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Korean election: Candidates look
north
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL -
"GNP will suspend aid to NK until nuke issue is
resolved," blared the front-page headline in a recent
issue of the Korea Times. However, South Korea's
opposition Grand National Party of course has no
authority to do any such thing, at least until it wins
the presidential election scheduled for December 19.
Indeed, with 35 days to go before the presidential
election, all candidates are making numerous, yet
difficult to realize, promises to the South Korean
public in their campaigns, and North Korean issues are
no exception.
Since any issues or programs
related to North Korea are highly sensitive, the sitting
administration holds total control of Seoul's policy
toward Pyongyang. The reality is that literally no one
can change the course of that policy once implemented
and pursued by the administration. It is total monopoly.
Those outside the administration can do nothing but keep
guessing the orientation, direction and outcomes of the
administration's policy. In other words, the North
Korean policy pursued by the administration is always
unforeseeable and unpredictable.
The best
examples lie in the current administration's policy to
North Korea - the so-called Sunshine Policy - and in the
historic summit meeting between North and South last
June. Despite the criticism of the Sunshine Policy that
has continued since its adoption with the birth of
President Kim Dae-jung's government, nothing has
changed. While the critics persist, the aid and
assistance continue to pour north with nothing in return
but a slap in a face, such as the recent admission of
the covert nuclear-weapons program. Pleas for an
explanation of the government's unilateral aid program
are always met with one simple answer: humanitarianism.
The government justifies its case on two grounds. One is
to prevent North Korea from immediate collapse by
providing food and other humanitarian support to the
hunger-stricken nation, as the cost of dealing with the
consequences of not helping the North now would be well
beyond the South's capability. The other is to lead
North Korea to reform and an open-door policy through
economic cooperation and personnel exchanges.
After two years, the historic summit meeting
between the leaders of the two Koreas is now under
scrutiny as the government has been accused of advancing
a payment of US$4 billion for the realization of the
occasion to the North. The payment is claimed to have
been made in hard currency with help from a renowned
South Korean conglomerate, Hyundai. How ironic that one
of the prime contenders for the upcoming presidential
election is a family member of Hyundai. A related story
concerns the resignation of former director of the
National Intelligence Service, the South Korean
equivalent of the US Central Intelligence Agency,
because of his failure to realize such a meeting in
1999. The story could go on endlessly on the monopoly
nature of the South Korean government's policy to North
Korea. It is in this light that it would be interesting
to see the views and policies on North Korea held by the
three main presidential candidates.
The
candidates
Officially there are nine presidential
candidates but only three are regarded by national polls
to have a legitimate shot. They are Lee Hoi-chang of the
conservative GNP, the opposition party; Roh Moo-hyun of
the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP); and
National Alliance 21's Chung Mong-jun, president of the
Korean Football Association and vice president of the
Federation Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA).
Lee was a justice of the Korean Supreme
Court before entering politics as prime minister, a post
that lasted less than a year because of a personal
conflict with then president Kim Yong-sam during the
early 1990s.
A former human-rights lawyer and
lawmaker, Roh is the nominee of the party that was once
headed by current President Kim Dae-jung, who resigned
the top post last year.
Coming from the wealthy
family that controls the Hyundai conglomerate, Chung
joined the presidential race in September on the back of
his success at running the 2002 World Cup, in which the
South Korean national soccer team advanced to the Final
Four.
The policies
From their personal
backgrounds, we get a taste of the candidates' personal
views toward North Korea and related issues. Obviously,
Lee, as a candidate of the conservative opposition
party, is very critical of the current administration's
Sunshine Policy. He and his party believe that in the
name of the Sunshine Policy the Kim Dae-jung government
has given too much aid and assistance to the North
Korean regime with no substantial return, such as peace
or a reduction in tensions. South Korea, he claims, has
endured nothing but slaps in the face, such as the
attacks by the North's naval forces in 1998 and 2002 and
the recent admission of the covert nuclear program.
Like successful presidents in the past, Lee
Hoi-chang, throughout his campaign, has consistently
emphasized that the ultimate objective of his North
Korean policy is the establishment of peace on the
Korean Peninsula through the easing of military tension.
