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A
QUESTION OF LEVERAGE
Part 3: A matter of
principle
By Jaewoo Choo
Part 1: China's role in the Korea crisis
Part 2: Sorry, not interested
SEOUL
- At the onset of the People's Republic of China in
October 1949, the country proclaimed the fundamental
diplomatic principles that would guide its foreign
behavior and diplomatic practice in the future. These
"Five Principles of Co-Existence" remain in effect to
this day. According to the Chinese leadership and
intellectuals, what makes them effective is the fact
that they were based on historical and revolutionary
experiences during losing struggles that lasted for a
century, from the first Opium War until the foundation
of the new China in 1949. Among those five principles,
one stands out in China's fundamental position on the
current nuclear crisis as well as on its relations with
North Korea. That is, "Respect another's sovereignty and
do not intervene in another's domestic political
affairs."
The principle of respecting a state's
sovereignty over its domestic political affairs is more
than a theory. There are numerous cases that illustrate
the consistency with which China has adhered to this
belief in practice. The very first one came in the wake
of the US intervention in the Korean War in 1950. That
case illustrated that China, if a third party intervened
in a state's domestic affairs, and if this action were
to present a threat to China's national interests, would
not restrict itself from any and all possible kinds of
retaliation or counteraction. Thus far, the principle
still stands valid in China's diplomacy. It still
opposes states intervening in any other state's domestic
political affairs, regardless of the cause or reasons.
Even if the intervening party's action is for
humanitarian reasons or has benign intentions, such as
to restore order and peace, China still opposes it if
what it regards as proper procedures are ignored. China
only supports such an action if the cause is taken to
the international community, including such
organizations as the United Nations.
China's
justification and rationale behind its belief in the
non-intervention principle are deeply rooted in its
historical lessons from its struggle to achieve what it
is now. For long, it has been an advocate of the rights
of a country to decide its guiding philosophy. It bases
its argument on the case in which a state has the right
to choose and decide its own course of development in
accordance with the circumstances and surroundings. Once
a state selects a course, others have the obligation to
respect its decision and therefore will have to show
respect based on equality. In return, it advocates, one
will be respected by others. Otherwise, confrontation
will be inevitable, as was proved during the Cold War
period. It is a result of this firm belief that China to
this day keeps practicing non-intervention principles,
regardless of the other state's size, economic and
political strength, ideology, etc. Furthermore, what
precipitates this principle is China's firm opposition
to imposing one's values and ideology upon others. Such
action has, especially in China's case, prompted an
immediate strain in its relationship with states who see
things differently. This is clearly reflected in its
relations with the United States in recent times and
with the former Soviet Union in the late 1950s and early
'60s.
China, therefore, has rarely exerted any
form of diplomatic influence or pressure on those states
under the criticism of the international community for
irrational and unreasonable behavior. Instead, it has
its own principles in dealing with those states that
generate much concern about the stability and peace of
the world. These principles to which China tends to
adhere in managing an international crisis involving a
third nation can be drawn from empirical observation of
Chinese diplomacy.
First, China would not take
any kind of action to engage itself physically in the
process of resolving the third nation's problem, whether
it has international repercussions or is limited within
the boundary of one's territory. It would express its
concern in the name of world peace and the public good
by issuing an official statement.
Second, it
would incessantly repeat that the parties involved in
the crisis should find a solution by themselves. No
matter how long it would take until the problem is
solved, China would repetitively emphasize the same view
of the way the crisis should be handled. It might flinch
a bit if there were a change in the direction of the
course of the crisis. However, one thing very worthy of
note is China's strong adherence to the principle of
"only those directly concerned are eligible to take an
appropriate and proper action to resolve the crisis in
which they are involved".
Third, if the crisis
requires a third party's help, China would always point
its finger to an international organization, such as the
United Nations. It has a strong belief, for instance,
that the UN is the sole legitimate third party that has
the authority to bring an international crisis for
solution, if required. It also regards the UN as the
best possible source of means for solving an
international crisis in a peaceful manner.
Nevertheless, China's record as a permanent
member of the UN Security Council does not correlate
with its belief and words. If the circumstantial
constraints such as ideology and political settings were
meaningful excuses for China's controversial voting
behavior during the Cold War, it is no longer so in the
post-Cold War era. China, however, still shows
irrational and sometimes unreasonable behavior in its
votes at the United Nations. When the North Korean
nuclear-arms crisis, for instance, was brought to
discussion to decide whether it should be referred to
the UN, all necessary and possible terms for a
resolution were also subsequently discussed. During the
entire course of the discussion, China remained
unyielding in its opposition to economic sanctions
against North Korea and submitting the issue to the
Security Council. At the same time, it reaffirmed its
unwillingness to play a mediating role with regard to
the North Korean nuclear issue.
Conclusion
The North Korea nuclear
crisis is certainly an international problem, where the
security interests of many states are at stake.
Conventional wisdom claims that a road to a peaceful
solution requires tremendous international and
diplomatic cooperation. While several types of
multilateral ways of approach to a peaceful solution
have been suggested by the concerned states with due
respect to their national profile and interests,
however, efforts to seek cooperation at the bilateral
level are concurrently being pursued. Along the course
of this effort, China, because of its traditionally
close relations and others' assumptions about its
leverage, has faced demands for active engagement with
North Korea. To the dismay of the US and other concerned
states, China has thus far expressed unwillingness to
employ any kind of leverage over North Korea.
