Page 1 of 2 India places its Asian bet on Japan
By Peter Lee
In a dismaying week for the People's Republic of China (PRC), India turned away from it, and gave further signals that it is ready to move beyond the narrative of Japanese World War II aggression that has informed China's Asian diplomacy and anchored the US presence in Asia for over half a century in favor of a view of Japan as a leading and laudable security actor in East Asia.
I don't know if there is a term in the diplomatic lexicon for "deep tongue kiss accompanied by groans of mutual fulfillment", but if there is, it seems it would be illustrated by the encounter between Indian President Manmohan Singh and Japanese PM Abe Shinzo
in Tokyo on May 27-29, 2013.
Speaking to an assembly of Japanese government and corporate worthies in Tokyo, Singh said:
Asia's resurgence began over a century ago on this island of the Rising Sun. Ever since, Japan has shown us the way forward. India and Japan have a shared vision of a rising Asia. Over the past decade, therefore, our two countries have established a new relationship based on shared values and shared interests. ...
Our relationship with Japan has been at the heart of our Look East Policy. Japan inspired Asia's surge to prosperity and it remains integral to Asia's future. The world has a huge stake in Japan's success in restoring the momentum of its growth. Your continued leadership in enterprise, technology and innovation and your ability to remain the locomotive of Asian renaissance are crucial. India's relations with Japan are important not only for our economic development, but also because we see Japan as a natural and indispensable partner in our quest for stability and peace in the vast region in Asia that is washed by the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Our relations draw their strength from our spiritual, cultural and civilizational affinities and a shared commitment to the ideals of democracy, peace and freedom. We have increasingly convergent world views and growing stakes in each other's prosperity. We have shared interests in maritime security and we face similar challenges to our energy security. There are strong synergies between our economies, which need an open, rule-based international trading system to prosper.
Together, we seek a new architecture for the United Nations Security Council. In recent years, our political and security cooperation has gained in salience. Japan is the only partner with whom we have a 2-plus-2 Dialogue between the Foreign and Defence Ministries. We have also begun bilateral exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force.
The romance was consecrated by an audience with the Japanese emperor and empress for Singh and his wife, and the announcement that the royal couple would be visiting India before the year's end in only the second overseas trip for the aging emperor since 2009.
It should also be noted that India is studying Japan's offer to sell an amphibious plane, the US-2, that would be de facto Japan's first overseas military sale, though it would go out under the flag of "dual use" (the Japanese government has previously supplied maritime patrol vessels to Indonesia, and has promised them to the Philippines, but as "developmental assistance," not as a sale).
Compare and contrast Singh's effusions in Tokyo with the proper but distant tone of the communique on Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang's recent visit to India:
There is enough space in the world for the development of India and China, and the world needs the common development of both countries. As the two largest developing countries in the world, the relationship between India and China transcends bilateral scope and has acquired regional, global and strategic significance. Both countries view each other as partners for mutual benefit and not as rivals or competitors.
Much of the Indian coverage gave full rein to anti-PRC feelings (The Hindu being the exception, although it perforce titled its skeptical editorial on Singh's Japan trip as "Love in Tokyo"), implying that India's vociferous China bashers were celebrating an overt shift in Indian government attitudes or, at the very least, Japan had been extremely thorough in its spadework with right-wing Indian media to cultivate a Japan-India alliance.
The Times of India headlined: "India, Japan join hands to break China's 'string of pearls'". First Post wrote:
It's true that no other country in the world today feels as threatened by China's so-called "peaceful rise" as Japan. But then India too feels threatened by China. That is why Shinzo Abe, the Japanese Prime Minister and a known India friend, had said in his address to the joint session of Indian parliament in the Central Hall in the summer of 2007 that the Indo-Japan relations were a "confluence of the two seas", a phrase that he drew from the title of a book written by the Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in 1655.
Abe is an unabashed China-basher who says he is determined to see that the South China Sea does not become a "Lake Beijing". He has proposed an ADSD - Asia Democratic Security Diamond, comprising Japan, India, Australia and the US.
This is what Abe said in a signed article in December 2012: "If Japan were to yield, the South China Sea would become even more fortified. Freedom of navigation, vital for trading countries such as Japan and South Korea, would be seriously hindered. The naval assets of the United States, in addition to those of Japan, would find it difficult to enter the entire area, though the majority of the two China seas is international water."
Abe has forecast that in about a decade Japan-India relations would overtake Japan-China and even Japan-US relations. "I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific," he said in this article.
India and Japan were never as close to each other as they are today. The bonding is to become all the stronger in the near future. All thanks to China.
Economic Times observed:
Japan occupies a large space in Manmohan Singh's heart, and he has logged enough frequent flyer miles to Tokyo to prove it. When he lands in Tokyo on Monday, Singh is certain to get the kind of reception that will show Japan reciprocates in full measure.
Japan has the kind of technological and innovation heft India needs in spades. Acknowledging this, the PM once famously listed three of India's relationships he described as "transformational" - US, Japan and Germany - that if India used these relationships wisely, they could help transform our nation. ...
With Shinzo Abe back in power in Japan with a convincing mandate and a will to resuscitate Japan from its "lost decades", India has a unique opportunity. ...
It is time India came out of the closet to strengthen the countries in the region: Indonesia, Vietnam and the real power in Asia - Japan. India should not waste its time looking for Japanese endorsement of Kashmir or Arunachal Pradesh, though many officials will tell you this is why we're kind of reticent with them. Instead, India should be more helpful on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue - because if China gets away with this one, it will be unstoppable everywhere else.
Put China on the list of observers who came away with the impression of an Indo-Japanese love fest.
