COMMENT False choices for
Tokyo By Brad Glosserman
A gloom is settling over Tokyo, with deep
and deepening frustration and anxiety as Japanese
contemplate their strategic options.
Decision-makers in Tokyo have framed their choices
in overly simple terms that do not reflect the
range of possibilities in foreign and security
policy. Worse, Japanese behavior threatens to
limit future choices. While the roots of Japan's
insecurity will endure, Japanese can take steps to
ease anxieties, create more options and raise the
comfort level.
Political developments in
Tokyo and Washington are the primary
source of anxiety. The
Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) victory in Upper
House elections last July plunged Japan into
uncharted territory. The DPJ is determined to
seize the moment and force a general election,
fighting the government on every issue. This has
resulted in virtual political paralysis.
While some recalibration of priorities
after the departures of prime ministers Junichiro
Koizumi and Shinzo Abe was expected, the
unblinking focus on domestic politics - the phrase
"navel gazing" was used in several conversations -
has irritated even friends of the alliance. It is
distracting decision-makers and draining the
energy from Japanese institutions.
To take
one example: two countries did not send a head of
state or cabinet-level delegation to the Middle
East peace conference held in Annapolis, Maryland:
Sudan and Japan. Not surprisingly, no one is
expecting the domestic political tough decisions
that are needed to continue the transformation of
the US-Japan security alliance.
Japanese
are equally nervous about political developments
in the US. There is in Tokyo an instinctive
distrust of Democrats, who are thought to be soft
on security, captive of economic interests and
ready to bash Japan. Memories of Bill Clinton's
1998 trip to China are quick to surface: his
failure to stop in Tokyo on either leg gave birth
to the term "Japan passing". One hears frequent
reference to candidate Hillary Clinton's recent
Foreign Affairs article that called US-China
relations the most important bilateral
relationship and considerable angst about what her
victory in November might mean for Japan.
This first false dichotomy - Republicans
are good for the US-Japan relationship, Democrats
are bad - is based on a false assumption: Japan
and China are competing for American attention.
There is great concern in Tokyo that Washington
and Beijing will make common cause to deal with
shared problems and issues; that China with its
size, considerable resources (among them, a
permanent seat on the United Nations Security
Council), and newfound confidence, has assets
Japan cannot match; and that the US will become
frustrated with Japanese inaction. For many
Japanese, Beijing's role in the six-party talks
and the evolution of US policy toward North Korea
confirm the fragility of the alignment of US and
Japanese interests and are a harbinger of future
developments.
Japan has responded by
clinging tighter to the US and searching for ways
to differentiate Tokyo from Beijing. The call for
"values-based diplomacy", which aligns Japan with
Washington, Australia, India and Europe, is the
most visible manifestation of this effort. This
policy echoes those embraced at the outset of the
Meiji Restoration when strategists pondered
whether to look to Asia or the West. Then, Japan
turned its back on Asia, swiftly modernized, and
returned to Asia with a vengeance.
While
talk of an "East Asian Community" would seem to
resurrect that dichotomy, the choice today is a
false one. Japan need not pick one or the other.
Japan is member of both communities: Asian by
geography, but Western by virtue of its postwar
political and social evolution. Given its global
interests - economic and political - Japan cannot
be a purely "Asian" country. The key in this, as
in all other "choices" identified here, is in
balancing concerns.
That is a constant and
difficult process. Policymakers must be vigilant,
scanning the horizon (and beyond) for challenges
that they must then be prepared to confront. A
reactive diplomacy will not serve Japan well.
While adjustments will be ongoing, Japan can
devise a framework to guide strategic thinking. It
should include:
Japan should recognize that its choice is not
Asia or the West. Japan is an integral part of
both communities and must engage both. Failure to
identify with Asia or to participate fully in the
development of Asian institutions will marginalize
Tokyo within the region. Tokyo will not "speak
for" one or the other - as has sometimes been
suggested - but it can provide insight into how
each sees and is seen by the other.
Japan should seek to build a better and more
stable relationship with China. As the two biggest
countries in East Asia, positive relations make
almost anything possible. At a minimum, they are
the foundation of an Asian community. Fortunately,
this process appears to be underway, but it is
just beginning and it is still fragile. It must be
tended and nurtured.
Tokyo should adopt an inclusive outlook and
not feel threatened by improved relations between
Washington and Beijing. Just as a positive
Japan-China relationship will not threaten Tokyo's
ties to Washington, improved US-China relations
need not undermine the US-Japan alliance. The key
is ensuring that the US sees the value of an
alliance with Japan; one asset will be an improved
Japan-China relationship. Japan should also reach
out to South Korea to ensure that Seoul doesn't
feel left out of regional deliberations.
And easiest of all, Japan should court more
Democrats in the US (or at least stop bad mouthing
them). The bilateral security alliance has been
resilient because it has enjoyed bipartisan
support. Dismissing Democrats' views and the
public handwringing about what a Democratic
administration would do to the alliance alienates
friends and allies.
If these suggestions
seem simple, they in fact demand a radical change
in how Japan sees itself and its place in the
world. Most significantly, Japan must see itself
as an actor shaping international politics, rather
than a country merely reacting to external
developments. That does not mean adopting a great
power mentality; it does require thinking more
clearly about Japanese national interests and
acting to protect them. This transformation in
Japanese thinking will not be easy, but the stakes
could not be higher.
Brad
Glosserman (bradg@hawaii.rr.com) is executive
director of the Pacific Forum CSIS.
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