| |
A QUESTION OF LEVERAGE
China's role in
the Korea crisis
By Jaewoo Choo
SEOUL - Since the revelation of North Korea's
enriched-uranium development program last October, China
has been under enormous pressure from the international
community in general and the United States in particular
to play an active role in tackling the intensified
nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Hoping that
Pyongyang will behave in a more reasonable and compliant
way in their efforts to find a peaceful solution to the
crisis, they want China to exert influence on North
Korea by immediately suspending economic assistance.
However, China maintains a seemingly indifferent
posture on the issue that is of great concern to the
interested nations, namely the US, Japan and South
Korea, as well as European nations to a certain extent.
Regarding China's position, two schools of thought stand
out in their interpretation of reasoning. While one
argues that there is still time and room for China to
act and fulfill the world's expectation as a so-called
"responsible state", the other suspects that China may
have already lost its leverage over North Korea. Under
the circumstances, a question with respect to China's
position naturally arises: does China have leverage over
North Korea's foreign affairs?
For a state to
have leverage over another's international conduct means
that it has the ability to affect the outcome of one's
decision to act in an intended way. Since North Korea's
behavior remains a conundrum in the eyes of the
observers of the affairs of the Korean Peninsula for
lack of valid information on its foreign-policy
decision-making process, answers to this question may
entail much analytical work based on circumstantial
evidence, rather than hard, proven facts.
Many
observers have attempted analyses in a conventional way
only to find themselves in a much deeper hole in their
guessing games as to whether China has any influence on
North Korea's behavior in the realm of foreign policy.
Such a consequence is inevitable, for their method of
analysis relies a great deal on assumptions,
speculations, and perceived interpretations. This
explains why many observers are careful in their wording
when it comes to justifying their argument on China's
relations with North Korea. Such words as "reportedly",
"allegedly" and "quietly" are easily detected in their
work, instead of "certainly", "apparently" and
"clearly". In analyzing China's role in the previous
nuclear crisis in 1994, for instance, no one can be
definite, as is shown in this excerpt from an article in
Issues & Studies by Yongho Kim: "During the US-North
Korea nuclear negotiation (in 1994), China allegedly
played a mediating role in the successful conclusion of
the talks via asserting its great influence over North
Korea." Given the lack of concrete evidence due to the
discreet nature of the foreign policymaking process in
both North Korea and China, being more assertive than
that is risky.
With all due respect to the
discreet nature of the bilateral relationship between
China and North Korea, in what ways can one possibly
make an objective assessment on the validity of
Beijing's leverage over Pyongyang? In other words, what
sources of information can one rely on in analyzing the
question of Chinese influence on the outcomes of North
Korean foreign policy and behavior? This article
attempts to draw an inference from the facts available
from open resources. Facts from open resources would
exclude rumors, allegations, and even analytical
speculations, but include those readily available in the
context of written historical documents of the relations
between the two states. This article will allow those
speculations based on the analysis of these written
historical facts to assert its intention of the purpose.
Thus, it will first analyze the relationship of the two
states in the historical context so as to assess whether
China is in a position to leverage the political
consequences of North Korea's behavior. Such a study
would naturally need to focus on a negative view of the
relationship.
Based on these findings, this
article will try to prove the case with a primitive
literature survey of the number of works published in
the 1990s by Chinese scholars and academics studying
North Korea itself and the bilateral relationship. It
posits that a state's interest on a subject may have a
correlation with a number of works by
governmental-affiliated institutions. Since research
institutions in China are all government-controlled,
they are under heavy scrutiny and control of the state
to serve the legitimacy of the government and
leadership. Their work, therefore, tends to reflect the
nation's perceived interest. Furthermore, their findings
are also often taken into account as a first-hand source
of information in China's policy decision-making
process. Under the circumstances, these works may be a
legitimate indicator of the degree of interest. In a
state where public speeches, writings and the media are
under state control, the national agenda tends to sway
the focus of research, as a nation has a monopoly on the
guidelines and principles for academic work.
To
substantiate these findings in China's practice of
foreign policy toward North Korea, this article will
make an overall assessment on China's belief and
principles on the nuclear issue. In general, China has a
long tradition of abiding by its belief and principles
when it comes to foreign policy and behavior, especially
when a problem directly connected to its national
interests or ally arises. With respect to such a policy
in practice, this article will further attempt to find
rationale behind its reluctance to engage itself in the
crisis. In conclusion, it will describe the possible
dilemma in which China may find itself if it fails to
reckon with the immediate need to assume the mediating
role in the crisis. Furthermore, it will try to explain
the best possible means available for China to avoid
such a dilemma while not losing face for itself or North
Korea.
Weak grounds for
leverage
Indeed, the bilateral relationship
between China and North Korea may well be described as
the relationship between lips and teeth. They fought
together under the same flag of communism and
anti-imperialism against the United States during the
Korean War in the early 1950s. Until 1958, when Chinese
military forces that were stationed in North Korea to
guarantee the security of its ally's safety against the
US military presence in the South, the two nations did
not foresee the impending end of their brotherhood. They
did not expect their relationship to evolve around their
involvement with the superpowers next door, namely the
Soviet Union and the United States.
This was
particularly so with China's changing profile in the
context of international security at the regional level
of East Asia. China, geographically a bigger state with
a bigger vulnerability to international security
threats, underwent a series of adjustments for
national-security reasons in its relations with the two
superpowers. Alone in the socialist camp, North Korea
exploited the negative development between the Soviet
Union and China to its advantage in retrieving political
support and economic assistance. Since the end of the
Cold War, coupled with the demise of the Soviet Union,
North Korea's foreign relations began to shift toward
the United States.
