if it causes short-term friction
with India as well as the US. In the long run, a
commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament
remains the most important element of Japan's
national identity and interest. At a time when
confidence in the NPT regime is at an all-time
low, Japan's heightened scrutiny of the US-India
nuclear deal would give the regime a much-needed
shot in the arm.
If India is allowed
access to the global civil nuclear market while
remaining outside the NPT regime, this could
reduce the incentives for non-nuclear-weapons
states inside the NPT regime to remain
non-nuclear. But India is not likely to join the
NPT in the foreseeable future. As such, Japan
might decide to support this exception in the NSG
as the next-best political option.
Such a
decision would be a mistake. Instead, Japan should
use its economic leverage to pressure India to
sign and ratify the CTBT. For almost a decade,
Japan has submitted a draft resolution on nuclear
disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly
urging the treaty's early entry into force. Only
three countries voted against the disarmament
resolution Japan submitted last year: the US,
India and North Korea. Japan can use the carrot of
the nuclear deal and the stick of reduced economic
cooperation to push India at least to abstain in
the resolution.
If the US-India nuclear
agreement unambiguously stated that the United
States can terminate and cease the deal should
India conduct a nuclear-weapons test, and if the
agreement clearly required all of India's nuclear
facilities to be placed under the International
Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards,
Abe might have been able to express clearer
support of the agreement during his visit to India
last month. In fact, Abe commented in an interview
that the agreement between India and the IAEA
should respond to the concerns of Japan and the
international community.
Japan will
continuously enhance its efforts for nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation in every aspect,
including promoting the early entry into force of
the CTBT and strengthening IAEA safeguards as well
as international export controls. Japan can never
escape from its responsibility as a champion of
nuclear disarmament. Only by making hard
decisions, as in the case of the US-India deal,
can Japan maintain this worthy identity.
Masako Toki is a research
associate at the James Martin Center for
Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey, California,
and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus. The
views expressed in this article are purely
personal and do not necessarily reflect those of
the organization to which she belongs.
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