China's passive and seemingly indifferent
posture has left many bewildered, wondering about the
validity of its leverage status. In addition, many
observers have begun to cast doubt on China's relations
with North Korea. Such suspicion naturally leads one to
ask what is keeping China from engaging itself with
North Korea on the issue. Why is it that China cannot
dare to make an initiative on the nuclear problem? Why
is it not even being consulted by North Korea on the
matter? Why can it not offer a hand to Pyongyang? What
makes it so uncomfortable with its relations with North
Korea?
Historically, as examined and reviewed
above, the history of the relationship between China and
North Korea has been marked more by political anxiety
and difficulties than by friendship and feelings of
closeness. In other words, there were more bad times
than good times in their relationship. During the past
54 years, it seems that there were more times filled
with a feeling of disparity, anxiety, uneasiness and
betrayal. Exchanges of high-level officials were cut off
between 1963 and 1978, aside from unofficial visits such
as Zhou Enlai's in 1971. From 1982-92, it was North
Korea that sent a delegation and high-ranking officials
to China on 85 different occasions, while China only
reciprocated 14 times (Chen, Wang, 2002: 307). Military
shootouts between the two took place on at least three
occasions in the '60s. Since the inception of its own
communist ideology in 1955, North Korea did not regard
China as its political patron, instead adopting and
practicing equidistant diplomacy with the Soviet Union.
These feelings of mistrust may also have
developed out of the two countries' perception of each
other as a consequence of their respective domestic
development. While China was undergoing the Cultural
Revolution for 10 years, experiencing economic hardship,
North Korea was relatively well off, its gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita reaching in the range of
US$1,200-$1,900 in 1978. After China took off
economically with its open-door policy, the economic
cycle in North Korean began to spiral in the opposite
direction, reaching its nadir in the early '90s. North
Korea now is the biggest beneficiary of China's economic
assistance and aid, with food and energy standing at 90
percent and 70 percent respectively, according to
estimates. Under the circumstances, many believe that
cutting off all this economic aid would have an
influence on North Korea's behavior. But would it?
Immediate economic sanction by China against
North Korea would have the leverage effect on North
Korea's behavior that the international diplomatic
community would like to see. However, it might also
generate undesirable side-effects: exodus of North
Korean refugees into China, Japan, and South Korea
because of economic hardship, and the collapse of the
Kim Jong-il regime. Against this potential chaos, many
observers of China affairs, including the Chinese
themselves, have run their computers and concluded that
it would be of much greater advantage and benefit for
China to keep holding the supporting line for North
Korea. In addition, survival of North Korea would
maintain a buffer function to China's national-security
interests in Northeast Asia.
With all these
calculations taken into account, China has decided to
join those who support solving the case through a
multinational cooperation effort. Its decision is not
out of sheer desire to prolong the life of North Korea
and its mission as a buffer against the United States.
It is based on its firm and unyielding belief that only
international organizations such as the United Nations
have the right, authority, justification and legitimacy
to intervene in and solve international crises. It also
understands that it can play a much bigger role in the
North Korean nuclear crisis if it were to participate in
such an organization, as it knows that multinational
cooperation is incomplete and ineffective without its
participation.
Although the record of its
behavior and voting might not support China's claim to
status in the international effort, however, China voted
on February 13 at the International Atomic Energy Agency
council meeting to agree to submit the North Korean
nuclear case to the Security Council. This may have been
a prelude to China's decision to pursue daguo
waijiao (big-state diplomacy), by which it will have
to assume more responsibility and leadership in its
diplomatic practice and in world affairs.
References
Choo, Jaewoo,
(1994), Bashi niandai zhongguo
duichaoxianbandaozhengcede yanbian yu fazhande
chutan ("Changes and Developments in China's Policy
Towards the Korean Peninsula in the '80s") (Beijing:
Peking University MA Thesis)
Chen Fengjun and Wang
Zhuanjian (eds) (2002), Yataidaguo yu Chaoxian
bandao (Asian-Pacific Major Powers and Korean
Peninsula) (Beijing: Peking University Press)
Hart,
Tom (2001), "The PRC-DPRK Rapprochement and China's
Dilemma in Korea", Asian Perspective, Vol 25, No 3, pp
247-250
Jin Xide (ed) (2001), Zhongguode dongbeiya
yanjiu ("China's Studies on Northeast Asia")
(Beijing: Shijiechubanshe)
Kim, Yongho (2001), "Forty
Years of the Sino-North Korea Alliance: Beijing's
Declining Credibility and Pyongyang's Bandwagoning with
Washington", Issues & Studies 37, No 2 (March/April
2001), pp 147-176
So, Alvin Y (2001), "South-North
Reconciliation and Prospects for North Korea-China
Relations", Asian Perspective, Vol 25, No 2, pp
49-71
Wang Taiping (1999), Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo waijiaoshi (disanquan: 1970-78)
("Diplomatic History of People's Republic of China", Vol
3: 1970-78) (Beijing: Shijiezhishichunbanshe)
Asia
Times Online
Yonhap News
Jaewoo
Choo, PhD, is research fellow, Trade Research
Institute, Korea International Trade Association.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
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