Searching times for Japan's premier
By Peter J Brown
After just three months in office, Japan's Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama finds
himself in a "zone of indecision" amid mounting pressure on a range of key
issues.
At a meeting late last week in Washington DC, senior United States officials
informed a ranking member of the small People's New Party - part of the
coalition government in Tokyo - that a US government budget-related deadline
looms and that if Hatoyama does not make a decision by Friday about relocation
of the Futenma military base, the US will be compelled to abandon widely
discussed plans to move 8,000 United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam.
Hatoyama, according to reports in the Japanese media on
Tuesday, is stalling and has delayed making a decision until May. Reports said
Japan would continue with preparations to move the base but also explore
alternative relocation sites. The plan, agreed upon under a 2006 deal between
the US and Japan, is to relocate Futenma to a less crowded part of northern
Okinawa, but Hatoyama has said the new site could be changed, perhaps even off
the southern island.
Besides the Okinawa base controversy, Japan's infectious economic weakness and
even China are contributing to the end of Hatoyama's honeymoon. A lack of
coherency infused with a certain lack of discipline is not helping matters.
The heat is on and the end of Hatoyama's honeymoon is close. This does not mean
that Hatoyama's political future hangs by a thread. Any dissatisfaction with
Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as a whole has been mild. If
dissent does become more widespread, it will do little more than mark the start
of a new era of relative instability in Tokyo featuring political winds that
change direction quickly and constantly.
Despite the presence of seasoned politicians in the DPJ such as the secretary
general, Ichiro Ozawa, the party can best be described as a bold social and
political experiment, and perhaps more of a proposition than a deeply rooted
political party.
Hatoyama's task at this stage is to preserve party unity and maintain the
coalition government, in particular by keeping the more assertive Social
Democratic Party (SDP) on board; this requires a delicate balancing act. After
all, if Hatoyama is to succeed, particularly with his campaign to transform
Japan by overhauling the bureaucracy and essentially scrapping the way it has
been governed for the past 50 years, a well-organized machine must be activated
with defined objectives and firm discipline in the ranks.
Consider what the chief cabinet secretary, Hirofumi Hirano, was wrestling with
in early December. It was up to Hirano to rein in Defense Minister Toshimi
Kitazawa after Kitazawa irritated the SDP with remarks about the sheer
impossibility of relocating the Futenma air station to Guam. This took place as
Hirano was scrambling in advance of Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's
mid-December trip to Japan. China's request for a meeting between Xi and
Emperor Akihito had initially been denied by Hatoyama on the basis that it
would violate a long-standing constitutional ban on any activities by the
emperor that might be seen as the least bit political.
Only after Hirano's persistent efforts - he repeatedly contacted the Imperial
Household Agency - was the meeting with Xi approved because it was deemed of
great importance to Japan-China relations.
Then, Hatoyama changed his mind. "This is a matter of improving relations
between Japan and a foreign country, and so the expression 'political use' does
not apply," said Hatoyama.
Hatoyama finally gave his approval and the meeting was due to take place on
Tuesday, but he allowed himself to wander into a "zone of indecision" where the
outcome was uncertain.
Whereas Hatoyama should be calling the shots, he is starting to look as if he
is being propelled along by the flow of events rather than making things
happen. As his actions begin to be questioned, confidence is diminished and
this could prove damaging in a political sense.
The Liberal Democratic Party was quick to pounce in this instance. Shigeru
Ishiba, the LDP's policy chief, told Kyodo News that the meeting with Xi was
inappropriate, and that the emperor appeared to be engaged in diplomacy due to
China's request.
Japan's relations with China were also front and center as the DPJ's secretary
general Ozawa arrived in Beijing last week with an unprecedented delegation of
640, including more than 140 DPJ members of the Diet (parliament) - 80 of whom
had recently been elected for the first time.
One senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official described the trip as ill timed
and not helpful, given Hatoyama's inability to present the US with a firm
decision about what comes next on Okinawa.
Ozawa talked openly about how the growing ties between China and Japan would
only get stronger once the DPJ became Japan's controlling political party.
Ozawa also suggested that this would happen after next summer's elections
because, in his mind, the DPJ was on track to secure a solid single-party
majority in the Diet.
"I am recruiting candidates for the final battle and am aiming for a victory as
the commander-in-chief of the field army," Ozawa said, according to the
Mainichi Shimbun.
Ozawa's comments are worth a closer look. A Yomiuri Shimbun report quotes him
differently, and draws more attention to his choice of words.
"In
summer, we'll have a final battle [the Upper House election]. I'll leave the
government administration to Prime Minister [Yukio] Hatoyama, and devote myself
to the battle as a supreme commander of the people's liberation army's field
battle unit," Ozawa said. "If the DPJ wins the majority of seats in the Upper
House, it will create an environment in which we can have bolder discussions.
That also will contribute to deepening the bilateral relationship."
