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Korea crisis will test Chinese
diplomacy
By Phillip C Saunders and
Jing-dong Yuan
The looming crisis on the Korean
Peninsula poses a major test for Chinese diplomacy. As
the United States and North Korea head toward a possible
nuclear confrontation, China is positioned to play a
critical role in defusing the crisis. To do so, Beijing
may need to abandon its traditional passive posture in
favor of a more active diplomatic role. Korea could be
the crucible that reveals whether China's emerging
status as a responsible great power is real or illusory.
China clearly has important economic and
security interests at stake. These include both
substantive interests such as maintaining a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula and procedural interests in how the
crisis is managed. In the past, Beijing has kept a low
profile on Korean security issues and attempted to
exercise its influence quietly. China's cautious efforts
to preserve the security status quo and to maintain
stability have placed it in a passive and reactive
diplomatic posture.
China's response to the
current crisis reflects this pattern. Chinese Foreign
Ministry statements have called for supporting a
nuclear-free Korean peninsula, maintaining peace and
stability, solving the problem through dialogue, and
preserving the Agreed Framework. The recent joint
statement by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian
President Vladimir Putin expressed concern about the
North Korean nuclear program and called on North Korea
and the United States to normalize their relations
through "constructive and equal" dialogue. These
statements have highlighted the gravity of the
situation, but do little to point the way toward a
solution.
As Washington and Pyongyang continue
on their collision course, both sides appear determined
not to be the one to back down first. Their
confrontation could force China to become more active.
North Korea's admission of a covert nuclear-weapons
program and the George W Bush administration's
suspension of fuel-oil deliveries have probably
destroyed the political basis for the Agreed Framework
between Washington and Pyongyang. China could play a key
role in providing both sides with a graceful diplomatic
exit to the current crisis, while laying the foundations
for a longer-term resolution of the nuclear issue.
Efforts to return to the status quo of North Korean
nuclear ambiguity are unlikely to maintain stability for
long.
There are several reasons Beijing should
be more active. First is the urgent need to head off
negative consequences for Chinese security interests.
China's substantive concerns about Korea are defined
mainly in terms of outcomes that should be avoided. The
worst scenario is a nuclear domino effect where an
overtly nuclear-armed North Korea forces Japan, South
Korea, and even Taiwan to go nuclear. This would
profoundly reshape the security environment in Northeast
Asia and prompt the United States to accelerate
deployment of ballistic-missile defenses.
From
China's perspective, a North Korean collapse would be
almost as bad. South Korea might inherit the North's
nuclear arsenal, and US forces based in a reunified
Korea could have direct access to China's border. China
would have little ability to influence future security
arrangements on the Korean peninsula, and would have to
deal with the economic burden of refugees fleeing a
collapsing North Korean regime.
China also
worries that the United States might use force to try to
resolve the nuclear crisis. A war on the Korean
peninsula would have major strategic, economic,
environmental, and humanitarian consequences for China,
even if weapons of mass destruction were not used.
Economic damages would be tremendous, along with serious
environmental degradation. China has strong incentives
to play a more active diplomatic role in order to avoid
these worst-case scenarios.
In addition to these
substantive interests, Beijing also has procedural
concerns about how the crisis is managed. These include
a strong preference for a peaceful outcome, avoiding a
unilateral US use of force without United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) authorization, and having a
voice in future security arrangements on the Korean
Peninsula.
Advancing China's interests will
require diplomatic acumen and a willingness to make some
hard choices. China has historically been the least
active member of the P-5 (the five permanent members of
the UNSC) in tackling international security issues,
with a tendency to abstain on critical votes. It has
also sought to maintain balanced relations with both
North and South Korea. But if Beijing wants to
demonstrate its sincerity in promoting regional peace
and stability and prove its credentials as a responsible
great power, more will be required.
One way
Beijing could help is by using its influence to persuade
Pyongyang to halt its nuclear activities. China can
convey to North Korea the seriousness with which not
only the United States, but also South Korea, Japan,
Russia and the international community views its nuclear
brinkmanship. The recent visit to Beijing by South
Korean officials shows Seoul’s desire for China to play
a more active role. China should relay the message that
overt possession of nuclear weapons will preclude the
positive economic and political relationship with the
United States that North Korea says it wants. At the
same time, Beijing can credibly play the role of an
honest broker in conveying North Korea's legitimate
concerns to the United States. This will be especially
important if the Bush administration persists in
refusing to deal directly with the North.
Given
China's own stake in a peaceful resolution of the
crisis, Beijing might need to be more direct in warning
North Korea that its actions threaten fundamental
Chinese security interests. China's status as a donor
provides important leverage. Continued intransigence in
Pyongyang could force Beijing to reconsider its policy
of providing sufficient economic assistance to help keep
the North Korean regime afloat, including 90 percent of
North Korea's fuel imports and 40 percent of its food
imports. Threatening to cut off this aid would be risky,
but might be the only way to head off even worse
consequences.
China might also lead a
multilateral initiative to address North Korea's stated
reason for reactivating the Yongbyon reactor - the need
to generate electricity in response to the suspension of
heavy-fuel-oil deliveries. China could also call for
revitalization of the regional consultative process for
addressing long-term security issues on the peninsula,
including security assurance from major powers, a
possible nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean
Peninsula, and a new security framework for the region.
Russia could be a potential partner in these
initiatives. Although these measures are unlikely to
resolve the crisis by themselves, they could help
provide a face-saving exit for Pyongyang.
Beijing's helpfulness in finding a way out of
the nuclear impasse could help consolidate a fragile
US-Chinese bilateral relationship that has gradually
been rebuilt in the wake of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States and the war on
terrorism. Successful resolution of the crisis could
also reinforce the treaties that make up the
international non-proliferation regime, which are
China's preferred method of dealing with proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
While there are
good arguments for a more active Chinese role, it
remains to be seen what specific measures Beijing will
take. China played a positive role in defusing the
1993-94 nuclear crisis by working behind the scenes.
However, this time Beijing's sought-after role as a
responsible great power may require it to get its hands
dirty.
Dr Phillip C
Saunders and Dr
Jing-dong Yuan are respectively director and senior
research associate of the East Asia Nonproliferation
Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in
California.
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