China and North Korea began
to witness a crack in their relationship as that between
the Soviet Union and China deteriorated in the late
1950s. With its forces stationed in North Korea, China
provided a grant of 8 trillion yuan from 1954-57 to
assist North Korea's reconstruction after the war.
However, the Chinese leadership's criticism of the
Soviets became explicit after 1956, when the latter
brutally crushed the Hungarian revolt. China criticized
the Soviet leadership with such terms as "chauvinism"
and "revisionism", implying Soviet violation of
communist doctrine and principles. While the
relationship between the two big communist states
developed a rift, North Korea took advantage of the feud
by employing so-called "equidistant" diplomacy. What
enabled Pyongyang to assert such a position in its
foreign policy was its newly founded juche, a
backbone of its political ideology for independence,
autonomy, and self-reliance. Such practice resulted in
North Korea's winning the Sino-North Korea Friendship
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty and a similar
treaty with the Soviet Union in 1961.
Until
1965, the relationship between China and North Korea
seemed to be in sync, as they were in agreement on
Soviet malpractice over the Sino-Indian border dispute,
the Cuban missile crisis, and Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev's criticism of his predecessor, Josef Stalin.
Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union cut off its
aid to North Korea in 1962, only to resume it when its
relations with China began to deteriorate in 1965. In
the meantime, China and North Korea exchanged high-level
visits with each other in 1963, marking the last
highlight of friendship until 1978, when Hua Guofeng
paid a state visit to North Korea.
After 1963,
however, the bilateral relationship between China and
North Korea began to deteriorate as the leftist mood was
on the rise as a prelude to the Cultural Revolution.
Sino-North Korean relations were worsened as they
engaged in military action for the first time over a
territorial dispute surrounding Mount Baekdu
(Zhangbaishan in Chinese). In 1968, after a couple more
rounds of military clashes, China unilaterally closed
its border with North Korea. Between 1965 and 1969,
there was no exchange of high-ranking officials, nor a
conclusion of a cultural and economic cooperation
agreement between the two. Zhou Enlai was the first
Chinese premier to visit the North in 12 years in 1970.
In 1975, Kim Il-sung followed suit by visiting Beijing
for the first time in 24 years.
When the prelude
to the Cultural Revolution climaxed in 1965, it was the
Soviets' turn to look toward North Korea. It dispatched
high-ranking officials and subsequently concluded
agreements ranging from economic and technology
cooperation to military assistance. In 1967, when the
Cultural Revolution reached its peak in China, so did
the relationship between the Soviet Union and North
Korea, as reflected in their conclusion of a military,
economic and technology assistance agreement. Their
relationship was strengthened as a consequence of the
revolution, in which China was criticized greatly for
its revisionism and personal cult practiced by Chairman
Mao Zedong and his associates.
Another
contributing factor to the improvement of the
Soviet-North Korean relations was China's rapprochement
toward the United States. It was a big blow to China's
relations with North Korea as it eventually led to the
normalization of its relationship with the US in 1979,
undoing Chinese efforts to mend its relations with North
Korea as reflected in Hua Guofeng's state visit in 1978.
China's situation with North Korea did not fare
too well in the '80s, because of China's pursuit of
reform and an open-door policy, despite a number of
reciprocal visits at the highest level. North Korea
viewed China's reform effort as a betrayal to the
communist ideology, maintaining this stance until 1989,
when Kim Il-sung, for the first time, extolled the
achievements of socialist construction in its original
terminology, gaige kaifang. In addition, China's
growing contacts and exchanges with South Korea
undermined North Korea's confidence in its relationship
with China. Its participation in the Asian Games and the
Summer Olympics in 1986 and 1988, respectively, both
held in Seoul, was seen as an act of a betrayal to North
Korea. Furthermore, as an attempt to disrupt the two
events, North Korea committed sabotage only to lose face
as China joined the international community to mourn the
tragedies.
Only a year after having seen the
successful conclusion of the Summer Olympics hosted by
Seoul, North Korea had to witness another big blow to
its belief in the superiority of communism, as the
Berlin Wall tumbled down, marking the end of the Cold
War. As a result, the once seemingly invincible Soviet
Union met its demise. Only a few years later, it
witnessed the biggest remaining communist state come to
a normalization of relations with states that it had not
recognized before, such as Singapore, Israel, Indonesia,
Brunei, and South Korea. In 1993, North Korea handed out
its nuclear card to its neighbors as if to express its
dissatisfaction with the international developments
surrounding it. China's immediate reaction to the crisis
proved that it did not like the way North Korea played
its cards as it declared its support for the
de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to the
world's economic sanction. In the midst of all these
developments, including another deterioration in the
relations between China and North Korea, the latter lost
its leader Kim Il-sung, and the former did not send an
appropriate delegation to express its condolences.
After the three-year period of mourning, Kim
Jong-il finally emerged at the top of the leadership and
activated its efforts first to amend North Korea's
relations with its traditional ally, China. His
intention was substantially proved by his official visit
to Beijing in May 2000 and another to Shanghai in
January 2002. Despite his benign intention and
subsequent confirmation of "lips and teeth" relations
with China, however, Kim Jong-il was snubbed by China
after his nomination of a Chinese-Dutchman, Yang Bin, to
head the special administrative zone of Shinuiju.
Chinese authorities arrested Yang on charges of tax
evasion and other economic crimes a few weeks later.
Consequently, the bilateral relationship between China
and North Korea remains in a stalemate, despite
Pyongyang's revelation of its nuclear development
program, which may well have an impact on China's
foremost national interest, the stable and peaceful
international environment surrounding it.
Next: Sorry, not interested
Jaewoo Choo, PhD, is research fellow,
Trade Research Institute, Korea International Trade
Association.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
