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3 Japan has a mission in the Iraqi
desert By Michael Penn
In March, the Japanese Foreign Ministry
began speaking of a "long-term and strategic
partnership" between Japan and Iraq. The
terminology was new: Japan had previously
described its policy in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq
in terms of "reconstruction activities", but not
as a "strategic partnership". What accounts for
this shift in language? What does the new policy
entail? What does it overlook?
The
post-Samawa dilemma On July 19, 2006, the
final elements of the Ground Self-Defense
Forces (GSDF) mission rolled
across the border between Iraq and Kuwait. The
two-and-a-half-year mission in Samawa ended
without the deaths of any GSDF member on Iraqi
soil - although it was indirectly related to the
deaths of several Japanese civilians. As this
watershed event was taking place, the future
policies of the Japanese government remained
shrouded in uncertainty. Was this the effective
end of Japanese support to the post-Saddam Iraqi
government? Or was it simply the beginning of a
new phase?
In fact, Japanese policymakers
had been thinking about this issue for many
months. They had been extremely concerned about
the reaction in Washington as they withdrew their
"boots on the ground". They definitely did not
want to give the impression that the GSDF
withdrawal was an abandonment of Iraq in any way.
Their key concern was to find a way to demonstrate
their renewed commitment to the Baghdad regime.
Tokyo hoped to do this primarily through a
generous policy of government-to-government
financial aid. Among US allies, Japan's initial
pledge of US$5 billion in aid to Iraq far
outstripped that of any other country in the
coalition other than the United States. $1.5
billion of Japan's aid package to Baghdad had
already been distributed. The other $3.5 billion
was in the form of government loans to be provided
on special terms. The complete list of projects
within Iraq that would receive these Japanese
loans was yet to be determined, but it was
announced that this would be done by around the
end of 2007.
The generous Japanese
financial aid was not seen as sufficient by either
US officials or even the conservative Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) leadership, however. Japan
had been harshly criticized for "checkbook
diplomacy" during the Persian Gulf War of 1991,
and the GSDF Samawa mission itself had been sent
primarily to blunt such criticisms. Aid was fine,
but Washington demanded that Japan keep a toehold
inside Iraq in a more physical manner as well.
On January 17, 2006, then-US secretary of
defense Donald Rumsfeld sounded out then-Defense
Agency director general Nukaga Fukushiro on an
American proposal that the GSDF participate in
"security operations" within Iraq and also that it
play a direct role in training Iraqi military
forces. American requests for a military
contribution by the Japanese forces in Samawa had
begun as early as October 2005. Nukaga made clear
that he felt such a role would fall outside of his
interpretation of the pacifist Article Nine of the
Japanese constitution and would not be accepted in
Tokyo. Nukaga did suggest, however, that Japanese
leaders were still debating how they could
contribute to "international peace and cooperation
activities" through the framework of the United
Nations. Rumsfeld responded with comments to the
effect that "the world's second-largest economy
should contribute to global stability at a time
when international organizations are weak".
By February, Tokyo had received a direct
request from Washington to send senior GSDF
officers to Basra to aid in "provincial
reconstruction activities". This sparked concern
and debate among Japanese leaders as they were
considering plans for the GSDF withdrawal from
Samawa. They refrained from making any commitments
to the US government.
In March, Washington
raised the stakes. During a trilateral meeting
held in Sydney between Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, then-foreign minister Aso Taro,
and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer,
Rice reportedly told Aso that it was "essential"
that Japan send either military officers or
civilians to join a "reconstruction team" on the
ground inside Iraq. Again the Japanese side
demurred.
This was fortunate for them: in
mid-May Basra - which American officials had been
describing as safe and stable - suddenly exploded
into violence between rival political factions. A
British military helicopter was shot down at that
time. The effect of the Basra violence was to
reduce American demands on Tokyo to a certain
degree.
In the end, Tokyo successfully
resisted George W Bush administration pressure to
take a direct security role inside Iraq, but they
remained highly sensitive to of the need to show
support for the American project in ways that were
less risky.
The under-the-radar ASDF
mission The primary means by which Japanese
leaders tried to satisfy Washington in this regard
was through an expansion and renewed emphasis on
the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) transport
mission in Kuwait and Iraq.
The ASDF
mission was, and still is, shrouded in mystery.
Mention of it appears only infrequently in the
press, and it is likely that much of the Japanese
public is completely unaware that it is
proceeding. Unlike the GSDF mission in Samawa, the
ASDF transport mission has been accompanied by no
public fanfare. For the most part, it has been
under the radar.
What we can surmise from
the sparse information that has appeared are the
following facts: the mission, or at least
preparations for it, seems to have begun in the
autumn of 2003 at about the same time as the GSDF
deployment to Samawa. The main operations are
conducted from Ali al-Salim Air Base in Kuwait,
and involve about 200 men and three C-130
transport planes. An additional 10 ASDF officers
serve at the US Air Force Central Command, which
is apparently in Qatar. It is not clear what the
ASDF planes are actually transporting, but they
have denied rumors that their cargoes include
ammunition for US forces.
Significant
Japanese newspaper reports on the ASDF mission did
not begin appearing until April 2006 when the
Asahi Shinbun ran a five-part series that had
clearly gained official cooperation. A year later,
then-prime minister Abe Shinzo allowed himself to
be photographed inspecting the troops during his
April-May 2007 tour of the Persian Gulf.
The ASDF mission was originally
established, it seems, simply to support the GSDF
mission in Samawa. About a year later, however,
finding that only about two or three flights were
needed each week for this duty, the mission was
quietly expanded to transporting men and supplies
for the United States. Finally, as the GSDF
mission in Samawa was being withdrawn, serious
discussions arose about doing additional transport
work in Iraq for the United Nations as well. On
August 30, 2006, Japan and the United Nations
signed a formal agreement, and expanded transport
flights to Baghdad and to Irbil in northern Iraq
began shortly thereafter. From the point of view
of the conservative Yomiuri Shinbun, this made the
ASDF a "key player" in Japan's policy in the Iraqi
arena.
Even more shadowy is the issue of
possible Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF)
cooperation in Iraq War operations. According to
public information, MSDF activities are based in
the Indian Ocean and are strictly limited to
operations related to support for the United
Nations war in Afghanistan. In the fall of 2007,
however, controversial allegations appeared that
MSDF refueling operations were also aimed at
helping US forces in Iraq, which, if true, would
be a violation of Japan's deployment law.
While the truth of the matter remains
under dispute, it is certain that MSDF ships have
long been engaged in refueling operations in the
Persian Gulf. At the end of April, Abe also
allowed himself to be photographed inspecting the
destroyer Suzunami and supply ship Hamana in the
port of Abu Dhabi.
Be that as it may, from
the point of view of Tokyo the expanded ASDF
mission - and perhaps the MSDF mission as well -
largely fulfilled the American demand for a
Japanese physical presence inside Iraq.
Domestically, LDP leaders wanted the public to
largely overlook the unpopular mission. In
Washington and at UN Headquarters in New York,
they wanted it to be as conspicuous as possible.
This had actually been much the same pattern with
the earlier GSDF Samawa mission. In all of this,
however, the
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