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'Evil rogues' of different
stripes
By Ehsan Ahrari
In
the wake of North Korea's admission that it has an
active nuclear-weapons program, the United States is
scurrying around for an appropriate response. But if one
were to go by President George W Bush's depiction of the
"axis of evil", then there should be no distinction
between North Korea and Iraq; nor for that matter, among
the three countries that formulate that list: North
Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Yet, there are differences, at
least between North Korea and Iraq, or so we are told.
When Bush originally condemned North Korea,
Iraq, and Iran as members of a supposed "axis of evil",
it was generally assumed that the United States would
deal with them regarding their aspirations to acquire
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a uniform manner.
While one may quibble over the meaning of that phrase,
suffice it to say that application of reasonable
standards of uniformity were anticipated. What was not
clear then, as it is now, is whether Bush had a
hierarchy of "evil" actors. But as the issue of ousting
Saddam Hussein through the use of force started to heat
up, it was assumed that Iraq definitely topped that
list, considering that those inside and outside (but
closely linked to) the current administration frequently
compared him to Adolf Hitler. An additional aspect of a
wholesale denunciation of the Iraqi dictator was that
both North Korea and Iran, especially the latter, escape
a similar focus and condemnation, even though Iran not
only has an active nuclear program, but also possesses
chemical weapons.
As the United States is
immersing itself in consulting with Japan and South
Korea regarding North Korea's nuclear-weapons program, a
consensual perspective emerging in Washington is that
Iran and North Korea are distinctly different from Iraq.
One of the leading Bush administration hawks, Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, took pains to put the
regimes of Saddam Hussein and Kim Jong-il in different
categories, "because of Iraq's history of using chemical
and biological weapons against opponents". Rumsfeld
stated, "Iraq has unique characteristics that
distinguish it and that suggest that it has nominated
itself for special attention because of the threat of
what they are doing." He went on to observe, "Each of
the countries on the terrorist list is different."
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
arguably the second leading hawk inside the US
government regarding Iraq, had a different reason to
assign Saddam an ascended status on the "axis" list. "To
the best of my knowledge," he observed, "Saddam Hussein
is the only leader who openly glorified the attacks of
September 11." That aspect, he noted, demonstrates
"animosity to the United States" that is not visible in
the case of North Korea.
Specialists outside the
US government also place Iraq in a different category,
identifying that country as an "aggressive power" that
would be emboldened once it possessed WMD.
For
Rumsfeld, even the issue of inspection is not of great
significance in the case of North Korea. He states that
it would be of little use to send weapons inspectors to
Pyongyang, since North Korea had misled the
international community. But if Iraq does that once when
the next round of inspection begins, the United States
is likely to take military action.
Viewing the
issue of North Korea having an active nuclear program
from the perspective of the Bush administration's
newly-released National Security Strategy (NSS), it is
clear that the dual doctrines of preemption and
proactive counter-proliferation should be triggered. One
does not have to insist on the immediate triggering of
these doctrines. However, to suggest that the newly
described nuclear capabilities of North Korea somehow
belongs in a different category is both confusing and
contradictory.
During a CNN interview on October
19, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice quoted a
statement that Bush made. Bush, she said, has observed
that in this instance, morality is more important than
modality. On the contrary, given the long-standing
primacy of nuclear non-proliferation in the NSS
documents issued by past presidents, and given the newly
assigned ascendancy to the doctrine of proactive
counter-proliferation by the current president, North
Korea's nuclear program may not be considered merely
from the perspectives of morality or modality. It can
very quickly become an issue on which the very
credibility of America's policies of keeping any more
countries from acquiring nuclear weapons is at stake -
especially the so-called "axis of evil" states.
But considering the issue, one has to bear in
mind the United States' historical experience on the
Korean Peninsula in the 1950s. The memories of that
conflict might be forcing the Bush administration to
think hard before edging toward a military resolution.
That possibility should be a welcome sign.
But
one also has to consider another aspect of America's
experience involving the Korean Peninsula: the role of
the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since the EP-3
"spy plane" incident of April 2001, relations between
Washington and Beijing have stayed at a low point.
