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North Korea: What's on the table
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - The
month of January witnessed many talks at many levels
among the many nations that have stakes in the Korean
Peninsula. None of these players seemed prepared to
yield much but instead consolidated and confirmed their
positions on the North Korean nuclear issue.
The
consequences of all these talks only served to bewilder
the observers of Korean affairs even further. The latest
of such feelings were generated by the words emphasized
in US President George W Bush's State of Union address
last week. He used such terms as "outlaw regime",
"oppressive regime" and "axis of evil" to describe the
North Korean leadership. These words bear a much more
severe connotation and implications than one may think
if one understands the American cowboy culture and its
dedication and commitment to freedom, liberty and
equality.
Against this backdrop, South Korean
President Kim Dae-jung's special delegation to North
Korea, which left Seoul on the same day of Bush's
address, failed to have a meeting with Kim Jong-il. The
delegation included a director of the Unification and
Foreign Affairs Committee on the Presidential Transition
Commission, who delivered a personal letter from
President Kim. The delegation returned literally
empty-handed except for one response from its
counterpart that the letter would be reviewed and
answered in a timely manner.
All these events
have made us raise our eyebrows, and forced our eyes to
squint too much in an effort to see things straight. One
thing is obvious: the ball is now in North Korea's
court, as shown by its treatment of the special
delegation. The North Koreans will have to make a choice
from the menus presented from the recent talks.
Let us concentrate only on official meetings of
the surrounding states of the Korean Peninsula, thereby
excluding high-level talks involving non-governmental
organizations, including the Red Cross. It all began
with the ninth South-North ministerial-level talks held
in Seoul on January 21-24. That meeting was followed on
January 25 by one between US Secretary of the State
Colin Powell and a representative of South Korean
President-elect Roh Moo-hyun's delegation at the World
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. It was a very
significant meeting because for the first time it
revealed the United States' new formula in its approach
to the North, namely "5+5" dialogue, while Roh's
position of "4+2" was delivered with confirmation.
Two days later, on January 27, the two Koreas
held military working-level talks and exchanged a signed
accord on civilian border crossings at the truce village
of Panmunjom, further consolidating foundations for
economic cooperation by means of land transportation.
Two days after that, last Wednesday, Kim Dae-jung
dispatched his special delegation with a great
speculation of a possible meeting with Kim Jong-il. The
meeting fell through, allegedly because it conflicted
with the date of the State of the Union address.
Kim Jong-il now has four menus to choose from
for North Korea's engagement with the outside world, but
first he has to retreat from its blackmail/brinkmanship
tactics of nuclear threats.
One menu offers
direct talks with the United States, without a la carte.
However, this dish would not serve the interests of
other concerned nations nor the taste of the US
Congress, as it has much bitterness left over from
previous dishes served by the North Korean cooks.
The second menu would be "3+2", in which the US,
China, Russia, and the two Korean parties will be served
at the table. This dish has much Russian flavor, as the
Russian envoy basically drafted the recipe during his
visit to the North last month. However, this Russian
cuisine is not much to the taste of China and South
Korea. China would prefer to sit back and enjoy the meal
instead of watching Russia cook, host and orchestrate
the banquet. South Korea, meanwhile, would not be too
pleased by much bigger and more vociferous guests
sitting at the same table, making it feel much smaller
in importance. More important, it leaves out a special
guest from next door, Japan, which may have to end up
picking up part of the bill, if not all of it.
Next up is a menu with a "4+2" course dish, as
arranged by the next incoming South Korean government
under the host, Roh Moo-hyun. This menu includes
American, Chinese, Russian, Japanese and two different
styles of Korean dishes. Unfortunately, the North Korean
guest is not too fond of the Japanese dish. It fears
that the menu would be revised to the old "3+3", in
which the banquet could easily be ruined if the Japanese
decide to take sides. The Russian guest may attempt to
play a mediating role by tapping the water glass with
his silverware, but it would be difficult to draw other
guests' attention, as they would all be pretty much
preoccupied with arguments over which dish tastes
better.
The last possible choice for North Korea
would be "5+5", in which French, British and Australian
cuisine will also be served, along with a variety of
European dishes served up the cooks from the European
Union. The idea is great, making the banquet a real one.
All these special guests from Europe and Oceania would
have a real chance to taste the dish from North Korea.
These would be VIP guests because of their highly
regarded international profile and status in
international organizations, which may well have to play
a much bigger role in paying for the bill claimed by
North Korea.
The US, Japan and South Korea would
be hard-pressed to pick up the check for hanging out
with North Korea. They may need to get some help from
international financial sources and, as we all are
aware, these institutions are run by a board of members
that include the special guests at the "5+5" banquet.
Before these financial institutions can make any
decision on behalf of North Korea, they need to have a
better comprehension of what North Korea's needs are.
This cannot be achieved by a one-night stand with the
North, but it can be accomplished through frequent
dining and conversation over a long course in an
amicable, delightful setting.
This idea of more
guests at the banquet has one significant problem,
however. If a crisis breaks out, a sufficient response
would be hard to expect, not to mention deciding who is
responsible for ruining the banquet.
One thing
is for sure: in the minds of the directly concerned
states, including the US, Japan, China and Russia, is
their wish to make the banquet as much of an
international one as possible. They want the world to
know and understand the event. They want help from
international organizations. They want the survival of
poor North Korea for a list of reasons, ranging from
humanitarian ones to the well-being of the people and
the states around and in the Korean Peninsula.
To invite all these international guests to a
banquet of such a grand scale in the era of terrorism,
security has to be guaranteed. That means creating a
sense of security not only to those coming from
overseas, but to North Korea, which feels vulnerable to
attacks by others. That is, before any form of banquet
can be hosted to create an occasion to talk over and
solve the nuclear crisis, a written guarantee of no
attack will have to be forwarded before the invitation
letters go out.
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is a
research fellow with the Trade Research Institute,
Seoul. The opinions expressed in this article are his
own.
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