Lee says the following three principles would help him
achieve this end: (1) a peace-building process led by
the Koreas; (2) tension reduction in tandem with
exchanges and cooperation; and (3) gradual
implementation of a peace process. He firmly believes
that if these principles were carried out in the context
of strategic reciprocity, national consensus and
transparency, with strict verification, the nation would
be guaranteed peace and reduced tension.
From a
reading of these stated principles we can assume, as
also claimed by Lee's camp, that he would take a much
harder line than Kim in his policy and practice toward
North Korea. That is, "peace first, aid later". His
conservative posture is well reflected in his public
statement regarding North Korea's recent confession to a
nuclear-weapons program. In his plain words: "Monetary
support to the cash-strapped country should be stopped
at once and other inter-Korean economic cooperation
projects should also be suspended until the nuclear
issue is resolved."
However, his posture and
policy as well as principles on North Korea may turn the
clock back to the Cold War period, if realized and
implemented. We would be lucky not to witness any more
tension arising from this kind of policy. Meeting
political prerequisites prior to economic cooperation
has been much a difficult task for previous governments.
Whether Lee's policy stance on North Korean issues is,
as argued by some, in line with that of the US
administration of President George W Bush is left for
more observation. However, if it were so, a substantial
amount of time and effort for realignment of the
inter-Korean relationship would be observed in Lee's
early years as president. The world knows that as long
as the North does not recognize the South as a
legitimate government, as in the case of the
peace-treaty issue between the two states, managing
inter-Korean issues by the Korean people is at a
premature stage. And to practice such a policy while
keeping in line with US policy is unrealistic.
Regarding the vociferous nominee of the MDP, Roh
Moo-hyun has been persistent in his argument for
continuing support and aid to North Korea regardless of
circumstances. He has been a strong advocate of such aid
and assistance as "investment" in the future, implying
unification. He draws an analogy from Germany's
experience, arguing that West Germany spent more than
$47 billion on East Germany for 20 years before the
unification. He particularly emphasizes the case by
recalling the drastic increase in spending during the
time of chancellor Helmut Kohl, a man known for his
conservatism. In the wake of the North's admission about
its nuclear program, however, Roh backed away from his
original stance, a move regarded by many as an attempt
to distance himself from the Sunshine Policy. Conscious
of public consensus, he now has taken a very assertive
position on the aid issue and the nuclear problem.
Roh's fundamental principles in his view toward
the North consist of five points: (1)
confidence-building in place of reciprocity; (2)
promotion of a national consensus on North Korea policy;
(3) comprehensive security encompassing the military and
the economy; (4) economic cooperation and investment
from long-term perspectives; and (5) international
cooperation led by the Koreas. As to how to practice
these principles, Roh recently presented his action
plan. While incorporating the fundamental philosophy of
the Sunshine Policy, he argues for establishing a peace
council to realize his five principles. The council
would comprise the six concerned parties in Korean
Peninsula affairs, namely the two Koreas, the United
States, China, Russia and Japan. In addition, to sustain
"investment" to the North, he also proposes the
establishment of a "Northeast Asia Development Bank".
Furthermore, to draw a distinction between his meaning
of reciprocity and that of Lee Hoi-chang, he emphasizes
that his concept is not a calculated one as he will not
spare humanitarian aid for North Korea on the principle
of mutual survival.
Roh's vision is deeply
rooted in his belief that North Korea is not the "main
enemy" to the South's defense forces. Prior to 1994, he
insists, the South never explicitly recognized its
Northern counterpart as the "main enemy", as it does in
its Defense White Paper. He notes that not even Taiwan
publicly states that mainland China is its main enemy,
and neither does Israel with Palestine. While he would
try to eradicate such a concept in his defense policy,
if elected, he intends to conclude a peace treaty with
North Korea by transforming the current armistice
between the United States and North Korea into a peace
treaty. To meet this end, he would work toward
converting the hierarchical relationship of the US-Korea
alliance into a more horizontal one. Roh is certainly
equipped with detailed plans for his vision. However,
feasibility questions remain very much in doubt, since
his plans seem too assertive and naive about the power
structure surrounding the peninsula. Roh's policy could
leave too much room for the possibility of individual
states acting independently.
