A significant outcome of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum may turn out to
be the fillip it gave to the recent trends in
Russia-Japan relations. In his recap at the end of
the summit in Vladivostok over the weekend,
President Vladimir Putin said: "Japan is our key
partner in the region. We want to settle all the
problems that we have inherited from the past. We
have agreed that Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko
Noda will pay a visit to Russia to discuss all
such problems in a calm atmosphere."
The
Japanese side is already eyeing a December visit
to Moscow for Noda. Putin added: "I had an
impression that the Japanese prime minister was
satisfied with the progress of the Japanese
businesses in Russia."
Make no mistake about it, another attempt
is commencing in all earnestness aimed at
transforming the Russo-Japanese relationship.
Putin has always been enthusiastic about the
normalization of relations. The two countries are
technically at war, having failed to conclude a
peace treaty after World War II and are trapped in
an uneasy relationship, thanks to the dispute over
the Kurile Islands.
With Putin back in the
Kremlin, Tokyo senses an opportune time to
approach the Russia ties with some fresh thinking.
The Russian moves toward Japan are also becoming
nuanced. While there has been an apparent flexing
of muscle over the Kuriles, Russia is also probing
a compromise formula. On its part, Tokyo has taken
the recent Russian "provocations" (Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev's visit to the disputed islands)
in its stride, signaling its keenness not to raise
dust in the overall relationship, which has a
raison d'etre of its own.
What gives
impetus to the shift in the tectonic plates is
that both Russia and Japan are maneuvering against
the backdrop of the great fluidity in the
Asia-Pacific's security emanating out of China's
rise. Neither side would admit it, but they need
to come to terms with China's rise. But Russia is
better placed to leverage the normalization of
relations with Japan, since it has a strong
partnership with China, which, as Putin
characterized last weekend, has "colossal
potential", whereas, Sino-Japanese relationship is
buffeted by tensions. Having said that, Japan's
trump card is that its investment and trade can
make all the difference to Russia's blueprint for
the all-round innovation of the Russian economy
and the development of its vast Siberian and far
eastern regions in particular.
Indeed,
when it comes to Asia-Pacific, one core issue for
Moscow is the development of Siberia and the
Russian Far East. This is evident from the high
attention that Moscow paid to hosting the APEC
summit. APEC has no serious prospects of
developing as a free-trade area - unlike the
sub-regional groupings in the region which are
actively contemplating the FTA - and whatever
progress APEC makes as a "clearing house" on trade
and investment issues can only be incremental and
painfully slow.
Even so, Moscow saw its
usefulness as a forum for Russia to showcase its
accession to the World Trade Organization (and the
new attractions of trading and investing in Russia
that follow from it) as well as the potentials of
Russia becoming a cost-effective and efficient
transportation artery connecting the dynamic
Asia-Pacific with Europe. In fact, the experts of
the APEC's Business Advisory Council estimate that
the trade flow through the Russian route could
increase over five-fold through this decade.
Strong undercurrents To be
sure, Moscow has a burning desire for Japanese
involvement in the Russian economy. Japan can
bring advanced technology and capital and
significantly boost Russia's plans of
"innovation". But there is also a strategic
dimension to it insofar as from Moscow's
perspective, Japan can be a counterweight to
China's looming presence in the vast expanses of
Siberia and the Far East. Arguably, if Moscow has
its way, it might rather prefer Japan as its key
investor in Siberia and the Far East.
Interestingly, the only significant
business agreement to be reached on the sidelines
of the weekend summit in Vladivostok turned out to
be one between Russia's Gazprom and the Japanese
government to set up a US$13 billion liquefied
natural gas (LNG) plant on Russia's Pacific coast.
By putting the deal with Japan on a fast track,
Russia is signaling its preference for LNG as a
flexible product - natural gas can be shipped to
different destinations through any dedicated
pipeline routes to individual countries (say,
China or South Korea).