For an illustration of the diplomatic equivalent of "green eyed monster that doth mock the meat it feeds on" ie jealousy/envy/sour grapes, note this People's Daily editorial, which attempts to put the resolution of a minor border intrusion during Li Keqiang's visit to India on a par with the multi-course love feast between Singh and Abe (while diplomatically putting the blame for Singh's dalliance on Abe's shoulders) - "Sino-Indian diplomatic miracle embarrasses Japanese politicians":
"The clouds in the sky cannot blot out the sunshine of Sino-Indian friendship," said Premier Li Keqiang when describing the Sino-Indian ties on the last day of his stay in India. Before Premier Li Keqiang's visit, the China-India border standoff was hyped up by international media. The divergence and contradictions between the two countries were also exaggerated as if the Sino-Indian ties had been strained suddenly. But what surprised the media was that China and India properly solved the issue in a short time.
During Premier Li Keqiang's visit, the top leaders of both countries had sincere and candid talks and came to a series of strategic consensus and cooperation. The shift of Sino-Indian ties in such a short time is a miracle. In the development of Sino-Indian ties there are several divergence and contradictions. Some countries see these differences as an opportunity to provoke dissension. Not long ago, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called on Japan, India, Australia and the US to jointly form a "Democratic Security Diamond" to compete with the ascendant China. He also proposed that Japan should promote "Strategic Diplomacy" and "Values Diplomacy" and made visits in countries around China. Some politicians just made themselves petty burglars on China-related issues. The so-called "Democratic Security Diamond", "Strategic Diplomacy" and "Values Diplomacy" among other new terms seem very strategic. But in fact they unveiled the narrow-minded diplomatic thoughts of Japanese government. The conspiracy of these petty burglars is doomed to fail ...
A brief note: the "Democratic Security Diamond" was originally bruited about in Abe's first term and independently championed by US vice president Dick Cheney as a piece of unabashed China containment. He attempted to advance it during an Asian trip in 2007, over the objections of the rest of the Bush administration, which was trying to engage the PRC on the perennial North Korea nuclear issue at the time.
It is difficult to shed the feeling that Indian commentators who detect an anti-China shift in Indian government policy are on to something.
Certainly, the Japan-India affair has sound diplomatic and economic bases. India is not happy about its immense trade deficit with China; Japan sees India as an alternative manufacturing base to an increasingly hostile (and costly) China.
Abe also would welcome some big ticket deals with India - hopefully including a dominant share of India's nuclear power plant imports (see PK Sundaram's article at Japan Focus) - to keep the economy humming and keep Abenomics out of the ditch.
Various national quid pro quos are at work - several billion dollars in Japanese loans, Indian support for the Tokyo Olympics in 2020, and a promise to work together to change the structure of the UN Security Council, to date notably China-heavy and Japan- and-India-unrepresented.
But an interested reader - and, indeed, the Chinese government - cannot escape the sense that Singh, encouraged by Abe's vigorous approach to restoring Japan's national and regional stature, has decided to place an open bet on Japan - a fellow democracy and, until recent years at least, acknowledged master of the global economic and financial game - instead of obstreperous, state socialist China in the Asian sweepstakes.
Therefore, I for once and very gingerly take issue with the esteemed M K Bhadrakumar on his conclusion that China's assertiveness in Ladakh strengthened the hands of India's China bashers and queered Li Keqiang's trip and Sino-Indian relations overall.
Given the apparent desire of Prime Minister Singh to prioritize a Japan partnership, maybe somebody thought an Indian provocation in Ladakh would yield a timely and useful piece of anti-Chinese framing to the encounter in Tokyo. Or perhaps, Singh's heart was in Japan from the beginning.
Chinese state media has for the most part refrained from criticizing Manmohan Singh and India's Japan tilt directly. However, references to Radhabinod Pal have appeared in Chinese media and, provide an interesting perspective (and surrogate) for China's unease with its deepening Indio-Japanese conundrum.
Pal was an Indian jurist on the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal in 1946. Enamored of the anti-colonial rhetoric that accompanied the Japanese "advance" into Southeast Asia, he believed the United States had provoked Japan into war (the Japanese response was therefore not "aggressive"), was concerned about Allied wartime atrocities, and declined to endorse the "triumph of civilization" narrative of Japan's defeat or the creation of "Class A" war criminal category that the Occupation used to prosecute the Japanese military and civilian leadership. While acknowledging the commission of atrocities in the field (though a Nanjing Massacre skeptic), Pal voted for acquittal of the "Class A" defendants and prepared a 1,235-page dissenting opinion - suppressed by the Occupation until 1952 - stating that the trial was a "victor's justice" travesty.
So far so good.
After his dissent was published, Pal, unsurprisingly, became a hero to Japanese nationalists. Given the legal and moral flaws of the tribunal, the standard explanation is that Pal was simply a scrupulous jurist whose dissent got cherry picked by nasty nationalists for verbiage that supported their claim that the only thing Japan did wrong in World War II was lose it.
Actually, as an article at Japan Focus by Japanese scholar Nakajima Takeshi points out, in his dissent Pal went beyond challenging the legality and validity of the tribunal to excusing Japanese - activities? aggression? advances? Choose your favorite term - on the grounds that Japan was getting picked on by the West.
This is rather obvious in Pal's treatment of Japan's incursion into Manchuria in 1931, which Japan did on its own kick without the excuse that the US was forcing it into war. Pal obviously finds it extremely awkward that Japan, in his mind the front line of resistance to Western colonialism, adopted nakedly colonial policies in its dismemberment of China and subjugation of Manchuria.
He attempts to resolve his difficulties by deploying what might be characterized as the "monkey see monkey do" defense - that Japan, deluded by the precedent, pretexts, and spurious legality of Western colonial intrusions, mistakenly adopted the same methods and, indeed, erroneously adopted the very idea that it needed to occupy Manchuria, from the West.
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