Considering his PhD
background in political science from the School of
Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, we might expect Chung Mong-jun to hold a
more realistic view on North Korea and related issues.
As a son of the late Chung Joo-hyun, the founder of
Hyundai and the pioneer of the North Korea aid program
that started in the late 1980s, Chung should have much
more concrete and substantial ideas in handling North
Korea. He has traveled there many more times than the
aforementioned candidates. He has met personally with
the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. His company is
leading the tour program to Mount Geumgang. To our
dismay, however, he is not much different from the
previous two contenders in terms of naivete and
mediocrity. He may be constraining himself, as Hyundai
is currently under investigation on the charge of
transferring $4 billion to the North. This is clearly
reflected in his sudden and abrupt shift from a soft
posture to a hardline stance in the wake of the
confession by the North on its nuclear program, calling
for an immediate halt to the program and all
humanitarian assistance.
However, it seems that
Chung's fundamental principles will remain intact in the
broader context. These are: (1) maintenance and
promotion of peace on the peninsula; (2) establishment
of a peace structure based on tension reduction and
disarmament; (3) establishment of a de facto
commonwealth through economic cooperation; (4) pursuit
of humanitarian objectives through food and other aid to
North Korea; (5) support of North Korea's efforts to
join the international community; and (6) promotion of
national reunification as a mid- and long-term
objective. He prefers to label his potential North
Korean policy as engagement policy, influenced by what
he calls his realistic perception of the current trend
in foreign policy.
While opposing North Korea's
nuclear program by any and all means, however, Chung
does not want to halt the current humanitarian
assistance to the North. Instead, he believes that when
cases like the nuclear program arise, the debate should
focus on the level of assistance. Furthermore, he
asserts that controlling the level of aid would provide
his government, if elected, much greater leverage for
resolving issues such as military tension reduction and
repatriation of the remains of those missing in action
from the Korean War as well as those abducted during the
past 50 years. In the end, however, he firmly states
that his ultimate objectives in his North Korean policy
are twofold. One is not merely to freeze the ongoing
nuclear program, but to remove it permanently. The other
is to induce the North to adopt an open-door and reform
policy.
When it comes to economic cooperation
and providing humanitarian assistance, Chung may be more
magical because of his extensive experience with the
North. Nonetheless, it may take more than magic to
articulate the intertwining and complex international
relations surrounding peninsular affairs. He throws a
lot of political terminology into his principles on
North Korea, as expected. But international-relations
theory does not see foreign affairs in such a naive
sense. Indeed, we all want disarmament on the Korean
Peninsula. But as long as South Korea is tangled up in
the US alliance system, especially with Bush as the
commander-in-chief of the United States, it will be a
matter of changing US interests in East Asia in general
and Northeast Asia in particular.
Pluses and
minuses
All three candidates seem to share one
common denominator in their North Korean policy
equation. They are all inclined to pursue their policy
based on public consensus and reciprocity. They all seem
to have adopted these principles out of their awareness
on the Sunshine Policy's shortcomings. They are all
aggressive in their promise to achieve their own
respective policy and goals by directly engaging in
head-to-head talks with the North and cooperating with
the United States.
What they are all overlooking
is the potential danger underlying such tactics and the
reality of the international relations surrounding the
Korean Peninsula. Their actions will bear much more
complicated consequences, isolating themselves. They
have to face reality in forming their North Korean
policy. They have to come to a better understanding of
the United States' ultimate and final objectives in its
East Asian policy, and to a certain extent in its wider
Asian policy.
Moreover, they have to have a
better picture of the intention and goals behind the
North's foreign policy. For reference, we recollect what
has been blamed for the failure of the Sunshine Policy,
the North's shrewd tactic of ignoring the South while
communicating only with the United States - often
employed after exploiting the South's benign and
emotional intentions.
Jaewoo
Choo, PhD, is a research fellow with the Trade
Research Institute, Seoul. The opinions expressed in
this article are his own.
(©2002 Asia Times Online
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