SPEAKING
FREELY Okinawa remains an intractable
thorn for US and Japan By
Stacie L Pettyjohn and Alan J Vick
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
The latest plan to
mitigate local opposition to America's military
presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa fails
to address serious problems rooted in the complex
economic and security relationship among Tokyo,
Washington, and Naha. While it may reduce friction
with the local population, it is not likely to
resolve the fundamental problems associated with
the American military presence on Okinawa that in
2010 led to the downfall of Japanese Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama.
The plan is at
best an incremental advance in an enduring dispute
that has long complicated US strategic planning in
the Asia-Pacific theater. It calls for removing
9,000 Marines from the tiny
island in an effort to
break a 16-year impasse over the relocation of
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from a densely
populated area of Ginowan City to a less congested
part of the island.
The American and
Japanese governments assume that the Marine
withdrawal will foster a much less contentious
relationship with the local population. They also
contend it will finally lead to an agreement on a
new location for the long-delayed Futenma
replacement facility. Neither of these results is
likely to materialize, however, because the
failure to relocate the air station and the
general opposition to American bases on the island
cannot be explained solely by the size of the US
military footprint or the public disruptions to
everyday life caused by the American presence.
Okinawa's hostility toward American
military bases on its territory stems from the
World War II legacy, the island's pacifist
culture, and a variety of grievances that
accumulated during the American military
occupation between 1945 and 1972. Opposition was
further galvanized by the brutal 1995 rape of an
Okinawan girl by American servicemen.
As a
result of the rape case, the United States agreed
to consolidate its military presence on the island
and minimize the negative impact of its bases on
the local population. A particularly difficult
problem was the disposition of Futenma, which many
agreed must move, but with differing opinions as
to where it should go.
This initiative
made little headway until 2004, when a Marine
Corps helicopter based at Futenma crashed into the
Okinawa International University campus. Two years
later, Washington and Tokyo reached a new
agreement, including the relocation of 8,000
Marines to Guam, but only after Futenma had been
relocated. Like the previous plan, however, the
2006 agreement quickly stalled.
Despite
the planned drawdown of Marines, Washington and
Tokyo continue to view American forces on Okinawa
as a valuable strategic asset. The two sides have
a robust defense relationship characterized by an
American security guarantee and considerable
Japanese financial support for the large US.
military presence that underpins this commitment.
Because Okinawa hosts nearly three-fourths
of the American military forces stationed in
Japan, Tokyo provides significant financial
compensation to Okinawans, including hardship
subsidies, federally funded public works projects,
and vastly inflated rents to individuals who own
the land where US bases are located.
While
these payments have tempered Okinawan opposition,
they have paradoxically ensured that any efforts
to realign the US basing posture on the island
will be extremely difficult. Any major adjustment
to American bases on Okinawa will encounter
significant resistance on the part of entrenched
local interests that will suffer financial losses
if facilities are relocated. For example,
landowners at Futenma strongly oppose any move
because they will lose the artificially high
rents. Despite this "pro base" constituency,
general opposition to the American military
presence is likely to persist because the local
government has an incentive to emphasize the
negative impact of American bases to obtain larger
payoffs from Tokyo.
Given these
considerations, the withdrawal of 9,000 Marines
will not overcome the difficulties associated with
Futenma, nor will it solve the enduring problem of
anti-base sentiment on the island. Those who
believe the presence of Marines is the primary
source of Okinawan discontent overlook both
earlier protests against other US military
activities and the fact that Okinawan opposition
is fueled in part by financial calculations. As
long as there is a US military presence on
Okinawa, and as long as Tokyo buys the
acquiescence of the local population, Naha is
likely to continue to object to American bases.
The relocation of the Marines is a first
step toward a more sustainable US military
presence in the Asia-Pacific. Yet policymakers in
Washington and Tokyo should not expect this move
to eliminate or even significantly reduce an
enduring source of tension in US-Japanese
relations.
Stacie L Pettyjohn is
an associate political scientist and Alan J
Vick is a senior political scientist at the
RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan
research institution.
Speaking
Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows
guest writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
(Copyright 2012 Stacie L
Pettyjohn and Alan J Vick.)
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