Both Kitazawa and Ozawa are willing to make statements that will probably not
sit well with the SDP - let alone Washington - and this comes as no big
surprise. Nor is anyone going to be caught off guard by Ozawa's reference to
the existing coalition's inability or reluctance to undertake "bolder
discussions" with China.
However, because Hatoyama's political success is highly dependent on continuing
and consistent support from the compulsive SDP - not the most anti-American
force in contemporary Japanese politics, but close to it - Hatoyama cannot be
too happy when the opinions of senior DPJ members threaten to undermine this
relationship.
After hearing Ozawa's comments about next summer's elections, the SDP can sit
back and ignore Ozawa completely or wonder what exactly the DPJ is planning.
Either way, it is a sure bet that Hatoyama's honeymoon will not extend to the
next round of elections in 2010.
The SDP did not enter into a coalition with the DPJ to be left high and dry in
2010. With the DPJ placing so much stock in its younger members in particular,
this demographic slant must have the SDP concerned as well. Add it all up and
the SDP must do some quick calculations with respect to the benefits of the
arrangement in which it now finds itself.
If distrust mounts in the SDP, or if the SDP sees writing on the wall that it
finds alarming, it might choose to make a sudden exit, causing a collapse of
the current government. Fortunately for Hatoyama, the chances of this happening
are quite slim.
What is preventing any large-scale SDP split is the SDP's realization that a
bumpy ride with the DPJ is better than no ride at all. After years of LDP
dominance, during which the SDP played a marginal role at best and sometimes no
role at all, at least now the SDP can enjoy its seat at the table. Throwing
this out the window makes little sense for now. Yes, it would end Hatoyama's
honeymoon in an instant, but the cost appears simply too great.
However, senior DPJ officials who allude to a DPJ sweep next year are playing
with fire. The SDP only has to walk out the door in early 2010 to bring these
same DPJ officials back down to earth in an instant.
Hatoyama, meanwhile, is striving to get all economic arrows pointed in a more
positive direction. No cure for Japan's economic hangover has been identified
thus far, and under the DPJ, there are signs that the economy is again slipping
sideways, if not downwards.
A downbeat mood in the country helps to explain the large Japanese delegation
in Beijing. Japan is eager to find a solution to its persistent economic
problems, which might include an innovative solution featuring China and South
Korea as partners, if that is what it takes to turn things around.
Japan cannot innovate its way out of its mess, nor can it rely on the US to
ride to its rescue. China will not serve as a safe haven either because as
China starts to climb quite quickly out of its economic doldrums leaving Japan
behind, this could further undermine the Japanese public's confidence in
Hatoyama and the DPJ, with very adverse consequences at the polls next year.
As this unfolds, Hatoyama seems hazy. For example, when he stepped to the
podium during last week's Bali Democracy Forum he co-chaired with Indonesia's
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, he stated:
China, home to the
largest population in Asia and experiencing remarkable economic growth, has
been undergoing an economic and social transformation to open itself to Asia
and the wider world. In the 2008 joint statement between Japan and China, our
two countries pledged to "engage in close cooperation to develop greater
understanding and pursuit of basic and universal values that are commonly
accepted by the international community". There is great expectation that China
will continue to make progress, as a responsible power, on the issues of
democracy and human rights, along with various other issues.
It is important to note that there is no end to the process of evolving
democracy; it is always a work in progress with the possibility of further
improvement. One could argue that the recent change of government in Japan was
an example of such a process for improvement. It is essential that we recognize
each other's differences and advance our collaboration in an open and mutually
supportive manner. Japan supports the self-motivated efforts of other
governments towards democracy. I believe that an East Asian community, of which
I am a proponent, will also come into view in time as we forge ahead in this
way.
By raising the possibility in the abstract that China
might some day become "self-motivated" and stroll down some previously
undiscovered path towards democracy while prominent dissidents continue to head
off to jail there, Hatoyama was supremely diplomatic. Perhaps Hatoyama retained
visions of China's President Hu Jintao standing alongside dozens of his fellow
DPJ members - not only shaking hands with all the Diet members in attendance,
but having individual photos taken with most of them.
At the time this was taking place in Beijing and Bali, China's official news
agency was reporting the discovery of more evidence of the "Nanjing Massacre"
in the late 1930s, when Japanese troops occupied the Chinese city - certainly
not a breaking news story but one that was aimed directly at Tokyo nonetheless.
Hatoyama is not oblivious to this move by Xinhua. Nor can he ignore Barack
Obama's decision to exclude any mention of Japan's commitment of US$5 billion
in economic aid to Afghanistan during the US president's pivotal speech about
how the US will conduct the war in Afghanistan over the next 18 months. Obama
had much to say about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's involvement in
his speech, but nothing to say about the somewhat low-profile peace conference
held in Tokyo late last month.
Hatoyama is being pulled hard in opposite directions as he attempts to engage
in a delicate balancing act involving two of his closest allies, the US and the
SDP. As a more hawkish Obama administration rears its head and Beijing beckons
with its blossoming economy, Hatoyama's life is not getting any easier.
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine.
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