Japan
pivots south, with eye on
China By Richard Javad
Heydarian
MANILA - After decades of
self-imposed pacifism, Japan is beginning to carve
out a new role in regional maritime affairs. Newly
elected Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has
launched a charm offensive across the Pacific,
with Australia, India, Indonesia, the Philippines
and Vietnam among the countries Tokyo is bidding
to align against China's rising assertiveness.
Abe has vowed to revisit Japan's pacifist
constitution, re-calibrate its security alliance
with the United States, and steer the
establishment of a so-called
"democratic security diamond", a proposed
strategic alliance of like-minded Indo-Pacific
countries that share similar anxieties about
China's growing naval might.
If
implemented, Abe's policies will inject Japan into
the heart of the intensifying Pacific struggle
between Beijing and Washington for maritime
regional maritime dominance and stir new concerns,
especially in China, over a possible reemergence
of Japan's militaristic past.
Japan has
already broken with tradition by increasing its
defense budget for the first time in 11 years, [1]
providing military aid to Cambodia and East Timor,
and considering the sale of military equipment
such as seaplanes and advanced Soryu submarines to
strategic partners such as Vietnam and Australia.
New geopolitics While Washington
is traditionally the first foreign destination for
newly elected Japanese leaders, the new Abe
administration chose to prioritize southern
partners in the Pacific on their international
itineraries.
In January, Abe visited
Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, while dispatching
Deputy Minister Taro Aso to Myanmar and Foreign
Minister Fumio Kishida to Australia, Brunei, the
Philippines, and Singapore.
While
Japan-China trade has fallen from 18.4% of Tokyo's
total exports in 2000 to 11.2% in 2011, exports to
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations'
(ASEAN) Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam has risen from
9.7% to 10.9% over the same period, according to a
report from the Japan Research Institute. [2]
"Currently, the strategic environment in
the Asia-Pacific region is going through a dynamic
change," Abe said in explaining his reasons for
choosing Southeast Asia as his first foreign
destination. "During this change, having closer
relations with ASEAN countries contributes to the
region's peace and stability and is in Japan's
national interest."
Japan is at the
forefront of large-scale industrial investments in
liberalizing Myanmar, which is gradually emerging
out of China's decades-long patronage through more
engagement with the West. Japan's Sumitomo
Corporation, Mitsuibishi Corporation, and Marubeni
Corporation are set to take a 49% stake in a
US$12.6 billion Special Economic Zone (SEZ)
situated at Yangon's Thilawa Port, and Japanese
companies are heavily involved in other
large-scale industrial developments in the
country.
Thailand, Japan's regional
manufacturing hub with over 8,000 companies
situated in the country, is also slated to benefit
from a new wave of investments as more small and
medium-sized manufacturers look to relocate
outside of Japan. The moves come at a time
nationalistic protests and spiraling wages
threaten and undermine Japan's interests in China.
However, deeper geostrategic
considerations are driving Japan's southern pivot,
which aims at revitalizing defense relations with
old partners to rein in China's assertiveness.
Vietnam, locked in a bitter territorial
dispute with China in the South China Sea, is keen
to enhance its security ties with major Pacific
powers, namely the US, Japan, and Australia.
Former Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh has
just taken over as secretary general of the
10-member Association of Southeast Asean Nations,
portending a more proactive regional approach to
the South China Sea disputes.
Given
China's anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
vulnerabilities, Vietnam's navy is reportedly
considering the purchase of Japan's Soryu stealth
diesel-powered submarines, which if procured would
dramatically augment Hanoi's ASW capabilities.
Indonesia, ASEAN's informal leader and
economic behemoth, has stepped up its bilateral
security relations with all major Pacific powers
while exploring varying diplomatic means to
resolve the disputes in the South China Sea. In
recent years, Jakarta has sponsored the
establishment of guidelines for a regional code of
conduct in the contested areas.
Last year,
when ASEAN fell into disarray with China ally
Cambodia vigorously blocking efforts at
establishing a regional dispute-settlement
mechanism in the South China Sea, Indonesia pushed
a "Six Point Principles" initiative aimed at
diplomatically resolving regional territorial
conflicts. In this connection, Abe has found a
natural and influential ally in Indonesia, which
has also emerged as a major investment destination
for Japanese manufacturers.
For Japan,
however, the Philippines is perhaps its most
like-minded Southeast Asian partner. Similar to
Japan, the Philippines is a liberal democratic
country and a US treaty ally. Manila has also been
at the forefront of regional efforts to deepen US
military commitment to the freedom of navigation
in the Western Pacific and establish a robust
regional approach under the auspices of ASEAN to
multilaterally manage the ongoing disputes.
During Kishida's recent trip to the
Philippines, Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert
Del Rosario said, "We also need to be able to
address the possibility that the freedom of
navigation would be adversely affected," referring
to China's aggressive maneuvering in the disputed
territories. His Japanese counterpart agreed,
saying, "As the strategic environment is changing,
it is necessary for us as foreign ministers to
share recognition of the situation."