Before they could be improved, the United States was
struck with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
After that, nothing mattered to the Bush administration
except the global war on terrorism (GWOT). As the
intensity of that war subsided, still not much attention
was focused on improving US-China relations. Even the
language used in Bush's National Security Strategy of
September 2002 was somewhat critical of the PRC.
Washington has also accused China of helping North Korea
develop highly enriched uranium. In addition, even
though US intelligence sources have recently publicized
Pakistan's alleged role in assisting Pyongyang in its
nuclear-weapons program - a charge Islamabad has denied
- it may never be clear whether Beijing was also
directly involved, or whether it signaled Pakistan to
assist North Korea.
Viewed from within, the PRC
is going through a critical phase of leadership change.
While in a democratic system regime change and the
attendant policy alterations are issues of public
debates, no such activities are carried out in
non-democratic systems openly and unambiguously. Thus,
China appears to be awaiting the completion of the
transition of leadership before modalities of its
modified policies are apparent.
In the meantime,
as President Jiang Zemin is busy negotiating the
specifics of his own role in the "retired" phase of his
career, he would be attentive to playing a meaningful
role as a sort of intermediary between Washington and
Pyongyang. That suits the Bush administration, since it
does not seem to be interested in confronting North
Korea, at least for now. There are risks of triggering a
hardline position from Beijing. Even though its leaders
are not as militaristic as the late Mao Zedong, they
are, nevertheless, suspicious that the United States is
still interested in containing their country. The Bush
administration has done nothing to alleviate those
feelings. In fact, a case can be made that the growing
US presence in Central Asia may also be aimed at
balancing the Chinese proactivism, indeed its presence,
in that region.
There are a few recent
developments in Sino-US ties, signaling that the
environment of mutual cordiality, even warmth, may
prevail. However, China has also made it clear that it
will be free to disagree and, indeed, to take a
different path on major strategic issues. As Jiang
recently stated, "Confucius said more than 2,000 years
ago: 'In human relationships, a gentleman seeks harmony
but not uniformity.' That is to say, harmony but not
sameness, reserving differences without coming into
conflict."
From the US vantage point, at a time
when the GWOT is still being carried out in different
regions of the world, albeit with unequal focus and
intensity, and while the possibility of a military
campaign against Iraq is being considered, antagonizing
China might be politically untenable and highly
unrealistic. Thus, an important alternative would be to
use its good offices to reach North Korea, which has
already expressed its willingness to negotiate regarding
its nuclear-weapons program.
But if North Korea
had already developed one or more nuclear weapons, as it
is generally believed in the usually informed circles in
Washington and Seoul, would it be amenable to
dismantling its entire nuclear program as South Africa
and Argentina have done? Undoubtedly, there are hopes on
the US side along those lines. But what if North Korea
were to refuse to do that? Would the twin doctrines of
preemption and proactive counter-proliferation be
triggered, or would the United States accept a nuclear
North Korea as a fait accompli? That is a difficult
question to answer.
However, the Japanese and
South Korean reactions will play a significant role in
determining the modalities of the US response.
Undoubtedly, neither Japan nor South Korea is welcoming
any suggestion from Washington that the 1994 agreement
with North Korea is nullified. At the same time, they
are applying pressure on Washington to conduct a
dialogue. There are also reports that North Korea is
seeking a "non-aggression" agreement with Washington. As
long as the United States continues to prefer a
non-military solution to North Korea's nuclear program,
it is possible that a non-aggression pact also may
become part of the eventual solution. Tokyo and Seoul
are likely to apply increased pressure to that effect,
given that they have not been terribly happy with the
overall hardline policies of the Bush administration
involving North Korea.
The preceding underscores
that the Bush administration is fully capable of opting
for multilateralism when it chooses. But in the case of
Iraq, it seems to be moving in that direction
willy-nilly, and only because of a potential use of veto
by Russia or France.
Ehsan Ahrari,
PhD, is an independent strategic analyst based in
Alexandria, Virginia.
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