Page 2 of 2 China wary of a 'normal' Japan
By Hiro Katsumata and Mingjiang Li
by no means suggests that the Japanese support the idea of militarization.
According to a survey conducted by the Cabinet Office of Japan in 2006, a
majority of the population were not in favor of an increase in the country's
military capabilities: the percentage of those who favored the strengthening of
the SDF was only 17% [8].
One may point out that Tokyo today is seeking greater military collaboration
with the US, by jointly developing a missile defense system. However, such a
system should not been seen as a step toward militarization because it can only
be used for defense purposes. If the country sought to expand its sphere of
influence, it would have to procure a different set of weapons, including
aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, long-range ballistic missiles, and
perhaps nuclear weapons. Although these weapons are common to "normal" great
powers in the world, Tokyo has not begun to explore these options.
With regard to constitutional change, for the Japanese, the main purpose of
this would be to facilitate the country's active participation in international
peacekeeping activities. This is evident in the results of the survey conducted
by The Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned above. The most common reason, offered by
those who supported the idea of constitutional change, has always been the same
since 1993: it is difficult for Tokyo to make international contributions under
the existing constitution. For the Japanese, constitutional change is a
prerequisite for greater international contributions, since the existing
constitution leaves the legitimacy of the SDF ambiguous.
It is difficult to envisage for Japan a new constitution of a militaristic
nature. In the past at least two drafts of the constitution were proposed by
two major organizations: one was written by The Yomiuri Shimbun in 1994, and
revised in 2000 and 2004; and the other was proposed by the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party in 2005. Both these drafts plainly renounce war, while making
clear the legitimacy of the SDF.
Both organizations propose changes in the second part of Article 9. The
existing first paragraph of Article 9 stipulates that the "Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use
of force as means of settling international disputes." The existing second
paragraph states, "In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,
land, sea, and air forces ... will never be maintained." This second paragraph
is ambiguous, and can be interpreted as destroying the legitimacy of the SDF.
The idea behind the two drafts is to clarify this ambiguity.
Implications for Sino-Japanese ties
It can be concluded on the basis of the above observations that China need not
be on its guard against Tokyo's pursuit of normalization. The normalization of
Japan is by no means synonymous with its militarization. What the Japanese are
seeking is a nation that actively participates in international peacekeeping
activities, on the basis of a revised constitution that makes explicitly clear
the legitimacy of the SDF.
Nonetheless, the Chinese should be alert to a different sort of
"normalization": they should be careful about making Japan's normalization a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Their inaccurate interpretation of Japan's
normalization - that normalization means militarization - would constitute a
basis for Beijing to build up its military forces. Its excessive guard against
Japan would bring about the latter's anxiety, which in turn would lead to its
military buildup. In this way, the inaccurate interpretation of Japan’s
normalization on the part of the Chinese becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
To prevent this kind of unfortunate scenario, the Chinese have to enhance their
ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate information on Japan. While the
former is largely objective, the latter is usually tainted with nationalistic
or jingoistic agendas. In addition, the Chinese media have to stop using
anti-Japanese language, which distorts the way in which Japan is understood
among the Chinese public.
The Japanese have to make an effort, too. They should realize that they are
partially responsible for the misunderstanding on the part of the Chinese.
Their problem concerns their discourse and behavior that do nothing but make
the Chinese suspicious of Japan's intentions. Many Japanese have not realized
the sensitivity of historical issues. Without appreciating the sentiment of
their Asian neighbors, some Japanese politicians and opinion leaders have been
making unreasonable comments and behaving irresponsibly. Unless they change
their discourse and behavior, they will not be able to convince the Chinese
that a normal Japan will be peaceful.
After all, regional stability in Asian is a function of mutual understanding.
When a sense of mutual understanding develops between the Japanese and the
Chinese, the normalization of Japan will cease to be an issue. Therefore, the
former have to be sensitive to the emotions of the latter, and the latter
should try to see Tokyo’s security policy objectively. The promotion of a sense
of mutual understanding is the key to stabilizing the Asian region.
Notes
1. See, for example, Liu Qiang, "Lun riben 'zhengchang guojia' hua"
(Analyzing Japan's State Normalization), Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World
Economics and Politics), vo. 10, 2004; Lian Hui and Shi Zhe, "Riben: juli
'zhengchang' hai sheng ji bu?" (Japan: How far from being normal?),
Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), August 21, 2003.
2. See, for example, Feng Yongping, "Zhong ri guanxi kunjing jiedu" (An
Analysis of the Dilemma in Sino-Japanese Relations), Guoji luntan (International
Forum), Vol. 8, No 1, Jan 2006; Jiang Yaochun, "Lun zhong ri guanxi" (A
Discussion of Sino-Japanese Ties), Guoji wenti yanjiu (International
Studies), vol 5, 2006.
3. See, for example, Gao Lan, "Quanmian jiedu lengzhan hou riben guojia zhanlue
de biange yu yingxiang" (A Comprehensive Analysis of the Changes and
Implications of Japanese National Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era), Guoji
guancha (International Observations), vo. 5, 2005.
4. Ichiro Ozawa, Nihon Kaizou Keikaku (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993), p 104;
and its English version, Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: the Rethinking
of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994), p 95.
5. Cabinet Office of Japan Public Opinion Polls, February 1991; and Cabinet
Office of Japan Public Opinion Polls, January 2003 (accessed July 31, 2008).
6. Yomiuri Shimbun National Public Survey, March 2005.
7. Yomiuri Shimbun National Public Survey, May 1993 and March 2005.
8. Cabinet Office of Japan Public Opinion Polls, February 2006 (accessed 31
July 2008).
Hiro Katsumata, PhD, is research associate of the Center for Governance
and International Affairs at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom. Li
Mingjiang, PhD, is assistant professor of the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
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