Pyongyang shoots down diplomatic
hopes
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - Chinese diplomacy is the first victim
of a North Korean missile that landed in the Sea of
Japan 35 miles off the South Korean coast just hours
before the inauguration of South Korean President Roh
Moo-hyun. The test launch occurred on Monday, a day
before world leaders gathered in Seoul to witness the
inauguration.
In past months Beijing has been
the staunchest advocate of dialogue and a peaceful
approach toward Pyongyang. This stand was backed by
outgoing South Korean president Kim Dae-jung, who
devised the Sunshine Policy of talks with the North, and
by Kim's successor Roh. The United States had a vested
interest in a softer line on North Korea, allowing
Washington to concentrate on the Iraqi crisis. President
George W Bush played down the North Korean threat,
calling it a "diplomatic showdown". The Bush
administration sent a host of appeasing messages to
Pyongyang, pledging to resume and even increase its aid
to the poverty-stricken country and not responding to
Pyongyang's belligerent rhetoric.
However, Bush
also refused the offer of direct talks with North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il, talks that were advocated by China.
North Korea, for its part, pursued the political aim of
downgrading other countries' involvement in the issue,
such as Japan and South Korea, and essentially forcing
Washington into talks through threats. The offer of
talks with North Korea was reiterated on Monday during
meetings between US Secretary of State Colin Powell and
Chinese leaders. But the United States is pressing for
multilateral talks, which would test North Korea's
complex web of ties with its neighbors and force it into
reforms.
Monday's missile severely weakened any
call for talks, and there remains a political void
hampering any decision (see US: Political war on multiple
fronts, January 24). There is no political framework
nor political consensus among the main actors in this
drama about what kind of initiative could be taken with
North Korea.
Japan is extremely nervous about
the possibility of a North Korean missile flying over
its territory, and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went
to Seoul on Tuesday "to strengthen the rickety
tripartite alliance set up to quell the saber rattling
from Pyongyang", the Asahi Shimbun reported the same
day. Opinion in South Korea is divided between those who
are nearly as (or more) concerned about US military
presence in their territory as they are with the North
Korean threat, and those who never believed in the
Sunshine Policy and now find all their suspicions
confirmed.
But China is in the worst position.
It was the one country that still had some leverage over
North Korea, but it failed to deliver. The West has
accepted the idea that Beijing is no longer as
influential with Pyongyang as it was 20 or 30 years
back, but still Beijing has not set its mind about how
to handle North Korea. Beijing clings to its status quo
position, favoring slow but steady progress in the North
Korean economy that would ease future reunification. But
day after day Kim Jong-il works at burning all the
bridges between him and the status quo. Thus, while
there is no political agreement on the future of the
Korean Peninsula, or on the costs of a future settlement
for the North, there is also no longer a status quo to
go back to.
This is the paradox of the situation
Kim Jong-il seems keen on fully exploiting. China, Japan
and South Korea do not wish to see North Korea disappear
off the map, for they do not want to bear the huge costs
of reunification, of supporting the poor Northerners or
hosting waves of refugees.
In the face of this
situation Kim Jong-il's actions are helping build a
united front around and against him:
Roh was humiliated by the missile launch. The day of
his presidential inauguration turned into a show for Kim
Jong-il in which the South was portrayed as not
important, or the next target of the North's aggressive
strategy.
Japan once more was the chosen victim, as the
missile flew very close to the trajectory of one that
almost hit Japanese territory five years ago.
US offers were rejected, as Pyongyang chose to
escalate the tension further.
China's interest in a status quo that postpones
difficult questions about the reunification of the
Korean Peninsula or the stationing of the US troops
became seriously jeopardized.
The daring actions
of North Korea have worked to eliminate timidity as an
option: there must be a comprehensive solution for the
security of the Korean Peninsula that goes beyond the
nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The hundreds or thousands
of North Korean missiles, which could be fired in any
direction, are a danger to the regional security even if
without any nuclear payload.
In the short run,
as there is no clear political objective on the North
Korea problem, either by any single state or by all
states together, the solution seems to be to drag it out
until the Iraqi war is over. (This incidentally puts
further pressure on finishing the war in Iraq as early
as possible.) However, the policy of appeasement with
North Korea is not the best course and could hit China,
the country keenest on appeasing Pyongyang, the hardest.
F W Mote in his 1999 book Imperial China argues
that the Song Dynasty used a policy of appeasement with
the northern Liao Dynasty (pp 112-118). The Song
reckoned that it was cheaper to pay off the Liao than to
start a complex and expensive military program to
counter the Liao threats. In long run, however, Mote
argues, this political choice helped weaken the Song
Dynasty and brought it to an end.
North Korea
can't bring China to an end, but its saber-rattling
could certainly sour relations between China and Japan
and the United States, and this would be highly
detrimental to China.
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