Asia
poll prospects make for choppy
seas By Yong Kwon
In
the past few weeks, Western media outlets have
remained largely focused on the outbreak of anger
and violence in post-Arab Spring nations. These
are, without a doubt, significant events; however,
considering the overlapping interests of major
powers and the concentration of military assets in
Northeast Asia, protests in front of Japanese
diplomatic missions in China may have greater
consequences for the United States and the
international community than those in Middle
Eastern capitals.
Tensions in Northeast
Asia became even more strained in the past few
weeks as widespread displays of nationalism in
China targeted Japanese economic assets. The
safety of Japanese nationals living in China
suddenly became precarious and major
Japanese corporations
with stakes in the Chinese markets uch as Nissan
Motors and Honda Motors witnessed a steep decline
in their share values.
Despite the
increasing interdependence between the two
economies, bold civilian demonstrations and
semi-military actions in the waters around
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have pushed relations to
the edge with hints of further deterioration to
come.
This is not the first time that a
dispute over the maritime border in the South
China Sea has caused serious rifts in
Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, observing the
perennial outcries from this region, many
financial analysts predict that these events will
soon pass and leave little long-term
ramifications.
They point out, both
governments have so far stayed away from
state-sanctioned actions that would seriously
undermine the trading relations between the two
countries. Most of all, despite the rhetoric from
both Tokyo and Beijing, it is clear that states
involved in the overlapping territorial disputes
in the region, including Seoul and Washington, do
not regard instability to be in their best
interest.
However, rapid escalation of
tensions, movements threatening military
confrontation and prolonged public demonstrations
hint at other forces in action. The timing of
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s decision to
nationalize the islands certainly contributed -
August and September are months when people in the
region turn to traumatic events in the region’s
modern history; annexation of Korea by Japan on
August 22, 1910, the Mukden Incident on September
18, 1931, and the end of the Pacific War on August
15, 1945.
More pertinently, the increased
vitriol coincides with the lead up to changes of
leadership in South Korea, China and, most likely,
Japan. These parallel leadership transitions,
alongside elections in the United States, have
wide-ranging ramifications that force states down
a more aggressive path that further complicates
the ongoing dispute.
Beijing is placed in
a difficult position where it must preserve
domestic stability in order to ensure a smooth
transition in leadership - but this requires
maintaining public confidence in the state's
capacity to deliver results when it comes to
issues people regard as national prerogatives,
which currently include upholding China's
"national" borders and sovereignty.
The
belief that the Chinese state has not done enough
to protect its national territory manifested in
some of the anti-Japanese protests that took place
around the country. Along with the physical damage
from the protests, the challenge to the statecraft
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) poses serious
issues for Beijing (see Beijing
faces protests dilemma, Asia Times Online,
September 19, 2012).
With Beijing already
criticized for slow economic growth, latent
reforms and issues surrounding redistribution of
wealth, the Chinese state is now forced to
overcompensate for its mediocre domestic
performance by yielding to some of the
ultranationalist demands in foreign policy, even
if it means perpetuating tensions by pushing the
United States and Japan into a more antagonistic
position.
Furthermore, the current foreign
policy posture will be carried forward by the next
leadership, as Xi Jinping, who is the first leader
to not be picked from a pool of Deng Xiaoping
loyalists, will feel obliged to show continuity of
policy to establish his legitimacy.
Therefore, nationalist interests will
probably be catered to even after the transition
of personnel in the upper echelons of the CCP. In
addition, there are doubts as to whether the new
standing committee will have enough political
capital to push through crucial reforms without
mobilizing support through nationalist rhetoric
and agendas.
Japan is in a similar
political quandary. By passing legislation to
double the consumption tax by 2015, the Noda
administration is obligated to call for elections
in the near future and several political figures
are already appealing to constituents using
nationalist rhetoric. A prime example is the
current mayor of Osaka, Toru Hashimoto, a rising
star of Japanese politics who was recently voted
as the most popular politician in the country.
He is already a controversial character in
South Korea for denying Japan's forcible
recruitment of "comfort women" during World War
II, and the recent launch of his right-wing party
promises more controversy to come. In line with
his nationalist political views, he supports
stronger actions to establish Japanese sovereignty
over the contested rocks in the East Sea/Sea of
Japan and the South China Sea. His message appeals
to many Japanese citizens who see Japan's
weakening economic stature and position in the
international community, diverting support from
Prime Minister Noda.
With political
instability in post-Koizumi Japan wreaking havoc
on the state's effectiveness, it is a vital
political task to establish political consensus or
a public mandate. While the compromise over the
consumption tax issue showed that cooperation
between the ruling Japanese Democratic Party (JDP)
and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) can achieve
results, it is merely a temporary measure that
cannot cope with other divisive issues of vital
importance - such as the shape and form of the
US-Japan alliance in the coming decades.
As a result, the need to break the
stalemate has pushed specific issues like the
disputed islands and the extent of Japan's
exclusive economic zones (EEZ) to the forefront of
the political discourse.
Adding weight to
the argument, the current administration's
position noticeably hardened after the consumption
tax bill passed the Diet and it became clear that
there would be elections soon. In an unfortunately
timed statement on July 7 (on the anniversary of
the Lugouqiao or Marco Polo Bridge Incident that
launched the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937),
Tokyo announced the possibility of nationalizing
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island, provoking heightened
anti-Japanese sentiments in China.
On
September 10, Prime Minister Noda further
aggravated relations when he officially sanctioned
the government's decision despite having discussed
the gravity of the situation with President Hu
Jintao at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meeting a few days before.