The Russian
preference seems to be, why deal with a pipeline
toward a single buyer if you can ship the gas by
sea to a variety of destinations with more
flexible contracts? No doubt, Beijing would have
taken note of the Russia-Japan LNG deal. Beijing's
negotiations with Moscow over stalled gas price
have got protracted and there is yet no end in
sight, while Russia and Japan may be closing a
deal. The Russia-Japan LNG plant is expected to
come on stream in 2017, and thereafter the
pipeline to China or South Korea may become even
less of a priority for Moscow.
However,
the dispute over the Kurile Islands remains a sore
thumb in Russia-Japan relations and it is also an
emotive issue for Japan that is mixed up with its
domestic nationalistic agendas. The Chinese
commentators have concluded that the Kurile
Islands issue cannot be resolved anytime soon -
the implication being that Russia-Japan
normalization can go thus far and no further in a
foreseeable future. Admittedly, there is merit in
this argument.
The point is, Japanese
politics is at a defining moment. On the one hand,
there is a nationalist surge; on the other hand,
as the Australian scholar Rikki Kersten put it,
"Japan's political spectrum is in the throes of
disintegration and realignment." The ruling
Democratic Party of Japan is splintering, several
regional groupings are appearing and the locus of
coalition politics is shifting away from the
existing mainstream parties.
Suffice to
say, hawkish positions are a safe bet for
politicians in such times of flux and uncertainty
when it comes to emotive issues of the country's
territorial integrity - be it the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands or the Kurile Islands. The current case of
Tokyo's proposal to "buy back" four of the five
islands of the Senkaku/Diaoyu chain from the
private owners shows how even a "moderate"
politician such as Noda comes under compulsion to
outmaneuver hawkish adversaries in the surcharged
political scene. The acuteness of the emergent
political situation in Japan is such that, to
quote Kersten:
The spike in [Japan's] territorial
disputes could become a centripetal force for
the formation of new coalitions of
security-policy cohorts from across the
political spectrum in Japan. It is possible that
defense, and by implication constitutional
revision, could become the issue that not only
channels political opportunism, but enables
individuals such as Noda to seize the political
initiative. Instead of resisting realignment, he
would seek to lead it, using defense as a
strategic lever.
For Japan, the nexus of
political change and territorial disputes could
facilitate the elimination of tension in the
constitution between passive pacifism and the
maintenance of defense forces. It could also
extend to Japan embracing the right to
collective defense, with or without the sanction
of a UN-sponsored action. If devised and
delivered in a climate of threat and jousting
nationalists throughout the Northeast Asian
region, these revisions could contribute to even
greater insecurity in a region already replete
with security challenges. [1]
Moscow
is seized of these strong undercurrents in
Japanese politics. The "second coming" by Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev to the Kurile Islands in
July - the first-ever visit by a Russian head of
state to the disputed islands took place in
November 2010 - can be seen in retrospect as a
calibrated political and diplomatic move to probe
the Japanese sensitivities. Medvedev asserted
during the July visit:
I'd like to underline that I
consider visiting the Kuriles by the Government
of the Russian Federation crucially important.
We have been doing it before and, naturally,
this practice will be continued by the new
Cabinet. [The reasons for that] are quite clear;
[the islands] are an important part of the
Sakhalin region and an important past of the
Russian land.
What is in a
name? These were not mere symbolic moves.
Medvedev also took a decision in February last
year following his first visit to reinforce the
Russian military deployments on the islands. "This
is just our land and military forces should be
deployed there since this is the border" and the
deployment should be "sufficient and modern in
order to ensure the security of the islands as an
integral part of Russia", Medvedev was quoted as
saying at a cabinet meeting in the Kremlin. He
said Russia would keep strengthening its military
presence on the islands because of their strategic
importance. At the same time, Medvedev threw the
ball into Tokyo's court with a nuanced
proposition:
Undoubtedly, we want to expand good
relations with all our neighbors, including
cooperation on a number of issues on the
Islands. We are inviting everyone who doesn't
find such cooperation insulting to take part ...
We should develop fully fledged infrastructure
intended to serve for a long time ... I have
been talking to everyone about that, including
our neighbors, who could use those benefits ...
