A few months before the
outbreak of the Suez Crisis in 1956, Japanese
economist Wakimura Yoshitaro pointed to the
transport of Middle Eastern oil as a potential
flashpoint for global conflict. His assessment
appears obvious in retrospect, but his policy
recommendation to deal with this serious threat to
economic and political stability still remains
relevant.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
Wakimura and several other prominent economists
argued that reliance on oil increased the risk of
Japan being dragged into an unwanted war.
Therefore, to ensure Japanese neutrality, the best
policy for Tokyo would be to develop an
independent and reliable source of energy. [1] At
the time, people looked to nuclear energy.
More than half a century and a meltdown
later, when confidence
in nuclear power is at
an all-time low and alternative sources of energy
are still unready to be applied on an industrial
scale, Washington's expansion of the diplomatic
and economic offensive against Iran comes as an
unpleasant reminder to East Asian nations of the
cost of maintaining ties with the United States.
Furthermore, US President Barack Obama's
imposition of US foreign policy interests in the
Middle East will undoubtedly lead Seoul and
Tokyo's attention to develop deeper political ties
with Beijing, something Washington has been
working to prevent since its strategic refocusing
to the Asia-Pacific.
The Middle East has
always been a contentious issue in Washington's
relationship with Seoul and Tokyo. In particular,
economically coercing Tehran is difficult for the
two countries because a significant share of their
petroleum imports come from Iran. This supply
constitutes a vital lifeline to two economies
deeply invested in shipping, transport, and heavy
industry. The recent urging by the US to reduce or
ban oil imports from Iran was met with
negotiations from both governments to find
alternative means of punishing the Islamic
Republic while protecting their vital supply.
Since December of last year, the Japanese
government has prohibited domestic businesses from
working with Iranian banks and frozen the assets
of several Iranian organizations. However,
Japanese banks have been allowed to continue doing
business with Iran's central bank, which settles
the accounts for the oil trade.
South
Korea has followed suit by forbidding new
investments in Iranian oil and blacklisting
Iranian firms, but not taking measures to reduce
the supply of the much-valued energy source.
Obviously the two governments do not intend to
rupture their relationship with the United States.
Both states recognize the vital role that
Washington plays in regional security and
commerce. Nonetheless, the sanctions on Iran
remain a divisive policy because it forces both
countries to choose between maintaining economic
stability and establishing grounds for greater
cooperation in security.
Some Israeli
security experts have joined US officials in
forwarding the view to Seoul that it would be in
South Korea's best interest to join the tough
sanctions as this would invariably put pressure on
North Korea as well. [2] They added that Seoul
should not worry about oil imports from Iran
because other Gulf nations will increase their
supply to supplement South Korea's needs.
While it is true that the ties between
Iran and North Korea create greater impetus for
South Korea to seek means to prevent Iranians from
developing nuclear capabilities, the ongoing
measures introduced by the United States have only
brought on larger security problems while weapons
technology transfers and sharing arrangements are
likely continuing undeterred between Pyongyang and
Tehran. [3]
Meanwhile, Seoul is seeking
alternative sources of crude oil to satisfy its
needs in case it has no other choice but to abide
by US foreign policy in the Middle East. Likewise,
Tokyo has yet to provide an official answer on
reducing the import of oil from Iran and probably
will not do so until it can secure alternative
suppliers.
There appears to be confusion
within the fledgling Yoshihiko Noda administration
on how to approach the matter. When US Secretary
of the Treasury Tim Geithner visited Japan earlier
in January, Finance Minister Jun Azumi suggested
that Japan will reduce its oil procurement from
Iran.
However, Noda, who assumed office in
September, has reversed the statement, clarifying
that his government has not concluded on whether
to follow Washington or not. Meanwhile, certain
members of the Diet (parliament) in the opposition
Liberal Democratic Party such as Taro Kono have
supported Japan having a separate foreign policy
from the United States when it comes to Iran. [4]
For the two countries, fears that the
escalating crisis along the Straits of Hormuz will
raise oil prices to backbreaking levels,
regardless of their participation in the
sanctions, remains prevalent as they attempt
unsuccessfully to remain uninvolved as possible.
Enter China. On his state visit to Qatar,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao clearly noted Beijing's
opposition to both Washington's sanctions and
Iran's threat to close the Straits of Hormuz.
China has proposed discussing the matter of Iran's
nuclear developments at the United Nations with
the five permanent members of the Security
Council. This solution would be to the best
interest of South Korea and Japan as well.
China's passive and pragmatic opposition
to US policy on Iran reveals how Washington's
aggressive policies in one part of the world could
hurt its influence in East Asia. South Korea and
Japan are already inextricably more closely tied
to the Chinese economy than to the American one.
Even with the US-Korea Free Trade
Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership that
is under development with Japan, it is hard to
foresee the United States taking over China as the
principal mover of the region's economic
development. Therefore, when East Asian states are
forced to undertake high risk issues that are
practically non-essential to them, such as Iran's
nuclear program, it only highlights the slowly
diminishing importance of the United States.
By all means, Washington is still a
critical player in the Asia-Pacific, both
economically and militarily; however, it
increasingly appears out-of-touch with the real
concerns of its allies and lacking a long-term
game plan for the region.
Obama should
revisit the issue that Wakimura Yoshitaro saw as
the key problem with the Middle Eastern oil
supply. The late economist recognized that the
only way stable commerce could continue in the
region is if Western states negotiated with,
rather than dictate to, oil producing nations,
appreciating their aspirations and excising fears.
These are not merely the words of a bygone
economist, this is diplomacy 101.
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