Japan and China on a conflicting
course By Karl Lee
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Months after Tokyo
governor, Shintaro Ishihara's island purchase
plan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial spat
has shown no signs of abating from both Tokyo and
Beijing. Worst still, the likelihood that the
islands row would escalate into a full blown
political crisis has significantly increased after
the Japanese Cabinet decided to wrap up the
purchase deal with the islands' owner.
Unlike previous cases, the latest handling
of the crisis has shown obvious misperceptions
between the two nations. In so far as
China's repeated claim
on the disputed islands is not recognized by
Tokyo, Japan's handling of the issue is also not
seen as a conflict resolution gesture to Beijing
but rather, a serious encroachment of its interest
and territorial integrity.
The fear of
diplomatic backlash with China if the issue is
played up by the right-wing Ishihara required the
Japanese central government's swift response to
nationalize the islands before spiraling out of
its control. What the Yoshihiko Noda
administration hoped to achieve out of this is to
preserve the islands' status quo where the issue
is kept from affecting the overall Sino-Japanese
relations. Politically too, Noda is using the
issue to garner more public and internal support
after the passing of its unpopular sales tax hike
bill in August and the coming Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) presidential election.
The
Chinese government, meanwhile, thinks otherwise.
As part of its territories which is currently
administered by Tokyo due to historical reasons,
there existed a dispute between the two nations
and any unilateral attempt by Tokyo is a direct
violation against Beijing's national interest and
recognition.
The latest islands bid, be it
symbolic or "legal", is viewed by the Chinese
leadership as an effort to "wrest control" over
the islands against China's interests and thereby,
alter the present status quo of the islands.
Moreover, the purchase has also shown Tokyo's
unwillingness to bend on the dispute, something
which the Chinese authorities had hoped for in the
past.
The road ahead Unlike the
September 2010 trawler collision near the
contented islands, Beijing seemed to have learnt a
valuable lesson not to over-play its card as a
means of forcing the Japanese government to back
down. So far, Beijing has remained reactive to
Tokyo's move, preferring to observe as to how far
the unusually assertive Noda administration would
pursue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case before
taking stern measures to stake its claim on the
islands.
In fact, recent discourses by
Chinese leaders have hinted that Beijing may have
reached its acceptable limits following the
Japanese government's unusual assertiveness in
ramming ahead the purchase plan of the disputed
islands.
As demonstrated during
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting
in early September, Chinese President Hu Jintao's
outright rejection of any official sideline
meeting with Prime Minister Noda had signaled that
another round of frozen Sino-Japanese diplomatic
ties reminiscent of the Koizumi years may be well
ahead of us. Even the 15-minute informal
conservation with his Japanese counterpart was
marred with Hu's serious warning on the
repercussions that the islands purchase would
inflict to the overall bilateral relations coupled
with his reiteration of China's will to defend its
sovereignty at all costs.
A day later, on
September 10, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, also
reaffirmed China's unwavering stand to stake its
claim on the islands and pledged against making
any concession with Japan regarding its islands'
sovereignty. By far, these two statements are the
strongest ever been by members of the top
leadership ever since the islands purchase
proposal was mooted by Ishihara in April.
At the same time, there is also news that
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is stepping up
its military preparedness in the middle of the
crisis. On September 6, the Jinan Military Region
held a military operation in which it focused on a
marine group landing and taking control of an
island near the Yellow Sea. It seemed to indicate
that the PLA is seriously contemplating similar
operation if there is a need for military action
on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Apart from that,
Beijing may choose to employ its economic pressure
once again against Japan after its successful
attempt following the Chinese trawler collision
incident in September 2010. For Japan, it is
highly questionable on whether the Noda
administration is prepared or able to confront the
prospect of temporary or small-scale skirmish with
Beijing. While the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF) already had an operation plan to defend the
Senkaku Islands, the weak central government mired
with a myriad of problems, from internal party
bickering to domestic economic woes, meant there
is no guarantee that Tokyo is ready for full
mobilization of all its resources in response
against Beijing's armed and economic reprisals.
Also, the whole situation would become extremely
dangerous and complicated if Japan seeks
cooperation from its close ally, the United States
in order to respond to China's retaliatory
measures at an advantage.
With all these
developments in sight, it is highly skeptical to
concur to any view that China would take more
conciliatory approach as evident in the South
China Sea dispute. The central leadership
transition later this year, strong anti-Japanese
sentiment in China and grave public outcry to what
is perceived as Beijing's passive take on the
islands issue, meant that the same instance of
Beijing's diplomacy of restraint toward Japan may
not apply this time around.
It is crystal
clear that the Noda administration's
nationalization drive of the islands has failed in
alleviating concern from the Chinese top
leadership and defusing the Sino-Japanese
territorial tension. On the contrary, it
heightened political apprehension with Beijing as
the latter viewed the move as changing the status
quo of the islands. That China's reprisals against
Japan may begin with the signing of a purchase
agreement between Tokyo and the islands' private
owner, has shown that we are braving for a
political storm ahead of us.
Karl C
L Lee is the Master reader of the University
of Malaya, Malaysia. His research focus is on
China-Japan relations in Southeast Asia and the
wider East Asia.
(Copyright 2012 Karl
C L Lee)
Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular
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