The region must have prospects for development.
On another occasion, Medvedev was
rather forthright: "We [Russia] are prepared for
the joint use of the islands, to offer
opportunities for investment, to protect Japanese
investment and create conditions for doing
business. We are ready to do it right now." But
regrettably, he pointed out, Japan advocates a
different approach and insists that the two
countries must first resolve their dispute over
sovereignty over the islands before making
investments. "It won't do", he added.
The
poignancy of the current moment lies exactly here
- there is a growing mutual desire on the part of
Moscow and Tokyo to get going with a normal
relationship that can be of great benefit to both
sides but the sky remains overcast. Simply put,
Tokyo banks on Putin's pragmatism and his
long-term vision for Russia-Japan relations. But
then, Moscow also has many broths cooking in the
kitchen - and Kuriles noodle soup may not even be
the main course. One such broth could actually be
the US' missile defense deployments in Japan.
Early last week, Putin himself referred to
the issue in a wide-ranging interview with RTV
devoted to the APEC summit. Putin said:
But the issue you mentioned - the US
missile defense system - is surely one of the
key issues on today's agenda because it involves
Russia's vital interests … In essence, the [US]
intention is to upset the strategic balance,
which is a very dangerous thing to do, as any
involved party will always strive to maintain
its defensive capabilities, and the entire thing
could simply trigger off an arms race. Is it
possible to find a solution to the problem, if
President Obama is re-elected for a second term?
In principle, yes, it is. But this isn't just
about President Obama. For all I know, his
desire to work out a solution is quite sincere.
My feeling is that he is a sincere man
and that he sincerely wants to implement
positive change. But can he do it, will they let
him do it? I mean that there is also the
military lobby, and the Department of State,
which is quite conservative ... They are run by
a number of professional clans who have been
working there for decades ... This is a highly
sensitive area of national defense … Our
partners are so far refusing to go along ... but
naturally, as our American partners proceed with
developing their own missile defense we shall
have to think of how we can defend ourselves and
preserve the strategic balance.
Ever
since the Wall Street Journal broke the story a
few weeks ago regarding the US' Ballistic Missile
Defense deployments in the Asian continent
(following the deployments in Romania, Turkey and
Qatar), Moscow has been brooding. Moscow
commentators viewed the US deployments in Asia as
posing a threat to China's second-strike nuclear
capability. But at a non-proliferation conference
in Moscow on Friday, Russian foreign ministry
finally broke its silence on the issue.
Addressing the APEC summit, Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergey Ryabkov expressed Russia's concern
over the US deployment in Asia. Ryabkov said, "The
continuing growth of the US potential in what we
call the Far East - the Asia-Pacific region - does
not go unnoticed in Russia. We are closely
following what is happening between the USA and
its allies in Asia." He added that Moscow's
concerns arise from the technology involved as
well as the "geography and the US capability to
deploy these assets in different locations". He
called on Washington to ease Moscow's concerns.
These remarks were made on the eve of
Putin's meetings with Noda and the Chinese
President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the APEC
summit in Vladivostok. Evidently, Moscow will
utilize Noda's visit in December for a
comprehensive political and strategic engagement
of Japan of which the Kurile becomes an important
sub-plot at best, from the Russian perspective.
Meanwhile, on Monday, Itar-Tass reported
that the "nameless Kurile islands have been
awarded names". And one of the two rocky
wind-swept islets with an area of about 100 square
meters and rising 30 meters above sea level has
been named in honor of Major General Alexei
Gnechko, who was, of course, the commander of the
Kurile amphibious operation in 1945.
The
Itar-Tass said more such "name-awarding" for the
remaining three islands is scheduled for October.
It seems inevitable that by the time Noda lands in
Moscow, the Kurile Islands will have proper
Russian names symbolizing the indivisibility of
Russian territories.
Note: 1.
Rikki Kersten, Japan's territorial disputes: will
they lead to constitutional change?, East Asia
Forum, September 11, 2012.
Ambassador
M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in
the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments
included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka,
Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait
and Turkey.
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