Abe
will be firm but flexible on
Senkakus By Bert Edstrom
The Lower House elections in Japan ended
in gloom for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
After a little more than three years at the
pinnacle of political power, the DPJ was roundly
rejected, its 57 seats a far cry from the 308 it
captured in its 2009 landslide win. Defeat for the
DPJ was victory for the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), and marked a return to power for Shinzo
Abe.
The LDP's comeback in the December 16
vote was astounding. The party that has ruled
Japan almost single-handedly since 1955 took 294
of the 480 seats in the House of Representatives,
more than double the 119 it won three years ago.
Together with its
companion from the pre-2009
days, the New Komeito party, which got 31 seats,
it secured a two-thirds majority in the Lower
House. The two parties will once again form the
government and Abe, the LDP's leader, will be
appointed prime minister, a role he served for one
year to 2007.
It seems that the LDP
leadership has understood the sentiment of the
electorate. In the immediate aftermath, their
comments were humble, noting that the result was
not so much an expression of enthusiasm for the
LDP but a protest against the DPJ. One LDP leader,
Yuriko Koike, said on the morning after the ballot
that her party had listened to the voters: "Under
its years in opposition the LDP has changed a
lot," she told Radio Sweden.
Given the
resounding rejection of the LDP in the 2009
elections, this should come as no surprise. The
change that Koike was keen to stress is presumably
one whereby the LDP has adjusted its policies so
that they reflect voters' priorities. Anything
else would be near suicide for any political
party, given the kind of wrath witnessed three
years ago. The problem is that the change that the
LDP has undergone, as represented by Abe, is far
from what the voters have been looking for.
In a way similar to the times when he was
a political hopeful and later became prime
minister, Abe's agenda is nationalistic. During
the election campaign, he focused on a revision of
the Peace Constitution, the strengthening of
Japan's defense, and lashing out against China
over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands issue in a way
that has inflamed relations.
It is hard to
maintain that the issues Abe hammered home during
the election campaign reflect the priorities of
Japanese people in general. With an economy in the
doldrums after racking up what is by now two
"lost" decades, with a shattered pension system,
mounting expenditure on social security and a
demographic that is impressive only in the
increasing number of elderly, it's hard to claim
that ordinary people are crying out for an agenda
that is certain only in its ability to create
tension in relations with neighbors. No wonder
that the 59% voter turnout in Sunday's election,
the lowest in the postwar period, signaled a
disinterest in the polling both.
The
post-election comments and lack of the customary
bragging indicates that at least Abe and his
advisers are aware of the fact that they have not
been given a carte blanche by voters to impose
policies single-handedly. To win an election is
one thing, to be in the government ruling the
country is a different matter. Given Japan's
economic malaise and strained relations with
neighbors, it is likely that Abe will shelve at
least some of his radical ideas. The matter most
likely to be attended to first is the inflammatory
Senkaku issue, which continues to poison relations
with China, something Japan can ill afford.
Firm but flexible For Abe as
prime minister, the strained relations with China
will loom large initially. Judged from his
previous stint as Japan's premier (2006 - 2007),
it seems likely that he will tread carefully,
however strong his rhetoric as a candidate. Before
he became prime minister in 2006, he was known as
a hardliner, opting for a right-wing swing of
Japanese politics. As premier, he tried to
implement his agenda but was not particularly
successful, but to the surprise of many, he
demonstrated unexpected skills in handling
relations with China.
Abe's predecessor,
Junichiro Koizumi, had regularly visited the
Yasukuni shrine to Japan's war dead, causing
Sino-Japanese relations to fall to decline
considerably by the time he left office. However,
the week after Abe was appointed, he was in
Beijing to begin the arduous task of repairing
relations with Japan's neighbor, even agreeing
with the Chinese leadership that Japan and China
were joined in "a strategic and mutually
beneficial partnership". In April 2007, he handled
the sensitive Yasukuni issue in a way that
satisfied his supporters and gave no reason for
the Chinese to protest.
Based on Abe's
past dealings with China, it can be expected that
back in office he will try to be firm but
flexible. When he takes over at the end of
December, relations with China are an issue that
he has to take by the horns.
There is
reason to believe that he will do so in a way that
defuses the explosive issue. There is a precedent.
In 1978, when Japan and China had problems in
advancing towards signing a peace and friendship
treaty, Japan's then prime minister Takeo Fukuda
was the one who acted and signed the treaty on
behalf of Japan, to the utter consternation and
anger of most fellow LDP politicians. Fukuda,
however, saw signing the treaty to be in Japan's
national interest. After the ink on the treaty was
dry, he prided himself on being the only one who
could have achieved the feat by his ability to
neutralize adversaries to the treaty within the
LDP.
On the inflammatory Senkaku issue, a
compromise has to be found. Abe's past career as
an outspoken and hard-hitting nationalist is an
asset when the rage felt by Japanese
conservatives, nationalists and ultranationalists
has to be subdued. As was the case with Fukuda
back in 1978, no one can question his credentials
as a nationalist. Abe can, if he chooses to do so,
repeat Fukuda's feat.
Bert
Edstrom is a Senior Research Fellow with the
Institute for Security and Development Policy,
Stockholm, Sweden. The opinions expressed are
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Institute for Security and
Development Policy or its sponsors.
(Copyright 2012 The Institute for Security
and Development
Policy.)
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