Along
with China, the Philippines bore the brunt of
Japanese militarism during World War II, with
countless Filipinos falling victim to Japanese
cruelty and much of Manila devastated by war. In a
telling sign of the Philippines' growing current
anxieties with China, Del Rosario said last year
he supported a re-armed Japan shorn of its
pacifist constitution.
"We are looking for
balancing factors in the region, and Japan could
be a significant balancing factor," he said last
year in an interview with the Financial Times. [3]
In addition to 12 patrol boats promised by
the previous Japanese government, [4] Tokyo is
finalizing its biggest ever security-related aid
package, with 10 cutters worth around $12 million
set to be donated to the Philippine Coast Guard.
[5]
China counterweight On the
eve of his reemergence as Japan's elected leader,
Abe pulled no punches in warning against repeated
Chinese incursions in the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.
"[Senkakus are Japan's] inherent
territory... we don't intend to worsen relations
between Japan and China," Abe said in taking a
tough line on the ongoing territorial dispute.
"China lacks this recognition a little bit. I
want them to think anew about mutually
beneficial strategic relations."
[6]
During his prior premiership in
2006-07, Abe chose China as his first regional
destination, underscoring the significance then of
booming bilateral economic ties. This time,
though, he struck a less sanguine tone on visiting
Beijing by stating, "The problem is that harm is
being caused to Japanese companies and Japanese
nationals in China who are contributing to the
Chinese economy and society." [7]
China is
likely at the top of Abe's foreign agenda, though
not only for economic reasons. Last year, in a
controversial essay published before the
parliamentary elections, Abe expressed his
commitment to forge ahead with a more muscular and
assertive foreign policy aimed at containing China
and consolidating a regional "democratic security
diamond".
"I envisage a strategy whereby
Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of
Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime
commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to
the Western Pacific," he wrote. "I am prepared to
invest, to the greatest possible extent, Japan's
capacities in this security diamond." [8]
During the first round of foreign trips
made by Japan's top leaders, Australia was the
sole non-ASEAN destination. Canberra's
significance lies in its status as the other spoke
- together with Japan - in the US-based "hub and
spokes" alliance network in the Pacific.
The three Pacific powers - Japan, the US,
and Australia - have been in a constant state of
interaction and cooperation under the Trilateral
Security Dialogue (TSD), while the 2007 Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation has served as
a linchpin in the evolving Japanese-Australian
strategic partnership. [9]
Aside from a
regular ministerial level (2+2) dialogue, the two
countries have signed an intelligence-sharing
agreement and Acquisitions and Cross-Serving
Agreement in recent years. [10] In terms of
enhancing inter-operability, Japan and Australia
have conducted joint naval exercises since 2009.
Recognizing India's rising profile in the
Pacific, especially given its direct energy
investments in Vietnam-controlled disputed waters
in the South China Sea, Tokyo has also sought
deeper strategic cooperation with New Delhi.
Last year, Japanese and Indian Coast
Guards conducted a joint exercise known as "Sahyog
Kaijin XI" from India's port of Chennai. The
Japanese Coast Guard ship Settsu (PLH-07),
two interceptor boats, and eight other coastguard
ships participated in the exercise. [11]
Japan's navy is viewed as the main
regional counterweight to China, which has rapidly
developed its anti-access and blue-water naval
capabilities in recent years. Japan has the
world's sixth-largest military budget [12], while
its navy boasts 48 major surface combatants; two
large helicopter-carrying destroyers; an
assortment of corvettes, frigates and stealthy
diesel-powered submarines (considered best of
their kind); and a state-of-the-art Aegis combat
system. [13]
The most important country in
Abe's "security diamond" is the US. In recent
months, the two allies have conducted a series of
high-profile joint naval exercises. In November,
47,000 personnel took part in the biennial Keen
Sword exercise off Okinawa, originally planned to
act out the re-capture of inhabited islands off
the southern coast of Japan. [14] This month,
Japanese and US fighter jets conducted a five-day
air exercise involving six US FA-18 fighters and
four Japanese F-4 jets. The exercise took place
just days after Japanese jets fended off Chinese
aircraft surveying the disputed islands. [15]
In response to the People's Liberation
Army's East China Fleet naval exercise last year,
which among other things simulated an assault on
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan
reportedly also conducted a military drill
practicing the recapture of similar uninhabited
islands. [16]
The Abe administration is
not only beginning to assume a larger share of
Japan's defense responsibilities, given the US's
fiscal woes and strategic prevarications, but is
also emerging as a pillar for a broader regional
effort to rein in China's territorial
assertiveness by reaching out to Pacific partners.
It's a strategic pivot that will have profound
implications for regional security in the years
ahead.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a
foreign affairs analyst focusing on Iran and
international security. He is the author of the
upcoming book The Economics of the Arab
Spring: How Globalization Failed the Arab
World, Zed Books, 2013. He can be reached
at jrheydarian@gmail.com.
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