Japan trusts in change By Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani and Aki Mori
An unprecedented change in government has raised speculation about the
direction of Japan's foreign policy. The August 30 legislative elections
allowed the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to take control of government for
the first time from the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Japan's
democracy is poised for change, but drastic revision of the Japan-US alliance
is not in Japan's national interest, is not what the Japanese people voted for,
and would seriously distract the new government from other priorities.
The DPJ won a 308-seat majority in the 480-seat Lower House of the Diet
(parliament), but lacks an outright majority in the Upper House. To enact
legislation smoothly, the DPJ decided to form a coalition government with two
minor parties: the pacifist Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the People's New
Party (PNP), known for its skepticism of economic liberalization. The coalition
is set to govern at least until the Upper House election in July 2010.
In forming the coalition, the DPJ reached agreement on five foreign policy
goals:
Increasing contributions for United Nations peacekeeping operations, disaster
relief, environmental diplomacy and free trade.
Pursuing a more sustainable and equal alliance with the US by reviewing
existing agreements out of concern for the Japanese taxpayer and citizens of
Okinawa prefecture.
Expanding cooperation with Asian neighbors and developing an "East Asian
Community".
Advancing nuclear disarmament.
Directing foreign aid toward the alleviation of poverty and post-conflict
reconstruction, including in Afghanistan.
These policy visions are in line with the DPJ's election platform, but the
inclusion of the SDP could constrain cabinet decisions on security policy. The
SDP has strongly opposed international activities of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces (JSDF). However, the SDP and PNP did not gain additional seats in the
recent election and account for only 2.5% of the Lower House.
This certainly does not indicate their policies enjoy broad support among
Japanese. Nonetheless, the appointment of PNP leader Shizuka Kamei as financial
services minister signals a dramatic break with former prime minister Junichiro
Koizumi's attempts at economic reform.
Even more important in terms of personnel decisions, DPJ leader and now Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama appointed Katsuya Okada as foreign minister and named
Ichiro Ozawa secretary general of the DPJ.
Ozawa, the veteran politician instrumental in the historic transition from LDP
to DPJ-centered government, wields considerable power behind the scenes. Many
DPJ lawmakers owe their positions to Ozawa, who will oversee not only party but
also legislative business since his closest aide, Kenji Yamaoka, chairs the
Diet Affairs Committee. An open question is how Hatoyama will coordinate policy
among Ozawa, Okada's Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the newly-established
"National Strategy Bureau" headed by Naoto Kan.
Hatoyama chose Toshimi Kitazawa as defense minister, a senior lawmaker not
expected to take a transformative role. As the DPJ is without governing
experience, it may be putting its most senior faces in the cabinet to inspire
public confidence. This appointment might also indicate the DPJ's intention to
play down defense issues ahead of the Upper House election. The tight election
cycle puts pressure on the DPJ to demonstrate progress on economic and social
issues. Japanese public surveys suggest that people voted against the LDP's
domestic failures rather than in favor of the DPJ's international agenda.
With domestic politics demanding economic recovery and an improved social
contract, and security concerns including a threatening North Korea and rising
China, it makes sense for the new government to focus its efforts on the former
and keep the US-Japan alliance strong to cope with the latter.
The DPJ will have its hands full redefining the interaction between elected
officials and bureaucrats while pushing through reforms. Political battles will
ensue, involving the DPJ, its coalition partners, the bureaucracy, LDP
opposition and investigative media reporting. It is in the interests of both
Japan and the US that the alliance does not become a political football in the
process.
The new government in Tokyo and relatively new government in Washington should
thus proceed on alliance-related issues with care. Okada emphasized to US
ambassador to Japan John Roos that the DPJ wanted to strengthen relations for
the long term and step up cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation and the
environment.
However, the handling of four issues - the Indian Ocean refueling mission,
troop and base relocation, historical accounting of a tacit nuclear agreement,
and the legal status of US forces in Japan - will determine whether the DPJ
government manages to "build trust" with the Obama administration as promised,
or whether the new government undermines the alliance.
First, it appears the DPJ will allow the JSDF Indian Ocean mission to expire.
This is regrettable since the mission is not symbolic "alliance dues", but a
substantive contribution to global security. The main task of CTF-150, which
Japanese refueling supports, has shifted from interdiction of terrorists and
weapons to countering drug trafficking - a major source of terrorist financing.
Canceling Japan's refueling support would make operations difficult for CTF-150
partners, particularly Pakistan.