To
Chinese citizens, Noda's actions appear as a
direct affront; on the other hand, for the Noda
administration, the cost of aggravating Beijing
may have been assessed as an unavoidable task if
the JDP is to remain in power after the elections.
Observing his domestic policies, Noda has,
for the most part, acted pragmatically during his
tenure as head of the Japanese government, taking
on difficult issues like the clean-up of the
debris left behind from the tsunami in 2011.
However, many of his policies have not been
popular, such as his decision to restart nuclear
power plants for economic reasons in spite of
public concerns regarding the safety of their
operations.
These actions have lead
politicians such as Mayor Hashimoto, who opposed
restarting the nuclear reactors, very popular at
the government's expense. In order to ensure the
continuation of JDP policies, Noda has little
choice but to push aggressively on foreign policy
issues to solidify the public's confidence in his
leadership.
Stuck in between its two
larger neighbors, South Korea is following the
confrontation closely as it too has many maritime
disputes with both Japan and China. Most recently,
Beijing has asked Seoul for support in the UN over
its claims to the continental shelf that extends
out to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
China's
claims closely parallel Korea's own claims over
its rights to extend control south along the
continental shelf towards Okinawa. [1]
Nonetheless, Seoul is just as wary of Beijing's
aggressiveness as it is of Tokyo's claims over the
disputed islets.
This situation is further
complicated by the fact that South Korea is also
heading into elections. President Lee Myung-bak's
aggressively open free-trade policies have
resulted in a popular backlash that called for the
government to prioritize on protectionism and the
defense of Korea's borders.
In addition,
President Lee is obligated to make policies that
would advance his ruling Saenuri Party's
candidate, Park Geunhye. Along with softening its
posture towards Pyongyang (as Park has recommended
in her policy speeches), Seoul suddenly pulled out
of a proposed bilateral intelligence-sharing
agreement with Tokyo and confronted Japan over its
claims of Dokdo/Takeshima islets.
Although
the confrontation is temporarily stalled, the
situation is far from being resolved and rhetoric
from right wing politicians like Mayor Hashimoto
will provoke public outrage in South Korea over
any number of issues. And when the public is
enraged, the election's frontrunners will push
Korean foreign policy into a more aggressive
posture.
These ongoing confrontations also
place the United States in an awkward position.
Maintaining a peaceful, working relationship with
Beijing while also upholding Washington's security
guarantees to its allies in the region have been
key objectives in US foreign policy in Northeast
Asia.
An open confrontation between Tokyo
and Beijing would force Washington to sacrifice
either its economic or political interests in the
region, not to mention pressure the government to
increase defense spending when balancing the
budget has become an existential issue for the
country.
Defense Secretary Panetta's
recent mission to Tokyo and Beijing was
undoubtedly to prevent any further escalation of
the conflict, which shows that the political
circumstances are serious enough that Washington
feels the need to mediate.
Going beyond
the possibility of a military confrontation, the
United States stands much to lose from shrinking
trade in the Asia-Pacific in general. Part of
Washington's economic revitalization plan rests on
making markets in Northeast Asia more accessible
to US products. The escalation of conflict is an
impediment to further discussions about the
expansion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
increased economic relations between South Korea
and Japan, new free trade negotiations, etc, all
of which Washington prioritizes as its economic
interests.
Even before the cooling of
relations between the three countries, the
Northeast Asian markets have been struggling to
cope with decreasing demand from the European
Union. Huge losses in Asia's shipping industry
summarize how serious the economic situation has
become even in a relatively healthy growth zone
like Northeast Asia.
Since 2008,
shipbuilding companies in China, South Korea and
Japan all gone through sizeable decreases in
aggregate compensated gross tonnage (CGT) of
ships. [2] In fact, close to 90% of Chinese
shipbuilding companies have gone under, showing
both the stagnating global demand and the slowdown
of Chinese economic growth.
The United
States has little to gain from China's losses as
China has become an irreplaceable economic actor
not only for the United States but also to its key
trading partners. Washington cannot help but
recognize that the current confrontation in
Northeast Asia is only further damaging the
struggling economic health of this pivotal region
and in turn the global market.
Throwing
further obstacles in this balancing act, the
United States is heading towards an election as
well. Both Republican and Democratic parties are
publicly criticizing Beijing's economic policies
and supporting measures that will hamper the
competitiveness of Chinese products in the US
market.
Usually the Chinese leadership
understands that both major US political parties
are required to engage in critical rhetoric to
attract voters to their candidates. Indeed, very
little beyond verbal reproach is ever directed at
China after a candidate wins the presidential
election.
However, this time the Chinese
leadership cannot afford to appear soft against
the United States or any nation as to avoid
appearing impotent or incapable of defensing
Chinese interests. The elections have very much
reduced the usual political flexibility that kept
confrontations short and kept it from disturbing
trade in the region.
2012 has proven to be
a uniquely vitriolic and jingoistic year. With US
presidential elections every four years, Korea's
every five, China's leadership transition
practically every ten and sporadic changes in
Japanese leadership, this is the first time in
modern history that all four governments have been
tested by having real shifts in political
leadership coincide all at once.
It will
be challenging for each government to navigate
successfully through the maelstrom of public
opinion, internal party dissent and pressures from
abroad without giving in to popular but
politically irresponsible statecraft. In fact,
more than simply avoid confrontation, these
countries must find a way cooperate as global
economic recovery relies heavily on these four
economies working together.
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