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Japan-North Korea: No yen
yet
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL -
After a two-year hiatus, Japan-North Korea talks on
diplomatic normalization resumed, and have just
concluded in Kuala Lumpur, as a consequence of the
historical summit meeting between Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on
September 17. The talks particularly drew the world's
attention as they took place in the midst of all the
hype about North Korea's nuclear-weapons programs. Their
timing was also significant because they began just a
day after the conclusion of the annual Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit, where a resolution on the
nukes matter was adopted by all participating leaders.
However, as Korean affairs observers had foreseen, there
was not much progress at the Kuala Lumpur talks, for a
variety of reasons.
One of the reasons was that
the agendas that the respective parties had in mind
differed from each other. While the top priority in the
minds of the Japanese included a halt to all nuclear
programs, including the uranium-enrichment program, and
a permanent settlement on the return of Japanese
abductees, it was economics for the North. North Korea
now feels that it has done its best to move forward with
concrete talks on economic compensation for the
atrocities inflicted by the Japanese during its
occupation of the Korean Peninsula from 1910-45.
As implied by Jong Thae-hwa, Pyongyang's
ambassador in charge of the normalization talks, North
Korea does not feel any obligation to discuss the
nuclear issue with any country, including Japan and
South Korea, but the United States. Regarding the
abduction issue, the North, again emphasized by Jong's
words, feels that the issue "has been settled in a broad
context. The remaining details should be dealt with in
working-level talks." The talks did not focus on a
discussion of the main question: how much is Japan
willing to pay for the atrocities during the colonial
rule in the first half of the 20th century? That was the
sole concern to North Korea, as it had scratched the
Japanese back where it itched.
Another reason
that much more patience is required before we can see
any progress on Japan-North Korea relations can be seen
in the historical lessons from the normalization process
of US-China and Japan-China relations. As those two
cases revealed, the normalization process with China,
which at the time resembled present-day North Korea very
much in its isolationist and seclusive posture, took a
lot of patience. As reiterated by Koizumi at the
conclusion of the Kuala Lumpur talks, "we have to be
more patient". Since China's normalization with Japan
and the US, the international setting has undergone a
substantial change, especially with the end of the Cold
War. However, one thing that remains unchanged to date
is US-Japan relations in the context of the
international power structure.
Japan's foreign
policy is still subject to the influence and outcomes of
US foreign relations. Its decision-making process still
lacks autonomy. Under the circumstances, North Korea and
Japan both know well that even if they agree to full
diplomatic ties, economic cooperation between the two
could not be realized as provided by the Pyongyang
Declaration by Koizumi and Kim Jong-il. An analogy can
be drawn from the Chinese case. As in that case, and as
suggested by US assistant secretary of state James Kelly
after his second visit to Pyongyang in October, the
United States will consider diplomatic talks with North
Korea when it is ready to reform and open itself.
Therefore, it will take a much longer time for North
Korea to get its economic bonus and gifts from Japan and
others, as was the case for China.
It was 30
years ago, in 1972, when China and Japan normalized
their relationship. The event came a long time before
Washington fully recognized Beijing in 1979. In the
course of negotiation with China for diplomatic
relations, Japan faced a similar compensation problem
for its atrocities during its invasion of China in World
War II. China, however, did not demand an official
apology from Japan for past wrongdoings, and neither did
it ask for compensation. What it expected, in return,
were economic assistance and aid when needed. However,
such assistance did not flow into China until the United
States formally recognized China. Until then, not a
penny from Japan went into China in the form of official
economic assistance. And that was only after January 1,
1979. It was only in November the previous year that the
Chinese government adopted reform and an open-door
policy. How ironic that all these things happened in
such short span of time. After January 1, 1979, all
kinds of Japanese assistance and aid, including loans
and grants, began to flow into China.
With
international cooperation at its peak in the history of
human beings, it is true that a small scale of economic
assistance from the world, including Japan, is flowing
into Pyongyang for humanitarian reasons and other
purposes, such as the Korea Energy Development
Organization (KEDO). One lesson we may extract from the
Chinese case, however, is that the kind of money or
assistance the North is seeking will be very hard to
realize until it normalizes - not merely improves - its
relations with the United States.
Thus, at this
stage, it is difficult to expect much progress in talks
between Japan and North Korea on the diplomatic issue
with the compensation problem always dangling over the
discussion table, unless history can fool us this time.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is a research fellow
with the Trade Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions
expressed in this article are his own.
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