The DPJ should consider renewing the mission with increased parliamentary
oversight, a compromise that would likely have the support of the Japanese
public. Meanwhile, it would be counterproductive for Washington to consider the
refueling mission a litmus test for the alliance. The US should leave the door
open for creative Japanese contributions to Afghanistan and elsewhere on
non-traditional security issues.
Second, existing US-Japan agreements on troop and base relocations are critical
for the alliance goals of defending Japan and ensuring regional stability.
While the US should fully engage in consultations about DPJ concerns, the
margin for adjustment is small. Implementing existing agreements is less a
matter of negotiation between Japan and the US than between Tokyo and Okinawa.
The DPJ naturally wants to advance the interests of all its constituents, but
it must ultimately show leadership to implement the plan to relocate Futenma
air base, which will reduce the US forces footprint while maintaining the
presence needed for Japan's security.
Third, the DPJ appears intent on reviewing a historical "neither confirm nor
deny" (NCND) policy about US nuclear weapons passing through Japan. This is
part of the DPJ's campaign promise to increase government transparency and
clean the slate from LDP rule. However, since the US no longer introduces
nuclear weapons into Japan, the issue is one for historians, not for today's
policymakers. Moreover, the origin of the decades-old agreement was a request
by the Japanese for political cover, so enshrining the non-nuclear principles
into law over this issue may appear hypocritical and damage trust in the
alliance.
Fourth, on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provides the legal
parameters for US forces in Japan, it is important to note that the US has over
100 SOFAs all over the world. While revising the SOFA may appear to be a
bilateral issue to Tokyo, it has multilateral implications for Washington. If
Tokyo seeks SOFA revision, to include an environmental clause for example, it
should take a gradual and multilateral approach, possibly involving fellow host
countries South Korea and Germany.
The DPJ leadership has signaled it will avoid drastic moves on the alliance,
instead pursuing policy reviews, consultations with the Barack Obama
administration, and government reforms ahead of the Upper House election. But
other public statements by DPJ officials suggest the new government will demand
change on the above four points within months.
For instance, Okada has a personal passion for nuclear issues, such as exposing
the NCND policy and calling for the US to declare a no-first-use (NFU) nuclear
posture. However, he no longer speaks for himself, but for the Japanese
government, and Japan's national interests include maintaining the alliance and
the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella.
Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell struck a helpful tone ahead of
Hatoyama and Okada's visit last week to the United States. He said that Japan
was an "equal partner" and that the US had "patience, a commitment to listen
and to work closely" with the new government in Tokyo.
The Obama administration has reacted calmly to Hatoyama's suggestion in a
pre-election op-ed that Japan should position itself carefully between the US
and China. The US could go further in encouraging Japan to reach out to its
neighbors, as an improved Japanese regional profile would be an asset to the
alliance. The DPJ proposal of a Japan-US free-trade agreement is constructively
bold, but for efficiency and to avoid undue bilateral friction, Washington may
encourage Tokyo to show greater leadership in the Doha round instead. There is
also room for increasing US-Japan coordination on North Korea, Iran and
Myanmar.
For Japan's new government, there is an opportunity in offering continuity with
the Security Consultative Committee statements, and taking steps forward rather
than back on international cooperation in the upcoming revision of Japan's
National Defense Program Guidelines.
The DPJ must be a good steward of the Japan-US alliance - building on existing
agreements, and seeking adjustments via consultations rather than politically
charged negotiations. Doing so will allow the DPJ to focus on pressing economic
and domestic issues.
It is also important for the LDP to be a faithful opposition - looking after
Japan's national interests rather than focusing on trying to topple the DPJ. On
the eve of the security treaty's 50th anniversary, both the Hatoyama and Obama
governments need to demonstrate that the alliance is not merely a partnership
between particular political parties. The alliance should transcend changes in
government because it is based on shared interests, values and trust, making
possible deeper cooperation on major global challenges.
Aki Mori (akimori401@gmail.com) and Tetsuo Kotani(tetsuo.kotani@gmail.com)
are PhD candidates in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha
University, and research fellows at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in
Tokyo. Leif-Eric Easley (easley@fas.harvard.edu) is a PhD
candidate at Harvard University, a visiting scholar at the University of
Southern California Korean Studies Institute, and a Kelly Fellow with the
Pacific Forum CSIS. This article draws upon a longer Pacific Forum CSIS Young
Leaders collaboration published in the journal, Asia Policy (http://asiapolicy.nbr.org).
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